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ABSTRACT

QUANTITATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESSES IN
CHILDREN
May, 1977

John J. Clement, A.B., Harvard University
Ed.D. , University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor Howard Peelle

Exploratory clinical interviews were conducted with third
and
fourth grade students as they attempted to solve quantitative
story
problems.

Models of individual students' cognitive processes are de-

veloped that account for many of the diverse phenomena observed in
the interview tapes.

Observed phenomena include: acted-out solutions; counting-based
solutions; solutions

via.

a number sentence; immediate solutions; solu-

tions via written symbol algorithms; use of drawings; and spontaneous

activities related to inverse, commutative, associative, and distributive principles.

Although some of the students' solution approaches

seem related to standard methods taught in school, others do not.

Several kinds of intuitive solutions to story problems ordinarily
solved via division or multiplication are reported from students who
have never studied these operations in school.

These solutions involve

practical actions and suggest that the students possess a practical knowledge base which could be tapped as a foundation for learning arithmetic

concepts in school.

The study also examines spontaneous occurrences

of solution approaches that are often referred to as heuristics, such
as:

solving a problem in pieces; using more than one approach to attack

vi

a problem; generating related problems; and using a
convergent trial

and error approach.
Some general features of the models of cognitive processes proposed
to account for these phenomena can be summarized as follows: Piagetian

and neo-Piagetian concepts such as assimilation, disequilibrium, intern-

alized actions, cognitive structures, and parallel structure activity
are utilized in these models and are related to specific instances of

observed behavior.

Other concepts utilized include: competition for

dominance, external and internal assimilation, chaining, and recursion.

Several types of cognitive structures are discussed, including written
symbol algorithm structures, counting-based structures, and practical

action structures.

These last structures organize actions such as shar-

ing objects or cutting an object in half.

A method of diagramming is

used which allows one to model cognitive structure interactions in a
student as they occur in time.

The protocol analyses suggest that these children have knowledge

structures which are active and semi-autonomous in the sense that their

structures aggressively assimilate problem situations, generate related
cases, dominate other structures, drive explanations, and influence per-

ceptions.

Many of the reasoning processes modelled take the form of

governed
structure interactions that are spontaneous rather than being

by established, hierarchical procedures.

Structures are shown interact-

interact in an eco
ing in a manner similar to the way different species
other;
system— conflicting with each other; cooperating with each

and

interacting with the environment.
knowledge structures and reasonIt is suggested that the intuitive

vii

processes discussed can be tapped as starting points for building

mathematical ideas in the classroom.

This approach may help students

develop a knowledge of mathematics that is applicable to real-world
problems as opposed to merely being an isolated set of rules for

manipulating symbols on paper.

)

)
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION AND RELATED RESEARCH

Introduction

One part of current movements toward process-oriented education
is a concern that problem solving skills should be a part of the know-

ledge that each student takes away from school.

Approaches to meeting

this goal at the elementary school level have ranged from open-ended

student design projects (Lomon, 1971), to attempts to suggest specific

heuristics for mathematics problems (Polya,

I9U 8

)

and for problems ex-

pressible in computer languages (Papert, 1972; Peelle, 197M

•

One approach to teaching problem solving that has been with us
for some time is the assignment of story problems (’word problems') in

mathematics (at all grade levels) and in the sciences (at the secondary
and college levels).

Yet teachers often complain that although most of

their students are successful in learning arithmetic algorithms, many
are relatively unsuccessful in applying them in story problems.

The

cause for this seems to be more than a minor instructional difficulty,

and an easy solution has not emerged in classrooms.

It is extremely

difficult to isolate steps in the problem solving process, diagnose
techniques or
the approach students are using, and give them some new
improve
steer them toward problem situations where they are led to

their approach.

about how
In other words, not much is known currently

how to teach them to solve
to teach students to solve story problems or

quantitative problems in real life.

This investigator believes that

state of our knowledge
this situation is a reflection of the primitive

2

of problem solving processes and of our knowledge of intuitive approaches

children use in problem solving.

This belief provided a motive for the

present study.
Issues discussed

.

A major goal of this study is to describe know-

ledge structures and reasoning processes in children that come into play
in the context of solving quantitative story problems.

Because of the

complexity of the phenomena, a clinical study of story problem solving
is a unique challenge, since so many key issues must be investigated to-

gether, such as: the nature of verbal comprehension; the nature of basic

number ideas; the nature of arithmetic ideas, both informal and academic, as they exist in children; the problem of how mathematical know-

ledge is used appropriately in a practical situation; and the more general issue of how internal knowledge structures interact adaptively in

children whose solutions include trial starts, setbacks, and recoveries.
These are some of the issues discussed in the present study.
The protocols included in this study were chosen to carry out two

particular purposes: l) to give the reader a feeling for a 'horizontal'
range of phenomena to be observed in the story problem solving behavior
make a
of children at this age (discussed in Chapter III); and 2) to
'vertical'

cut toward a deeper understanding of the processes involved

where solutions are
in one particular type of problem solving behavior—
in Chapter V).
acted out explicitly using blocks or drawings (discussed

the most potential for for
This last type of solution was judged to have

mathematical understand
mal analysis leading to insights about intuitive
ing.

present protocols that
Thus in Chapter III an attempt is made to

theoretical concepts, and
introduce a wide range of observational and

.

;

:

3

in Chapter V an attempt is made to extend these concepts
and use them

together to explain three particularly transparent protocols at

a deeper

level

Finally , Appendix

F

contains a short study of patterns

in

responses

to oral arithmetic problems that a student solves without using pencil

and paper.

The study shows how

met, hods

used

the analysis of story-

in

problem solutions can bo extended to the domain of arithmetic problems.
An Initial m ode l

If the process of

.

solving story problems

served to fit the following very general model

(called the

Id

is

ob-

nea r Mod el

)

Step a) Recognizing the words in the problem by reading or
listen! ng;
b) Comprehend ng F.he problem situation, thinking about
its relevant aspects;
i

c) Translating the situation

into an appropriate number

sentence
d) Solving the number sentence using arithmetic operations;

— then

it will be steps b) and c)

ine in detail.

that this study will attempt to exam-

In other words., a central

question from which to start

is, "What happens between the time a Btudent begins to comprehend a

problem situation and the time he has set up an appropriate equation to
solve on paper (or in his head)?"

This provides an initial orientation

for the study.
But in fact, this question turns out to be
is based on the assumption that all

ber sentences.

t.oo

narrow, because it

story problems are solved via num-

It will be shown that this

Is

not always the case, and

new questions will have to be proposed and discussed.
question.
did, however, begin the study with the above

The investigator
This illustrates

the fact that when one is engaged in exploratory clinical
research, the

questions asked must often be reframed in terms of the new phenomena

observed and in terms of the new theoretical concepts developed.
Developments in cognitive theory

.

The present study has a sur-

rounding context of developments in cognitive psychology and epistemology.

Jean Piaget’s work has had a profound impact in these areas,

partly because he has shown how very different the child's knowledge
structures and reasoning patterns are from the adult's.

It can be ar-

gued that his theories constitute the beginnings of a new paradigm in
the sense of Kuhn (1962) in the field of cognitive psychology because

they treat knowledge as an active process and because they describe
thought processes in terms of a biological metaphor.
This study draws heavily on the conceptual framework of Piaget.

However, Piaget has been more interested in explaining long-term pat-

terns of cognitive development in children than in explaining cognitive

functioning in detail over short periods of time (as in a 10 to 300
second problem solution).

In the present study Piagetian and neo-

Piagetian concepts will be applied to this second domain, and additional
new theoretical concepts will be constructed as needed.
On another front, a growing number of theorists have embraced a

computational or information processing metaphor for cognition.

This

approach has been stimulated by research in artificial intelligence
techniques.

of proThe present study contributes to the empirical base

tocol data against which such theories can be tested.

Thus, the empir-

behavior included here may
ical observations of human problem solving
of theories origineventually be used by others to test the adequacy

—
5

ating in the field of artificial intelligence for explaining
problem
solving behavior in children.

Characteristics o f the study

.

This study was carried out with

four additional goals in mind that ordinarily are not emphasized in edu-

cational research.

First, an attempt is made to model internal thinking

processes in the child.

Attention will not be restricted to studying

relationships between observable variables; concepts will be introduced

which model unobservable mental processes.

Second, the study is con-

cerned with building qualitative models which can account for qualita-

tive features of behavior rather than testing quantitative hypotheses.
The investigator feels that there are so many phenomena in creative

problem solving behavior of children that lack even a qualitative explanation, that quantitative modelling in this area is premature at
this time.

The third goal is to maintain intimate contact with the

phenomena as the conceptual model is developed.

One wants to keep the

theory from "taking off on its own" away from the reality of the real

behavior of children.

Rather than determining which established ideas

a child has mastered, one wants to describe the ideas of the child

including ideas that lie outside of the realm of 'acceptable' mathematics.

Therefore one always starts with detailed transcripts of taped

they
interviews and one's models are only judged successful inasmuch as

can be shown to fit these protocols in all their detail.

Fourth, one

compatible with deeper
wants the models, if not to explain, at least to be
awareness, unphenomena of cognitive life— problems of consciousness,

spontaniety, and creatderstanding, readiness, purposiveness, surprise,
ivity.

cognitive models which seem
At the very least one wants to avoid

6

to preclude the existence of these phenomena,
and at best one can hope
to add to our appreciation of one or more of them.

Related Clinical Research

In this section clinical studies relevant to story problem
solving

are discussed.

Emphasis is given to studies whose findings are drawn

upon in the current study.

In the final sections of this chapter key

Piagetian and neo-Piagetian concepts are surveyed in order to set the
stage for an attempt in the present study to apply and extend these con-

cepts in the analysis of problem solving protocols.

There has been very little clinical research done in the area of
children’s solutions to mathematical story problems.

However, this

study will draw on research from several partially related areas.

Clinical research on elementary concepts of quantity includes the
classic work by Piaget
the concept of
and seriation.

(

1952a) in which he discusses the development of

number as a synthesis of the ideas of classification
A central experimental finding reported in this work is

that most children below age 6 or

7

do not believe that the number of

objects in a set is conserved when the set is transformed by spreading
or gathering.
In addition to their better known results with conservation and

seriation experiments, it is interesting that the authors were aware
special psycholof (but did not emphasize) another issue - namely, the

ogical status of small numbers:
in the case of small sets- two, three or fourthere is already simultaneous perception of the whole
.

and of the elements.

.

.

Apart from these privileged

7

examples, which give rise to what might be called the
intuitive numbers 1 to 5, numbers that still adhere
to the objects numbered and are perceptual rather than
operational, children at the first stage cannot perform
enumeration and addition one as a function of the other.^

Subsequent studies, discussed in Klahr (197*0 have supported the existence of special or 'intuitive' numbers.

The main experimental find-

ing has been that subjects can recognize very quickly the number of dots

printed on a card in a random pattern when the number of dots is less
than

U or

With more dots than this threshold level, the time taken

to determine the number of dots rises sharply (approximately in propor-

tion to the number of dots).

With small numbers of dots, the time taken

to recognize the number of dots is practically the same as that for a

single dot.

The interpretation given for these findings is that small

groups of objects seem to have a special perceptual status in that
their number is immediately apprehended without the need for counting.

Clinical studies of solutions to numerical arithmetic problems have

been reviewed by Erlwanger

(197*+)-

He finds, however, that these studies

are predominantly nomothetic--that is, aimed at general findings apply-

ing to a certain polulation of children— rather than idiographic— that
particuis, describing the detailed behavior of particular children in

lar situations.

It can be argued that the latter type of study has a

is indigreater potential payoff for applications to instruction that

situations.
vidualized to the needs of particular children in particular
the conceptions
Erlwanger reports on clinical interviews that investigate

written arithmetic
used by Uth, 5th and 6th grade children in solving
1

(New York: W.W. Norton
Jean Piaget, The Child's Conception of Number
and Co., Inc., 1952a), p. 200.

8

problems.

He pays particular attention to their beliefs
about mathe-

matics as a subject and their beliefs about how one learns
mathematics.
The study concerns 6 children in an individualized instruction
program

where worksheet pages were prescribed several times weekly for each
student.

Its findings are disturbing because it shows that the chil-

dren in the program were overly dependent on rules for manipulating pat-

terns of symbols on paper and suggests that there was very little rela-

tionship between these rules for doing paper-and-pencil mathematics in
school and their intuitive ideas about quantities.

Ginsburg (1972, 1975a) discusses the informal analysis of clinical
interviews as a step toward better means of diagnosing students' dif-

ficulties in arithmetic.

Witz and Albert (to appear) discuss several

levels of analysis of a single interview concerning the multiplication
of two rational numbers.

They attempt to model the way in which a sud-

den insight on the part of the subject allows him to given an extended,

effective explanation of a mathematical relationship.

Skemp (1971)

provides an informal and readable theoretical account of the structure of mathematical concepts that he believes are accessible to children.

Driver (1973) develops a method for mapping intuitive conceptions
that 7th graders use to understand simple physical systems such as two

carts pushed apart from each other by a compressed spring.

These 'con-

changes
ception maps' allow Driver to explicitly identify structural

that occurred in several subjects during the school term.

She discusses

encouraged or prefactors in the 'discovery-oriented' classroom that

vented the growth of their ideas.

Some of the most powerful conceptions

9

possessed by the students were of the form 'an increase
in A leads to
an increase (or decrease, as the case may be) in B'

stronger spring leads to faster cart motion.'

quantitative conceptions.

,

for example,

'a

These are called semi-

They can be linked together into complex

conceptual frameworks by which the student understands a complex physical system.

The conceptions are called semi-quantitative because var-

iables that are size-ordered but not metricized are involved (as in,
'more weight means more friction.')

Quantitative conceptions (as in,

'twice the weight means twice the friction') are modeled by assuming

the additional role of a logico-mathematical structure (such as 'linear

proportion').

Thus, Driver documents situations where secondary school

students coordinate mathematical conceptions with intuitive physical

models of real apparatus.

She investigates structural change by dia-

gramming students' conceptual frameworks.
In the area of clinical studies of problem solving that concern

other than pure arithmetic problems, Polya (19^8,

195*+,

1962) provides

studies of heuristics which are not clinical studies proper, but which
do provide extensive hypothetical examples of more advanced problem solv-

ing techniques.

These include heuristics such as working backwards, gen-

erating related problems and analogies, breaking a problem into subproblems, use of recursion, and drawing a figure.

Wickelgren (197*0

gives a very reasonable account of these heuristics, written from the
point of view of a researcher in the field of artificial intelligence.
hern
Innovative education approaches dealing with problem solving

-

to program comistics have been developed in the context of learning

puters by Papert

(

1972a, 1972b) and Peelle (197*0.

Davis

(

1975a, 1975b)

10

provides an analysis of an extended tutoring session with a
7th grade

algebra student and discusses factors which influence the use or
non-use
of problem solving heuristics.

Information processing theories of intelligence have recently

played an increasingly prominent role in cognitive psychology.

In this

approach certain kinds of knowledge units are thought of as procedures,

which accept symbolic input data and control responses that vary according to the input.

The procedure concept serves to move one toward

thinking of knowledge as a process and away from thinking of knowledge
as a collection of static facts.

In addition, certain information pro-

cessing models such as Winograd (1972), Arbib (1975), and Minsky (1975)
have provided interpretations for the role of context in recognition
processes.

In these interpretations the recognition of an object or

of a word is not equivalent to the simple input of a stimulus.

Rather,

higher level processes activated by previous events actively tune the
lower level perceptual processes to be sensitive to likely upcoming
events.

As will be seen later on, Piaget's concept of assimilation en-

tails a similar notion.

Newell and Simon (1972) propose a theory of adult human problem

solving based on an information processing approach.

This theory

assumes that the problem solver works with conceptions of an initial
possible
state of affairs, a goal state or success condition, a set of
change
intermediate states, and a set of operators or ’moves' which can

the situation

from state to state.

Given a knowledge of this state

activity can be despace and set of operators, the problem solving
takes one from the
scribed as a search for a chain of operators that

11

initial state to the goal state.

This approach has been described for-

mally as an artificial intelligence technique by Nilsson
(1971).
Newell and Simon wrote computer programs to simulate the protocol

behavior of university students solving problems in logic proofs, chess,
and arithmetic puzzles called cryptarithmetic

.

Their models of thought

processes emphasize a subject’s deliberate, rational decisions made on
the basis of analyses of ends and means.

Their study shares with the present one the characteristic of
"analysis by synthesis"

-

that is, that protocols are analyzed by

attempting to synthesize a model that can account for the behavior.
However, in their model knowledge takes the form of procedures and
static, symbolic logical expressions which are retrieved from storage

and manipulated.
In contrast, the present study focuses on 3rd and

U

th grade chil-

dren; a biologically oriented model is used in which knowledge takes

the form of semi-autonomous, activatable, cognitive structures which
can compete and cooperate as they remain active in parallel through time
and which can control and anticipate the effect of the subject's actions.

This approach allows one to model the less rational and more

spontaneous thought processes of younger children.
Paige and Simon (1972) propose an information processing model for

cognition during story problem solving in secondary and college students.
beThey claim that the model accounts for portions of the students'
the use
haviors, but note that it cannot account for behavior such as

of diagrams.

given
This model is based on data from students who were

equation (or set of
a story problem and asked to write an algebraic

.

:
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equations) for it.

Unfortunately, because they limited the students to

this method, they do not discuss other spontaneous processes the
stu-

dents may have used.
In summary, there has been very little clinical research on chil-

dren solving mathematical story problems, but clinical research in re-

lated areas suggests that such studies might be very valuable.

Re-

search on early number concepts indicates that number is not an innate

idea but that it must be constructed gradually from active experience.

Very small numbers, however, seem to have a special psychological status.
A key study of children’s approaches to written arithmetic problems by

Erlwanger (197^

)

exposes the disturbing extent to which children can

develop elaborate symbol manipulation techniques without grasping an

underlying foundation of intuitive mathematical concepts.

But

more work is needed to investigate the nature of intuitive mathematical
understanding.

As Ginsburg puts it:

..we begin with these assumptions:
-We know little about children's understanding of
academic mathematics.
-We need to construct a cognitive theory of children's mathematical understanding.
-This must be done in an exploratory way.
-Two methods likely to be of use for this kind of
research are naturalistic observation and the
clinical interview. 2

Ginsburg also believes that informal as well as academic conceptions
need to be investigated in the same way.
problem solving
In this context a detailed clinical study of story
to research.
appears to have potential for making a contribution

and Part I,
^Herbert Ginsburg, "The Case of Peter: Introduction
(Winter, 1972
Journal of Children's Mathematical Behavior 2:1

1

p.

6U

A
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major goal in teaching mathematics is to foster
competency in practical
applications.

In asking a child to apply his knowledge
of mathematics

in a practical context, one suspects that the child
may need to use

his intuitive knowledge of mathematical relationships
more than he

might in standard arithmetic problems.

The study of story problem

solutions, then, may give one a better understanding of intuitive know-

ledge structures that are more fundamental than expedient rules for

manipulating written symbols in arithmetic.

Key Piagetian Concepts

The present work will draw on some of Piaget's theoretical constructs and extend others to explain sections of problem solving protocols in detail.

In this section several key concepts from Piaget's

theory will be reviewed briefly, including the concepts of a biological

model for cognition, patterns in play, cognitive structure, assimilation,
accommodation, disequilibrium, action-oriented knowledge, internalized
action, and the symbolic or semiotic function.

Certain neo-Piagetian

concepts from other researchers will also be discussed.
A biological model for cognition

.

Pi

aget was trained as a biol-

ogist, and his theory of cognitive functioning is linked to several

biological concepts.

Mental processes are thought by Piaget to obey

the same fundamental laws of organization as other life processes, such
as laws of adaptation and the maintenance of equilibrium:

"In short,

extends bioat its point of departure, intellectual organization merely

logical organization.

It does not only consist-as accepted by a reflex-

an ensemble
ology entirely impregnated with empirical associationism-in

of responses mechanically determined by external
stimuli and in a corre-

lative ensemble of conductions connecting the new stimuli
with old responses.

On the contrary, it constitutes a real activity, based
upon an

appropriate structure and assimilating to the latter a growing number
of
external objects."

Two basic complementary topics of study in biology

the. structures and functions of the organism.

Correspondingly, Piaget

studies the structures and functions of the mind.
In studying cognitive structures one studies their form - one tries

to describe different 'species'

of stable ideas.

One aims for the goal

of compiling a general catalogue of the most important kinds of knowledge structures that people possess, for example:

Piaget's studies of

knowledge structures (schemes) in infants beginning with the grasping
and sucking reflexes and progressing to the general notions of space,
time, objects and causality, studies of knowledge about different physical phenomena of all kinds at all ages; studies of moral concepts;
etc.

There are 'families'

(my use of a biological term) of ideas with

different general forms at different ages, and these are catalogued.
In studying mental functioning

,

on the other hand, the goal is to

construct a theory of how the structures work

-

the world and with each other and how they grow.

how they interact with
In developing a theory

capable of modelling cognitive processes during story problem solving
we will find it necessary to describe both the individual structures

that become involved and the ways in which the structures function together.
->5

—
Jean Piaget, The Origins of Intelligence rn Children
Norton, 1952), p. ^09-

,

(New York, W. W.
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When one says that Piaget's theoretical model
is a biological model
one means not only that his training was in biology
but also that the

fundamental units of his model are actually given life-like
properties.
For example, the concept of assimilation is a biological
one referring
to the way that living organisms absorb nutrients from the
environment

and put- them to use.

The way in which they put them to use is one that

actually transforms the absorbed elements.

The cognitive assimilation

concept emphasizes the idea that sensory input is transformed as it is

interpreted by the structures inside the organism.

This biological meta-

phor contrasts with a view of naive empiricism according to which items

of information are received and stored away intact.

It says that one

only really pays attention to information that resonates with some kind
of knowledge one already has; otherwise, it can go in one ear and out
the other, so to speak.

Similarly, with an animal absorbing nutrients,

unless there is a structure (in the form of an organ) within the animal
that can put a nutrient to use and built it into the body in some way,

then that substance will simply pass through the body and not affect it.
Also, biological assimilation is a process that organisms enter into

aggressively during feeding.

Cognitive assimilation is at times seen

as an aggressive activity of cognitive structures in the theory

— for

example, when an infant's scheme for grasping seeks out new objects to

apply itself to.

So one can see how the biological concepts in Piaget's

theory tend to assign life-like properties to cognitive structures.
Patterns in play and the origins of knowledge

.

Piaget's theory

detailed obseivations
is in part a product of an interaction between his
biology.
of infants and his knowledge of fundamental concepts in

Piaget
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(

1952 b) became fascinated with the strong tendency of infants
to explore

and play and 'get into' things around them.

Yet he found that these in-

teractions with objects were not random in character but were
often
simple movements the baby already knew how to do such as sucking
and
grasping.

He observed that infants would attempt to apply these simple

actions to an object within a certain range of sizes.

Certain aspects

of these movements are always the same even for different objects

kind of movement constitutes a stable behavior pattern.

— each

So a fundamental

question is, what is the source of these consistent patterns in the behavior of an infant?

Piaget proposed that there must be a stable, in-

ternal, mental structure (or scheme ) which organizes and controls a

movement like grasping or sucking, and which is responsible for the observed pattern in behavior.

Basically Piaget was saying that there are patterns in infant play.
The patterns are simple, but very significant.

He accounts for the pat-

terns by postulating the existence of internal cognitive structures.

Piaget also discovered that the infant's activity patterns change grad-

ually over time.
varied.

They become more elaborate and more skillful and more

So a second question is, what is the source of the changes?

The new patterns are too unfamiliar to be copied from adult actions, so
they must either be innate reflexes that mature and emerge as the infant grows older, or they must be invented by the infant.

Piaget's

beautiful observations show that these new patterns appear to evolve
and
gradually from the modification and combination of old patterns
in the environthat this happens as the child interacts with objects

ment.

earliei
This means that any scheme can be traced back through
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ones to the earliest schemes of grasping and
sucking reflexes.

Thus

Piaget presents the view that all intelligence
evolves from incredibly
simple schemes that are present at birth.

Sensory-motor schemes con-

structed during play are seen as building blocks out of
which all of
a person’s subsequent knowledge structures are built.

This changes

our view of play from that of a random peripheral activity to one
of
the "serious business of childhood."

Philosophically then, Piaget's theory takes an intermediate position on the nature/nurture issue.

On the one hand, nature endows us

with original ideas present at birth in the form of extremely elemeni

tary action structures, and the construction of new structures is constrained within certain limits by maturational factors.

On the other

hand new knowledge structures evolve from old structures only as they
are nurtured during their application to objects in the environment.

Thus both innate and environmental factors play a role, in development.

Structures

.

For Piaget an individual's knowledge consists of his

available cognitive structures

.

These are the mental units by which we

organize our experience and by which we control organized actions.

In-

stead of starting from the internal symbol as the unit of knowledge,
this model takes internal processes which coordinate actions as its

point of departure.

The coherent units of action that we see in the

intelligent functioning of an individual are assumed to be underlain
by stable patterns of activity in the mind called

c ognitive

structures

.

Structures then play a central regulatory role in monitoring the flow
its progress.
of an action in response to continuous feedback concerning

effects of
They can also play a predictive role by anticipating the

.

.
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actions

A ssimilation

.

When a structure focuses the organism on a certain

object or event or situation in the environment and
provides an inter-

pretation for that object or event, one says that the
structure assimilates that aspect of the environment.

We interpret the things around

us by assimilating them to various structures.

We comprehend something

outside of us only when a structure inside of us assimilates it.

Piaget

uses the infant's act of grasping objects to illustrate the concept of

assimilation

— the

grasping structure (scheme) assimilates various ob-

jects like a bottle or a rattle or a ball when it is active.

Thus for

the child, these objects can be treated as equivalent, as if they be-

longed to a kind of functional category

— 'graspable

things.'

In this

view then, two entities are functionally equivalent when they are assimilated by the same structure.

Several kinds of autonomy on the part of

the internal structure are implied: if a first attempt at grasping a
spoon is missed, the structure will 'try again', and after a success

the structure may seek out another object to grasp.

A structure ac-

tively seeks to relate to aspects of the environment that provide a
context for its functioning.

Thus, we refer to the act of assimilation

rather than to a passive reception of information from the environment.

Accommodation and disequilibrium

.

In the short run then, we have

a set of stable structures through which we act on and understand the

world around us.

But in the long run, our views change; structures

become modified with experience through the process of accommodation

Accommodation is the process via which mental structures themselves
change and grow.

Accommodation is especially likely during periods
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d isequilibrium

periods when mental structures are in conflict
with

sensory input or with one another.

This can occur when something unex-

pected happens to us, or when we realize that two of our
own ideas are
incompatible.

In these cases, accommodation takes place as mental
struc-

tures are modified so that they are no longer in conflict.
One can speak of accommodation occurring at several different

levels according to how lasting and how deep the structural change is.
At the shallowest level one can say that every assimilation is accom-

panied by an accommodation reflecting the way in which the structure
must adapt slightly to specifics of the current situation.

One can

speak of minor changes in cognitive structures at a second level and

major structural changes at a third.

A minor structural change would

involve a small modification or addition to an existing structure.

A

major structure change would involve a significant modification of a
structure, or the combining of existing structures to form a new one.
At a fourth level we find long term changes in the form

and global or-

ganization of many structures (such as the development of the object
concept).

These global changes are ordinarily simply referred to under

the name of cognitive development.
To return to the first level, any situation that a person is in

will be responded to by certain number of active structures that account for the person's awareness of the situation.

Having one's ex-

pectations violated in a situation, for example, can lead to adjustactiments in the form of changes in the current profile of structure
them.
vity and changes in the current assimilation relations between

the situation.
One can then say that the profile adapts to changes in
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Often we refer to this kind of adaptation as reasoning.

Rut there are

not always significant lasting changes in the component
structures themselves.

In this study these temporary changes will not be
referred to

as accommodation.

The term accommodation will be used only for the two

middle levels discussed above.

will

The description of reasoning adaptations

^ central topic of discussion in this study.

The issue of

whether accommodation in the sense of significant lasting structural
change is involved in these adaptations is beyond the scope of this
study.

Thus, the strategy is to first try to understand the adaptivity

of structures which can assimilate and cooperate in a variety of ways

without much structural change.

One then hopes that this understand-

ing can eventually be used as a foundation from which to attack the

problem of structural learning.

Action-oriented knowledge

.

Piaget emphasizes the role of action-

oriented knowledge as the most powerful and fundamental form of knowledge.

The knowledge of how one can change things is seen as more

powerful and fundamental than the knowledge of how things are.

When

one thinks of any type of knowing, one tries to think of it as an in-

ternal activity or process, not as an object-like 'piece of knowledge.'
Piaget takes action-organizing structures rather than symbols as the

fundamental components of knowledge.
With regard to the view of sensory-motor schemes as the most ele-

mentary building blocks of knowledge, the term sensory-motor implies
an integration between motor output and perception.

An action is thought

of both muscle
of as a unified whole that involves the coordination

movements and perceptual feedback.

Thus, the relationship between in

—
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ternal structures and the environment is thought
of as a proprioceptive

process involving perceptual and motor processes that
function simultaneously.

Internalized action

.

Cognition that takes place without exterior

actions develops only gradually, according to Piaget.
of life most thought is expressed as action

— thinking

ually action structures begin to be internalized

In the first year
is_

acting.

Grad-

it is no longer al-

ways necessary for a structure to function by interacting directly with
the environment.

Instead, a structure can function without the pres-

ence of the external situation it would ordinarily assimilate.

Thus,

the emphasis on thought as action is maintained while accounting for a

gradual transition from sensory -motor to more mature stages of thought.
The symbolic or semiotic function

.

The symbolic function emerges

only in later infancy after prerequisite action structures have been developed.

Piaget (1969) discusses five types of symbolic functioning in

the order of their appearance developmentally

:

deferred imitation, sym-

bolic or pretend play, drawing, mental imagery, and verbal evocation.
Thus a great deal of symbolic activity based on sensory motor intelli-

gence goes on before and during the emergence of evocative language.

These forms all share the property that an idea is evoked (a structure
is activated) by something that replaces or 'stands for' the real ob-

ject or situation that the idea (structure) ordinarily responds to.

Too

often we restrict ourselves to thinking of symbols as static objects.
symbols.
but the Piaget emphasizes the fact that actions are the first

children don't just
A final point emphasized by Piaget is the fact that
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acquire the use of symbols from adults, they spend a
large amount of
time constructing private symbols of their own.

Neo-Piagetian Research

Witz and Easley

(

197 5 ) provide an overview of their recent program

of research on children's thought processes.

Their work is character-

ized by its concern with:
1.

detailed micro-analysis of children's ideas from tape recorded interviews;

2.

diagramming techniques for clearly representing cognitive
structure complexes;

3.

extensions of Piaget's basic theoretical constructs including a generalized notion of cognitive structure, dynamic (time

varying) properties of various types of structures, and con-

ceptions of the semi-autonomous activity of structures oper-

ating in parallel;
U.

development of a methodology for structural analysis to
insure that:
a.

theories of cognitive functioning are held accountable to protocol data;

b.

the theorist is encouraged in the difficult process

of going beyond his or her own preconceptions.

Easley and Witz have reacted vigorously against the tendency to
interpret children's thinking in terms of established concepts.

In-

when trying
stead, they encourage an "anything is possible" attitude

to discern the nature of a child's (or adult's) ideas.

They are less
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interested in the question, "What adult concepts or concepts
from the
school curriculum does this child understand?", and more
interested in
the question, "What intuitive conceptions of his own has this child
con-

structed in his interactions with the environment?"

They assume that

the child may have conceptions that are completely foreign to the adult
experience.

Microanalysis

.

Whereas Piaget has been concerned primarily with

identifying broad categories of structures and forms of reasoning in the
child, Easley and Witz have in addition been concerned with the identi-

fication of specific knowledge structures that children use in partic-

ular situations.

Thus when Piaget studies children working with a par-

ticular piece of apparatus, say, a pendulum, he will work toward describing gross (major) stages in the structures of different children at dif-

ferent ages.

A different approach can be taken by doing deeper analyses

on fewer subjects - paying more attention to the detailed sequence of

behavior in each protocol and trying to formulate a detailed theory of
the way a particular child's structures unfold, come into play and interact during the interview.

We might take the study of the great families

of living things and their branching evolution as a metaphor for the de-

velopmental perspective of Piaget, whereas the microanalysis perspective
of Witz and Easley is more like the study of the behaviors of specific
species within an ecosystem.

The present study was done from the per-

spective of microanalysis.

Microanalysis techniques are used in several studies (Witz, 1973,
plays with a
Knifong, 1971; Witz and Goodwin, 1971) in which the child

hooks on it that can tip
simple hook balance, a beam with evenly spaced

2h

from one side or the other depending on the
configuration of washers

placed on the hooks.

These studies concern

and

5

year olds, and

one of their main features is the extent to which they
expose the pro-

found differences between a child's view of a piece of apparatus
and an

adult's view.

For example, some children do not know that placing a

washer oh one side of an empty balance beam will make that side go down.
Some will actually say that it will go up.

Relatively few children at

this age will display a knowledge of the way one can put washers symme-

trically on the beam to make it balance.
Elementary, action-oriented knowledge structures

.

One of the most

intriguing findings of these studies is that distinct patterns can be

identified in the ways the four-year-old children play with the balance.
These patterns show that although they do not have adult conceptions of
the balance, children at this age do have ideas of their own about the

apparatus.

An example of one conception a child might have of the

balance could be summarized verbally by the statement:

"When you hang

washers anywhere on the beam while holding it, and especially if you
hang the washers near the end of the hooks, then if you let go, they

will crash and fall off!"

Of course, the child is incapable of making

such a complex statement, but as an approximate description of his ideas,
it reflects something this child does many times with the balance in

the course of an interview.

The orientation of the child to the balance

interesting happen
as something one can act on and use to make something
is apparent.

The same child, in a different frame of mind might display

a second view of the balance:

"With or without weights on the hooks,

will bob up and down for
if you touch the end of the beam slightly, it

—

)
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awhile and then stop."

These appear to be extremely simple notions,

but the point is that they describe ideas in the
child that account for

actual patterns of consistently repeated behavior.

And despite their

simplicity, they do represent a basic form of understanding of
the

balance that allows the child to predict and anticipate the results
of

pe rtain actions on it.

They embody a primitive form of if-then relation-

ship, and involve relations between schemes that resemble the

and

'or*

'and'

conjunctions of logic.

We now summarize some specific findings from the

3

works concern-

ing the balance interviews cited earlier:
1.

Patterns in the behavior of 3-5 year olds using the hook-

balance were identified.

These often took the form of an

action (like putting weights on one side of the beam) accom-

panied by anticipatory comment ("It will crash."), followed
by a reaction to the effect ("I told you so.").
2.

These patterns were taken to indicate the presence of cognitive structures in the child called activity elements.

These

structures constitute the child's knowledge of the balance

knowledge of the form:

probably occur."

"If

I

do action A, then effect B will

(Structures of this kind are called 'activity

elements' and can be diagrammed as relational representations,

using the notation [A
3.

—CB

]

•

This is an important step forward because this research iden-

tified the specific form of a type of natural knowledge structure available to young children.

The "Do A then Expect B

pre^
structure is a simple but powerful form of knowledge that

.
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- edes

the adve nt of concrete operations described
by Piaget

as occurring at ages 6-8.
b.

However, as knowledge structures, activity elements
retain
the Piagetian emphasis on action-based knowledge, since
they

represent knowledge about the effects of specific actions.

Their form is therefore closer to a [Chosen Action
Stimulus] association than a [Stimulus

+•

-*•

Expected

Determined Response]

association
5.

An activity element [A

—C B

]

represents a form of knowledge

that can account for intentional, goal -oriented behavior.

If

B becomes a desired effect, then A is a means of achieving the

effect.
6.

Systems of schemes which tend to become active together were

identified in children by Knifong (1971

)

and Witz (1973).

These

groups of schemes form a species of cognitive structure called
a framework

.

A significant characteristic of frameworks is

their ability to dominate the child's thinking over a period

During these periods activity stems from, to put it

of time.

informally, "one way of thinking about the apparatus."

Ques-

tions from the interviewer are also assimilated by (interpreted
in terms of) the currently dominant framework.

one framework

(

point-of-view

)

Shifts from

to another are also identified

over longer periods of time.
The fact that these kinds of organized knowledge structures were

identified in the

^

year olds studied, even though they are very ele-

mentary structures, is important in itself.

For some of Piaget's most
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influential findings have come from experiments which
show striking
gains in knowledge of children as they reach the age
of 6 to 8 years
the emergence of concrete operational structures that
account for data
in the conservation experiments.

These findings unfortunately are ex-

pressed most dramatically as proof that there are some extremely basic
things that children don

*

t

know before

5

or 6 years of age, such as the

conservation of number and continuous quantity, etc.

Unfortunately this

can leave one with the impression that the younger children know very

little and therefore that there are few knowledge structures worth studying at this age.

This is what Seymour Papert (1972) calls
head,

standing Piaget on his

that is, interpreting the conservation tests as showing how

much there is that young children do not know, when in reality they of
course also show the incredible intellectual leaps that children take
on their own during the course of cognitive development.

But research

such as the balance beam interviews succeeds in revealing kinds of know-

ledge that younger children do have, not just the adult ideas that they
lack.

Thus it appears that the 3-5 year old child is certainly not

a "blank slate", but the conceptions of children at this age can be so

different from adult conceptions, that it makes the identification of

natural conceptions an exciting and serious challenge.
Informal vs. formal knowledge

.

This challenge also applies to

the study of mathematical conceptions in older children.

Ginsburg (1975)

informal
reviews research indicating that children possess two systems of

mathematics
mathematical knowledge before they enter school, a natural

system, and a system of counting and related procedures.

This work
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supports the notion that children are far from being
"blank slates"

mathematically when they enter school.

From a Piagetian perspective,

since these pre-school conceptions are what the child will
assimilate

school mathematics to, that is, since the child will try to make
sense

of school mathematics in terms of these conceptions, it becomes allimportant to identify what they are as a guide to pedagogy.

The current

study deals with somewhat older children in the 3rd and Uth grades.

But

it seems unreasonable to assume that the natural processes of knowledge

construction that produced the two informal systems mentioned above

would cease to operate as soon as the child enters school.

On the con-

trary, it is quite possible that students continue to develop mathema-

tical conceptions of their own either independently or in conjunction

with ideas learned in school.

So it will be the task of the current

study to remain as open to new ideas as possible in analyzing the protocols.

One should remain open to the possibility that a student's

mathematical ideas may not conform to adult concepts or concepts presented in the curriculum.

To enable the reader to participate in this
In this way

process, unedited transcripts will always be included.

the reader can attempt to develop alternative interpretations of his

own to account for the protocol data.

Structure activity and parallel processing

.

Another ongoing research

project described in Witz and Easley (1975) is the A— 1 project.

project is also an attempt to analyze patterns in play
using video tapes of a single
of objects.

8

-

This

in this case

month old boy playing with various kinds

the fact
Part of the challenge of this project derives from

that at this pre-conceptual

,

pre-language stage the child's world is
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so completely different from the adult's
that one is virtually attempt-

ing to model the thinking of an alien being.

The researchers model in

excruciating detail the complexes of interconnected
sensory-motor schemes
that are responsible for his simplest play behavior
such as reaching out

and grasping a rattle, or getting an object to put in his mouth.

This

modelling is done at a precise enough mathematical level to specify
the
simulation on a computer of behavior determined by scheme activity.

Thus

the play behavior of this 8 month old child is currently being simulated
on the PLATO IV computer system at the University of Illinois.

A major

aim of the project is to model the way sensory-motor schemes interact
in detail for a particular child and to do this in a way that allows

for the inherent spontaniety in the play.
for observed on the tapes include

:

Phenomena to be accounted

patterns of repeated actions,

attention shifts, resumption of a specific activity after an interruption, organization of action sequences such as dropping an object before trying to pick up another one, anticipations such as the effort

that will be required to pick up a heavy object, and memory of the posi-

tion of recently fixated objects in the room.

A distinctive character-

istic of the A-l model is that various structures function in parallel
in a relatively autonomous manner, as opposed to being part of a strict

hierarchical control structure.

Thus there is a distributed locus of

control in the system.
The model of cognitive functioning used in A-l consists of several

levels of perceptual and action-governing schemes.

A scheme at the

lowest level might control the act of grasping a small object

-

involv-

necessary
ing the simultaneous coordination of a motor action and the
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kinesthetic, tactile, and visual feedback.

A higher level structure

would control the coordinated act of locating an object, reaching
for
it, grasping it, and bringing it to the mouth for sucking.

This higher

level structure does not exist in the newborn infant and must be con-

structed over many months of gradual development.

Lower level struc-

tures can act as the substructures of a higher level structure.

The

higher level structure is then responsible for the organization of the
actions of its substructures in time

-

the actions can either be se-

quenced or coordinated simultaneously as required.
A major conceptual innovation in this model is the notion of the

activity of a cognitive structure.

Structures are said to be active

over a period of time when they enter into controlling the behavior of
the organism or orient to a stimulus in the environment.

Only a small

percentage of existing structures will be active at any given time.
Thus one has a stable collection of dynamic structures that exist con-

tinuously in the child in a dormant state as 'potential-action processes.'
Under certain conditions some subset of these is activated, and once

activated each structure has a built in property causing it to remain
active for a certain period of time on the order of seconds or minutes,

depending on the type of structure.

Once activated, a structure's ac-

tivity will remain high for this period and then die out, unless it
is reactivated.

This characteristic produces some of the same proper-

theories.
ties that a central short term memory area does in other

In-

refers to 'the
stead of referring to 'the data currently in STM,' one
set of structures that are currently active.'

Also, in combination

active state for
with the assimilation concept, the concept of an
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structures provides a theoretical explanation for the fact
that stimuli
are context dependent

,

since a new stimulus tends to be assimilated by

structures that have been recently activated by contextual stimuli.
This theory implies that perception depends not only on the new exter-

nal stimulus, but also on the set of structures that are currently ac-

tive internally.
The simultaneous activity of different structures is necessary

partly to account for the simultaneous coordination of motor actions,
such as moving a held object and tracking it visually at the same time.
But parallel activity allows one to begin to model another effect as

well - the ability to be aware in some sense of a number of aspects or
objects in the environment at the same time and to 'keep track' of them.
This means, for example, that if there is a change in the position of
an object that is not being focused on currently, but that is in the

visual field, then the computer simultation of the child may respond
by looking at the moving object even though it currently engaged in some

other activity.

Thus there is a 'sea' of ongoing internal activity in

the child that interacts with a 'sea' of influences in the environment.

Structures in A-l interact by influencing each other continuously

along a multitude of established links.

In this context

'influence'

means that one structure, when active, may excite or inhibit the ac-

tivity of another structure to which it is linked.

For example, a

higher level structure will excite two of its lower level substructures
produce an
with the correct (perhaps overlapping) timing in order to

effective action.

Structures not directly connected to one another

will sometimes both share a common substructure.

This means that po-

.

:
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tent i ally all of the structures can be linked indirectly in
countless
ways.

If the activity of one structure excites another structure
suf-

ficiently

,

then the second structure will become active.

So, activity

can spread from one part of the system to another spontaneously without

being directly controlled by the subject.

This provides a mechanism

that one can use to begin to account for spontaneous behavior.
Thus, in A-l there is a distribution of initiative throughout the

vase collection of cognitive structures within the organism, at both

higher and lower levels.

This means that structures will often be ac-

tive simultaneously, and makes conflict between active structures possible, leading to the suppression of activity in many of the structures

that could be active in a given situation.

Simultaneous activity makes

possible the cooperative integration of structure activities in time.
These possibilities will be examined later in the context of story

problem solutions.
Later on it will be shown that some of the theoretical conceptions
in the A-l model can be fruitfully adapted to explain mathematical be-

havior in older children.

In conclusion, some key concepts from the

A-l model are
1.

Structures are activated and then stay active for a certain

period of time.
2.

Activity of substructures can be integrated by a higher level
structure in sequential or parallel fashion.

3.

parallel
Different structures can be active simultaneously in

U.

structures
Structures can excite or inhibit activity in other

5.

have a
Structures, although influenced by other structures,

large degree of autonomy
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CHAPTER
METHODOLOGY

In this chapter

,

II
I

a discussion motivating the use of exploratory

clinical interviews for this study will be given

,

followed by a de-

scription of the exploratory clinical method used, the setting, the subjects, and transcript notation.

Studying the Conceptions of the Child

If one subscribes to a "blank slate" model of the learning process,

then one ordinarily subscribes to a view of the educational process as
the attempt to transfer a body of knowledge from the curriculum to the

mind of the student.

The present study begins by assuming that Piaget's

constructionist model of learning is a more valid view.

This model

states that cognitive development is the product of a 'bootstrapping'

process

— that

significant new knowledge is constructed from old know-

ledge as the old knowledge is actively applied by the student to new

situations in the world.

If the teacher's role is to facilitate this

process of knowledge construction, then it becomes crucial for educators
to know something about the forms of knowledge children have and the

ways in which these forms of knowledge interact with each other in different situations.

What a child's forms of knowledge are is always

active role in
an open question because the child is assumed to play an
of this prothe construction of his or her knowledge, and the outcomes

cess are never entirely predictable.
informal knowledge
A major goal of the present study is to describe

structures and reasoning processes in children that come into
play in
the context of solving quantitative problems.

It is interesting to note

that this study would be irrelevant for an educator subscribing to a

blank slate model

— there

the educator only needs to "know his subject"

i.e. the body of knowledge to be transferred to the students.

The stu-

dents' worthwhile knowledge is assumed to be a copy, or partial copy,

of this formal body of knowledge, and therefore no study of alternative
forms of knowledge possessed by the students is required.

In the view

presented here one does not assume that the logical exposition of a certain area of mathematics is identical in form with the knowledge structures children develop in that area.

The child's view may be concrete,

practical, or inconsistent while the view of the discipline is abstract,
logical, and consistent.

So it is assumed here that one cannot describe

a child's knowledge of mathematics by simply circumscribing a subset of

standard topics in arithmetic that the child has mastered.
The goal of studying the child's own conceptions also conflicts

with the practice of claiming to measure children's knowledge by using
tests.

In using tests one ordinarily tries to determine the presence

or absence of some segment of knowledge that has been previously defined.
In an exploratory clinical interview, on the other hand, one tries to

identify the form of the child's own ideas, whether or not they cor-

respond to pre-defined ideas in a curriculum or anywhere else.

In the

the
constructionist point of view one assumes that certain ideas of

child may never have been defined before

.

This view derives from a

and from an
recognition of each individual child's creative potential

construct ideas of
acceptance of the Piagetian position that children
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their own.

The exploratory clinical interview is then a kind of
hunt

both for ideas of the child that are unfamiliar to the investigator
as
well as for those that are familiar.
Much of Piaget's work (especially with pre-school aged children) has
served to expose previously unknown forms of self-constructed ideas in
children.

But the common emphasis in interpretations of his work has

been centered on conservation tests and other kinds of tests where the
typical cognitive structures identified are now familiar.

This emphasis

on testing tends to obscure the exploratory role of the clinical inter-

view in uncovering ideas in children that have not been previously identified.

It also tends to bring one back to the blank-slate assumption

that it is only worthwhile to look for the presence of established aca-

demic ideas or reasoning processes in children.
But this investigator feels that this assumption must be rejected
in order to gain new insights into the nature of intuitive mathematical

conceptions or reasoning processes.

In this kind of exploratory study

when one investigates a child's ideas one tries not to make the prior
assumption that they will conform even to the most basic tenets of es-

tablished mathematics or logic.

Instead, one starts from what the child

says and does in the interview, and tries to remain completely open in

working toward a description of the child's ideas and reasoning processes.
The word "tries" is used here because in one sense the investigator's
solvknowledge of mathematics (and his practical approaches to problem
ing) is his own worst enemy in this endeavor.

It is all too easy for

of assuming that a
the investigator to fall unknowingly into the trap
or less polished
child solving a story problem is using some abbreviated
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version of an idea or a process that the investigator would
use himself.
The problem here is very similar to the anthropologist's
problem
of trying to understand a foreign culture.

As he studies a culture

that is new to him, he must constantly fight to avoid making biased

observations.

He must learn to see social relations in totally differ-

ent ways' from those of his own culture.

He must be extremely open as

an observer and gradually try to get into the point of view of those
in the culture he studies.

In a radically different culture he will

have to construct radically new concepts for himself in order to appreciate the relationships in that culture.

Similarly, in the study of

young children's ideas one must be prepared to construct totally new
concepts in order to be able to see "through the child's eyes."

Although the findings of this study are tied closely to detailed
protocol data, the study was by no means begun in a theoretical vacuum.

Where applicable to phenomena observed on the tapes, the investigator
has drawn on theoretical concepts developed by Piaget and others re-

ferred to in Chapter

1.

In some cases these concepts are extended or

refined, and in other cases new concepts are developed to explain the

observed phenomena.

In addition, many of the identified phenomena them-

selves are new and require new labels.

Thus, new observational con-

cepts are also developed.

The Exploratory Clincial Interview

structuies and
In order to develop models of children's knowledge
were utilproblem solving processes, exploratory clinical interviews
ized.

were given a
In these interviews 3rd and ^th grade students
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story problem to solve and asked to make comments on their
means of

solution both during their work and after reaching an answer.
lems were elementary story problems constructed by the author.

The probIn some

cases the problems were read out loud by the student from a card and in

others the interviewer introduced the problem orally in conversation

with the student.

The students were told that they could use pencil

and paper or any of the objects in a box of manipulative materials (in-

cluding numerous counting cubes of different sizes, people pieces, cuis-

3x5

sinaire rods,

were set.

cards, and assorted scrap materials).

No time limits

When the student made an ambiguous comment or a comment of

interest to the investigator, he would often ask the student to explain
it more fully.

video tape.

Each interview was tape recorded using either audio or

Sections chosen for analysis were then carefully tran-

scribed from the tape.

The interviewer took an active role in encourag-

ing students to comment on their work.

For example, if a student moved

his lips silently while counting a group of objects, the interviewer

would ask him to speak out loud.

The interviews were conducted in a

flexible manner so the interviewer could follow up on interesting ac-

tivities of the students.

The interviewer would often ask a student

what he meant by a particular phrase or would ask him to repeat an ex-

planation he had just given.

At all times the interviewer tried to

or
minimize the problem of suggesting his own ideas to the subject,

transparent in the
having his own interpretation of the problem become

questions put forth.
was something
Talking about the ways in which they solved problems
doing.
that the students were clearly not used to

Correspondingly the
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investigator's role as someone who was interested more in their
solution processes than the correctness of their answers was a role
that
the students became accustomed to only gradually.

After the Amherst in-

terviews, an effort was made in the Urbana interviews to acclimate the
subjects to the presence of the interviewer in the classroom.

A series

of preliminary interviews were held with most of the students in the

classroom centering on informal discussions.

In this way the investi-

gator became more "a part of the scene" to the children in the classroom.
Visits to the classroom were made on two or three mornings per week.

Before problems were given to the child, the children were told
that the investigator was interested in "the different ways that kids
do math problems" and were asked to talk as much as possible about

their ways of doing the problems.
Several questions are kept in mind during such a series of interviews

:

1.

What categories and patterns of behavior can be identified?

2.

What theoretical cognitive concepts can explain such behavior?

3.

What further problems or topics should be pursued with the
child?

inThe fact that these questions are not answered before a series of

terviews begins is a distinguishing characteristic of the exploratory
clinical study.

This means that the investigator does not have the

rigidly controlled
feeling of security provided by the set procedures of

experimental research.

do,
In trying to follow up on what the children

measure of control over the
the investigator must give up a significant

direction of the investigation.

Although larger questions like "What
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spontaneous reasoning processes do children use," and "What is the
nature of intuitive mathematical understanding", serve as a guiding
motive

behind this kind of investigation they are so broad as to be initially
untractable.

One must ask narrower, more precise theoretical questions

in order to make progress.

But given the decision not to limit oneself

to looking for standard academic mathematical concepts in the students,

and given the fact that one is really exploring territory that is largely

uncharted, deciding what are the relevant theoretical questions to ask
about children’s mathematical ideas becomes a real challenge.

Thus the

present study did not start with a well-defined question or set of questions in the form of testable hypotheses.

Key questions about the in-

teraction of internal mathematical structures were not defined beforehand, but arose in response to interesting sections of protocols.

The constraints on the scope of the study arose gradually in re-

sponse to early observations and to the need to find interview topics

where one can begin to get a handle on modelling the phenomena observed.
These considerations led to the following general constraints:
1.

The study was limited to problems ordinarily thought of as

involving discrete whole numbers as opposed to continuous
quantities or fractions.
2.

3rd and Uth grade children were preferred for the study for

theie
several reasons: in the experience of the investigator

explain
are more children at this age who will attempt to
grades;
their solution approach verbally than in 1st and 2nd
still focus
challenging problems can be given at this age that

child that are not
on fundamental arithmetic concepts in the

1*0

too complex to be analyzed; and children at this age,
espec-

ially in 3rd grade, seem to be more spontaneous

— they

exhibit

more natural, less school— oriented forms of mathematical behavior than older children.
It was found that most children were reluctant at first to con-

struct story problems of their own from scratch.

However, they seemed

to enjoy and become more involved in problems where they could contri-

bute some of the details such as the names of the characters or types
of objects being counted.
the use of this technique.

Kathy's protocol in Chapter V illustrates
1

The open-endedness of the tasks and of the theoretical and observa-

tional concepts developed makes the task of reporting findings more difficult.

Many more problems were given than were analyzed in detail and

more were analyzed than can be reported here.

Including initial ex-

ploratory work, approximately hO students from grades

1 to 6

were in-

terviewed in all and approximately 12 hours of video-taped and 38 hours
of audio-taped protocols were collected.

Of these, 25 students were in

the 3rd or Uth grade, and 25 hours of protocol were devoted to solving

story problems, the rest being devoted to arithmetic problems.

The

main criterion used for selecting interviews for analysis was the presof
ence of ample data in the protocol - i.e. enough clues in the form

thought
statements, drawings, or observed actions to begin modelling the

processes underlying the behavior.

This is especially gratifying when

analysis sheds light
the behavior is anomalous or unexpected and the

on how the behavior came about.
1

as a method of introducThis technique appears to have some potential
of their own.
problems
word
ing children gradually to constructing

The protocol analyses included in this report
were then chosen to
carry out two particular puposes of this study

— first,

to give the

reader a feeling for a "horizontal" range of phenomena to
be observed
in the story problem solving behavior of children at this
age (discussed

in Chapter III), and second to make a "vertical" cut toward a
deeper un-

derstanding of the processes involved in one particular type of problem
solving behavior— where the solution is acted out explicitly using

blocks or drawings (discussed in Chapter V).

This last type of solu-

tion was judged to have the most potential for formal analysis leading
to insights about intuitive mathematical understanding.

Thus in Chap-

ter III an attempt is made to present protocols that introduce a wide

range of observational and theoretical concepts, and in Chapter V an
attempt is made to extend these concepts and use them together to explain three particularly transparent protocols at a deeper level.

Analysis of the Protocols

The analysis process takes the form of a repeated cycle of obser-

vation and modelling activity in which the findings are progressively
refined.

Once an interview has been taped, the next step is to make a

detailed transcript of the statements and actions made during the interview.

With the aid of the transcript, the tape is then replayed

several times as the analyst attempts to identify important events in
the protocol.

Note that the analyst is not making profiles.

He does

to
not start from a checklist of pre-defined categories of behavior

look for.

idenHe starts from raw transcripts and tapes and tries to

to the children
tify categories of behavior that appear to be important

.

h2

Some of these categories will be ones the analyst has
used before, but

others will be new.

The categories used to describe the behavior take

shape in response to viewing the protocols.
As behavior patterns are identified in a protocol, the analyst

begins to think about models of the subject's cognitive processes
that can- explain the behavior.

These models may utilize existing

theoretical concepts or, on the other hand, one or more new theoretical concepts may have to be developed.

After a cognitive process

is proposed to explain a segment of an interview, the tape of that seg-

ment is replayed several times in order to evaluate the plausibility of
the explanation and to see whether it is compatible with all of the

aspects observable on the tape.

Often this evaluation process leads to

new observations of detailed behavior that were not made earlier.

These

will in turn suggest revisions in the proposed cognitive process model.
So a cycle of analysis activity is built up leading to a body of theories

and observations which become progressively more refined as the analysis

proceeds
This kind of bootstrapping cycle is very difficult to reflect
in a final written report.

Instead, in this study, observations are

generally reported first, for each protocol, followed by cognitive interpretations.

The reader should not be misled, however, into think-

straightforward
ing that the analysis process itself proceeds in such a

manner.

alternating cycle
On the contrary, the analysis is originally an

of detailed observation and theory construction.

The observations and

the analysis protheories then become progressively more refined as

ceeds

.

The Setting of the Study-

Interviews were conducted with students from an elementary class-

room

3 rd

(

and +th grade combined) in Amherst, Massachusetts from 9/TU
1

to 11 / 7 *+ and from another elementary classroom (3rd and Uth grade com-

bined) in Urbana, Illinois from 5/75 to 6/76.

Protocols of one subject

from Amherst (Roy) are included in this study and all other protocols
are from Urbana students.

Many of the children in the Amherst school

came from families associated with the university community, whereas

children in the Urbana school came primarily from working class families.

In both locations students were on individualized schedules,

so that subjects could be chosen throughout the morning as they worked

without interrupting a group lesson.
all times.

mosphere.

Participation was voluntary at

Every effort was made to do the interviews in a relaxed atAudio taped interviews took place in a semi-enclosed corner

of the classroom, while video taped interviews took place in a separate

room in the same building.

The students typically exhibited some in-

terest in the recording equipment at first, but quickly lost interest
in it and appeared to ignore it.

The Students

The chart on p.

shows the age, position in curriculum and

classteacher’s overall comparison of mathematics performance with

mates for each of the students.

pseudonyms.)

(The names of the students given are

the
The age and position in curriculum given are as of

date of the interview.

was
In choosing subjects the only criterion used

was simply to have a group of
to avoid exceptional students— the goal

. .. .

kb

The Interview Subject

Anna
4th grade
9 yrs.

Teacher's Comparison
of Mathematical
Performance with Classmates

in

Curriculum

Average

Completed all
work on multiplication and
division in Uth
grade text

Average

Completed work
on division in
Uth grade text
through single
digit divisors
such as: 9^9$

Well above
average

No training in

7 mos.

,

Position

Barry
l*th grade
b mos
10 yrs
,

.

David
3rd grade
8 yrs , U mos
.

Joey
3rd grade
2 mos
9 yrs
.

Below average

,

multiplication
or division

Completed one
chapter on multiplication
working in first
part of chapter
on division in
3rd grade text
,

Boy
3rd grade
2 mos
8 yrs

Slightly above
average

No training in
multiplication
or division

Kathy
3rd grade
U mos
8 yrs

Well above
average

No training in

.

.

,

,

multiplication
or division
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subjects that were not very atypical of American students.

with an identified learning disability were not interviewed.

Students
Also in-

terviews were discontinued with those few students who were unwilling
to talk about their solution at all or who seemed ill at ease during an

interview.

This means that the students interviewed tended to be some-

what less shy and somewhat more confident in verbal expression on the

average than their classmates.

Mathematics Programs in the Students' Classrooms

The mathematics program in the Urbana classroom was organized

around a single textbook which has been used fairly widely throughout
the country.

The children were given individual assignments in their

assignment books, typically consisting of a certain number of consecutive problem pages to complete in the text.
own pace.

Students worked at their

The teacher would occasionally help or tutor students indi-

vidually as time permitted.

She would also introduce topics or provide

drill for students in small groups who were at approximately the same
place in the text.

Word problem pages in each chapter were assigned

and corrected in the same way as pages of arithmetic problems.

Pro-

ject problems in the text (such as making a chart of the number of

children in the class with birthdays in each month) were assigned only

occasionally to the more able students.

The more innovative chapters

on such topics as number theory and geometry were ordinarily not

assigned.

Overall the mathematics curriculum could be described as a text-

based program, fairly traditional in content, with an innovative arrange-
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ment for individualizing the pace of work for each student
and for

providing some individual tutoring and small group work.
The classroom in Amherst had a very similar program to the one
in Urbana, with the following exceptions.

In the Amherst classroom

the teacher would assign pages from several different textbooks rather

than a single textbook.

Topics in 'innovative' chapters and individ-

ual 'project' problems were assigned slightly more often, and some

number games and puzzles were used by the children.

Transcript Notation

Each analysis in the study is accompanied by a transcript.

Con-

siderable care has been taken to make these accurate as possible.

When

a transcript appears in shortened form in the text, a complete version
is included in Appendix II.

Names are abbreviated by single letters,

for example, K. for Kathy and I. for interviewer.

In all cases the

The following abbreviations are also used:

interviewer is the author.

Uh huh:

Yes

Uh uh or
Un uh:

No

(Puts block on
table)

Parentheses enclose
actions or gestures

Now, we divide.

Comma indicates short
pause or break

It would- work.

Hyphen or period indicates
a pause, two hyphens indicate a pause longer than
approximately 2 seconds

,

Then

—

It's (6

it's

s.

)

3.

not

3.

Pauses approximately
seconds

6

.

Two tangerines*

Asterisk indicates shortened
phrase, which appears in full
in transcript in appendix II

Five

Gap in line numbers indicates
shortened section of transcript,
which appears in full in appendix II

Can you add them?

You can't add

5-

Underline indicates strong
word emphasis by speaker
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CHAPTER III
INITIAL PROTOCOL ANALYSES

A Range of Solutions

This chapter attempts to describe the range of different
kinds
of approaches that 3rd and Uth grade students exhibit in solving
story
problems.

This is done through the analyses of 6 interviews.

Given

the endless variety of creative behavior in children, no such collec-

tion of approaches could hope to be exhaustive.

But the interviews

presented here do open up a large territory of phenomena that need to
be explained.
(1) Anna-

The six protocols are labeled as follows:

"Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol

(2) Barry- "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
(3) David- "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol
(1>)

Joey-

"8 Cake Packages" Protocol

(5) Hoy-

"Sharing Six Candies" Protocol

(6) Roy-

"40 Tangerines" Protocol

In these protocols four basic modes of solution behavior will be iden-

tified:

Mode of Solution Behavior

Protocols

Formulation of an arithmetic
problem in standard oral form
and/or standard written form

(1)
(2)

Anna
Barry

An acted out solution

(3)

David

A counting based solution

{k) Joey

An immediate solution

(6)

Roy
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In addition, three general phenomena will be identified:

Misapplication of written
arithmetic algorithms
Problem is ’misread* to
fit the subject's ideas

(2)

(

Successive shifts of
approach

5

)

Barry

Roy

(2) Barry
(6) Roy

A second purpose of this chapter is to begin assembling a set of

theoretical concepts for describing thought processes that produce the
behaviors observed.

In each of the six protocol analyses a list is

made of specific phenomena observed in the protocol.

Characteristics

of the child's cognitive processes are then proposed in a second section that help explain or account for many of the given phenomena.

Other phenomena are identified but not explained, and are left as observations for interpretations by others in the future.

Observation and theory

.

Wherever a phenomenon is listed, a ques-

tion is implied- "How did this occur?"

So even the phenomena that are

not explained in this study play an important role in raising implicitly

formulated questions for later theoretical work.
Note that the study is not concerned with making profiles by startThe anal-

for.
ing from a checklist of categories of behavior to look

attempt to idenyses start from raw transcripts of taped interviews and

important to the children.
tify categories of behavior that appear to be
grow in response to
The observational and theoretical concepts should

viewing the protocols.
than almost all of the
These six initial analyses are more formal
in the following
clinical research reviewed in Chapter 2,

-’

en ° e

-

1.

un
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edited transcripts are exhibited with the analyses;
and

2.

an attempt

is made throughout the analyses to maintain a
distinction between ob-

servations and theory.

This last constraint provides a real challenge.

Basically it means that one tries to describe what a subject does
(observed behaviors) separately from describing models of his or her

thought processes.
Later in Chapter V protocol number

3

(David) will be reanalyzed

and two new protocols will be analyzed, all more formally than is done
in this chapter

.

There diagrams will be used to develop models of cog-

nitive structure interactions as they occur in time and to explicitly
tie aspects of the models to protocol observations.
Use of the terms 'knowledge

1

and 'reasoning

.
'

In the course of

this chapter, certain general theoretical concepts will be used with

the following meanings:

The phrase

cognitive process

will be used very generally to refer

to any 'train of thought' that may involve the activity of one or more

internal cognitive structures.

A student's knowledge is considered to

be the collection of his or her cognitive structures

—a

cognitive struc-

ture being a stable mode of internal functioning that, when activated,
can interpret aspects of the environment and/or control behavior.

phrase 'mode of internal functioning'

The

is used to emphasize the fact

that even perceptual structures are thought of as active processes (anal-

ogous to the way in which the eye actively tracks a moving object).
of lower
Higher level cognitive structures consist of organized systems

level structures.

The word

reasoning

is used in a general way to
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refer to competitive and cooperative interactions between
cognitive
structures that are not fixed, established modes of functioning.

As

will be discussed further, this point of view leads to a metaphor
for

cognition where the various cognitive structures play a role that is
more like the complex interactions at many levels between species in
an ecosystem, than the predictable, precise functioning of a machine.

.
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(l)

Anna - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol

A Solution Using a Written-Symbol Calculation

This very short protocol provides what might be termed a 'text-

book case' of a direct approach to solving a story problem via a
written— symbol algorithm.

Anna works on the following problem, which

describes a group of children who want to share some stones they have
found in a sack.

Anna's profile

9 years,

Age:

Grade

:

(5/9/75)

:

7

months

U

Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance With
Classmates: Average

Position in Curriculum: Completed all work on multiplication and division in fourth grade text

Transcript
1

A:

"Jim and his U friends found a
(Reads aloud)
green paper bag about 2 feet away from a rabbit
They
Inside they found 15 green stones.
hole.
green
many
How
want to share them equally
stones should each one get?"
.

3

2

A:

friends - divided by 15 -- (writes U 15
15 divided by four (looks up at wall).
(Writes 3) 3, (writes 12) 12, (writes 3)
a remainder of 3 They should get 3b

|

)
-

M 15
-12.
3
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3

I

^

A:

:

How do you know they should get

3?

have to divide and make 'em in equal groups,
so they should each get 3.

I

The problem text contains more information than is
needed to solve
it, but Anna seems to ignore this extra information
without difficulty.

Like most students her age who have worked on this problem, however,
she

interprets the text as designating a total of
rather than

h

poj£ple sharing the stones

The investigator intended the problem to designate

5-

5

people sharing 15 stones, but Anna doesn't seem to see it that way!
This demonstrates that a story problem cannot be assumed to be a neutral,

standard stimulus for all subjects.

The subject's perception of the

problem will depend on the form of the structures in the subject that
assimilate the problem.
a problem.

Subjects can vary in their interpretation of

But this does not mean that one must reject this protocol

as unanalyzable

.

In a clinical interview approach, different inter-

pretations constitute an interesting finding, as opposed to being

treated as an annoying interference with the research design.

Anal-

ysis can proceed on the assumption that Anna is solving the problem

involving four people.

It is not clear why Anna uses

h

people, but

one factor may be that Anna is in the habit of always using the printed

numerals as they appear in a story problem in school.

Her interpre-

tation is perfectly acceptable in terms of the purpose of the interview, however, and the interviewer makes no mention of this issue as

the interview procedes.

We can make several observations concerning Anna's solution.

Ob.

1

Anna does not refer to the extra information given in
the text.

Ob.

2

Anna writes down a division problem in standard written
form.

Ob.

3

She refers to the division problem as she writes it down using a non-standard word order - "U friends - divided by 15."
(This kind of word order inversion between divisor and divi-

dend is observed frequently in grade school children.)
Ob.

U

She then says:

"15 divided by U," expressing an arithmetic

problem in standard oral form
Ob.

5

Anna makes a written calculation in the form of a standard
written-symbol algorithm

Ob.

6

7

.

She spontaneously relates a number from her calculation to

the story context
Ob.

.

,

saying: "They should get 3."

She gives a short explanation concerning her approach: "I

have to divide and make 'em in equal groups...," in which it
appears that she relates the division calculation to an action
on groups of objects.
Ob.

8

She does not mention the remainder in reporting the solution.

One often sees solutions of this kind with students who are prac-

ticed at solving story problems in school, and who are faced with a
familiar type of problem involving a familiar mathematical relationship.

The student formulates an arithmetic problem in standard verbal

her head' or use a written
form, and may solve the arithmetic problem 'in

algorithm as Anna does here.
expression
Standard verbal form is defined as the oral or written
used in school (with or
of an arithmetic problem in a traditional form
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without the answer).
away 6 is

Examples of standard oral form would be:

"24 divided by 6 equals

„
Examples of standard written form are:

"6 goes into 24
15

4

"15 take

times."

15-6=9,-6,24t6=

,

and

5

and

9

6»^.

These expressions contrast with statements like, "You have

put 2 more and then you have 7," "How many 6s are in 24," "3 less than
12 is 9," or "What is the difference between 60 and 70?"

Anna’s solution seems very straight-forward, and appears to correspond well with standard mathematics as it is taught in school.

How-

ever, it is difficult to gain much insight into the question of describ-

ing the internal process that led Anna to formulate the problem "15

divided by 4" in standard oral form.

This is a difficult question to

attack, partly because this process is so automatic in us as adults
that we take it for granted.

In subsequent protocols we will see that

the process is not so automatic in many children, and indeed that en-

tirely different types of solutions are given that do not involve formulating an arithmetic problem in standard oral form.

We have some clues

from her statement in line 4, "I have to divide and make 'em in equal

groups...," for which these same processes may be responsible.

Anna provides us with very little interpretable behavior.

But

Thus we are

not able to say much about the crucial question of how she reformulates

the problem as an arithmetic problem.
deeper
The investigator has found this problem of a lack of data for
even in
analysis to be typical when students use a standard algorithm,

student more about
cases where the interviewer tries to question the

"how he or she knew to divide."

Often the answer contributes little and
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is a variation of, "Because it would be
wrong.

get the right answer."

You have to divide to

One approach to overcoming this difficulty

will emerge from some of the protocols yet to
be discussed.
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(2) Barry - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol

The Problem of Applying Algorithmic Knowledge

This protocol provides a view of a student whose proficiency with

arithmetic algorithms is high, but whose Judgment in applying this

knowledge to a practical problem is poor.

Barry works on the same

"Sharing 15 Stones" problem.
Barry's profile

(5/9/75)

:

Age:

10 years,

Grade:

4

4

months

Teacher's Comparison of Mathemat ical Performance with
Classmates:
Average

Position in Curriculum: Completed work on division
in 4th grade text through single digit divisors
such as:
9|W

Transcript
1

B:

(Reads) Jim and his 4 friends found a green
paper bag about 2 feet away from a rabbit hole.
They want
Inside they found 15 green stones.
How many green stones
to share them equally.
should each one get?

—

(says this to himself) they'd have to
Four
friend.
another
have

2

They would?

3

I

4

B:

Uh huh.

5

I:

Show me why there isn't, why you think it isn't.

6

B:

15 isn't a equal number.

:

-

Why?) There
equally stones.
(I:

there isn't the

1

or gaps in line
Gaps in the transcript are indicated by asterisks
IT.
Appendix
A complete transcript is included in
numbers.
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Barry seems to ignore the extra information without
difficulty.
Like Anna, however, he interprets the text as designating a
total of
h

people sharing the stones rather than

5-

The interviewer makes no

mention of this issue as the interview proceeds.
Barry's initial comment, "They'd have to have another friend,"
is a tentative indication that he has some insight into the fact that

the 15 stones cannot be divided evenly among

could be among

5

people.

U

people but that they

(This interpretation is reinforced later on

when Barry proves his prediction using a drawing to show how each of
5

people could receive

3

stones each.)

by 15 not being an 'equal number.'

But it is unclear what he means

When asked about this, instead of

explaining what he means, he seems to shift to another approach, and
suggests that he could multiply to get the answer.

Mmm

could multiply -

- I

times 15-

Ik

(19s.

15

You can? You think that would solve the problem
for them?

16

B:

)

(Lines show

15-

equals,
times
5 times 5 is 20
zeroU

carry the 2
k times 1 is
un uh -

4

60

(writes 6)

What

18

Too high a number.

19

Too high a number?

20

60?

'

s

(Looks at

.

correspondence
between speaking and writing)

1

wrong?

IT

Observations

U

I.

Why?

How do you know?

and smiles)

Why Barry chooses to multiply 15 by

U

is not clear,

and easily.
but he executes the algorithm on paper smoothly

However,

5
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he doesn't like the answer he gets, saying
that it's too high.

decides this is also unclear.

How he

So up to this point we have the follow-

ing phenomena:
Ob. 1

Barry does not refer to the extra information in the problem.

Ob.

There is an initial period where Barry refers to 15 not being

2

an 'equal number' and suggests that the problem would be

solvable for

5

people rather than

Thus he refers spon-

l*.

taneously to a related problem.
Ob.

3

There is a shift away from this approach as Barry refers to
the process of multiplying and then proceeds with a paper-

pencil algorithm.
Ob.

h

Barry expresses and solves a multiplication algorithm in
standard form.

Ob.

5

Barry evaluates hi s answer and rejects it

Barry proceeds to divide 15 by

5-

could divide maybe.

2 Ob

B:

I

21

I:

Well, give that a try.

22

B:

k (writes 15^ =
(Barry writes 3 for the answer,
then rewrites the problem this —>
way. )

15 - divided by

_3

)

30

B:

And that's the answer.*

31

I:

Which is?

32

B:

That (points to

33

I:

Where?

3k

B:

Right here - (points again to the
the 12) the 3.

35

I:

3

U

|

1

-12
3

underneath the 12).

3

underneath

OK now, how do you know that's the answer?

'

60

always do that in math.

36

B:

I

37

I:

And what - do you think that s a good answer?
I mean, will that solve your problem?
What
is their problem?

38

B:

Get rid of one of their friends (laughs).

39

I:

They have a problem
rid of a friend?

ho

B:

Or gain a friend.

-

why do they have to get

Barry returns to his idea about changing the number of friends.

Why he refers to the
clear.

3 in

the remainder's position as the answer is un-

The interviewer tries to get him to balk about changing the

number of friends so that he can understand his idea, but is unsuccessful.
52

Then Barry says:
B:

B:

I

goofed - that was 11.*

Hmmm- (speaking to himself) what can

70

I

do now

Well, why don't you read the problem again and
So far
just make sure (3 inaudible words).
your answer is what?

71

72

^
11

What happened?

61

62

15

15 take away 4 (writes)
15, lU, 13, 12, 11 (puts U fingers on
1. hand as he counts). (Writes 11 )*

B:

(Rereads the problem text out loud.)
Ah, 11.
(Writes)
Got it.
(7s.) (clicks fingers)
15
+ Ji
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(corrects the answer to read 19-)*
19?

79

80
81

B:

Does that look right?

Uh uh (shakes head).

How come?

-

6l

82

B:

'Cause 19'

83

It

Well, this is a problem. We can multiply or
divide, or subtract, or add.
Or maybe something else, I don't know. And how do you decide which one to do?*

Qb

B:

I

s

too high of a number.

don't know.

Thus Barry makes a 'grand tour' through each of the four standard

arithmetic operations in the course of his solution attempt.
he appears to be dissatisfied with the answer.

Each time

When he uses the opera-

tion that would traditionally be used with this problem

-

division - he

goes through the algorithm accurately, but he seems unable to relate

the work he has done on paper to the problem situation.

tries subtracting, and then adding the two numbers 15 and

Instead, he
b.

He also

makes a second reference to changing the number of people involved.
Thus we have the following additional phenomena:
Ob.

6

Barry attempts to use several different standard arithmetic operations for the same problem

,

using written algo-

rithms with two of the numbers from the problem text.
Ob.

T

These attempts form the pattern of a repeated cycle in

which a method of solution is tried, and the suggested
answer is evaluated (and in this case always rejected).
Ob.

8

numReferences to related problems - involving changing the

ber of people involved in the situation

-

occasionally in-

terrupt the above cycle.

Related arithmetic problems

.

To investigate the way Barry reported

the answer, the interviewer
the remainder in the division problem as
problems.
asked him to do three other division

In each case his be-

)

.

havior was similar.

For example, consider the following transcript

Barry - "3 into 31"
1

I:

Let's do a, this one do that?

2

B:

Uh huh.
Where's my pencil - there it is.
3 and 31?

3

I

Uh huh

k

B:

Divide - division?

5

I:

Yup.

6

B:

(Writes 3 [31
into 3 is 1.
3 times 1 minus
3
*
equals
minus 3 is zero
bring down
3 - divided by 1 doesn't work
3 times 0 - s'
minus 0
^
one

:

into 31 - can you

3

— 10

-

3

3[3l\

—

-3

\
\

—

/^l

\

\

/

.

what's the answer?

7

I:

And what's

8

B:

One

9

I:

One's the answer, OK.
Now what are these numbers here for (points to
the numbers under 31 ), and what's this number
(points to quotient)?

10

B:

11

I:

And what's the answer?

12

B

One

13

I:

:

-

Oh, 3 doesn't go into 1 (points to 1 in "01"),
so put the zero there (points to 0 in quotient)
OK?
See, divide.
Then multiply uh - that.
Once, see, 3 goes into 3 once, right, then mulI could do those all
tiply - 3 times one is 3.
day.

Do you get most of them right?

)
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Ik

B:

When

I

first went into 'em

I

didn't understand

em.

'

15

I:

How about now?

16

B:

I

17

I:

And the answer's one, and the, a - so you don't
have to give anybody this number (points to quotient) or any of these (points to numbers below

understand 'em pretty well.

31)?

18

B:

I have to do it like that (sweeps pen over his
work from top to bottom).

19

I:

Do you use those numbers?
use at the end?

20

B:

When I'm done with the problem?

21

I:

Yeah.

22

B:

That one (points to "1" at the bottom.

23

I:

And what's

2h

B:

Uh huh.

25

I:

OK.

26

B:

I

27

I:

Easy huh.

OJ GO

B:

Uh huh.

—

Which numbers to you

that's called the answer?

can do these all day.
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We summarize the phenomenon as follows:
Ob.

9

Barry executes a division algorithm proficiency
but reports
the remainder as the answer.

Barry also did this in the same way on other written division
problems.
Cognitive interpretations and comments on pedagogy

.

At this time

Barry had worked through the greater part of a long chapter of division
problems in his Uth grade textbook in school, including extensive work
on division of this kind with a remainder.

In Barry's class mathematics

was individualized so that students moved ahead through work pages in

their text only after completing previous pages 'successfully.'

How

is it, then, that he was not aware of the meaning of the numbers in

the remainder and quotient positions of his division calculations?

The

only apparent explanation is that Barry did not need to understand these

concepts in order to move through the curriculum.

Apparently, Barry's

written work in division, which is quite accurate, constituted the main
index of Barry's progress for his teacher.

2

So we have a clear example here of the way in which knowledge of
an algorithm for manipulating symbols on paper does not necessarily

constitute a useful understanding of the basic mathematical concepts
involved.

Barry's proficiency with the standard division algorithm is

impressive, but when it comes to applying this algorithm to a story
problem, a gap in his knowledge is exposed.

The term appi ieation gap

will be used for the general phenomenon seen in subjects who display

proficiency in certain arithmetic skills but have difficulty applying
in-class eval^For an extended discussion of the problem of inadequate
uation procedures, see Erlwanger (1973).
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them.

Each of the written arithmetic algorithms
that Barry performs take
the form of an organized pattern of activity.

One can begin to model

the cognitive activity responsible for this
organized behavior by

saying that Barry possesses a specific cognitive
structure for each of
the algorithms identified.

In this case they will be called written

symbol algorithm structures.

Each cognitive structure is thought of

as the repeatable pattern of mental activity which assimilates
a cer-

tain kind of situation and which controls and coordinates an appropriate

motor response.

This theoretical concept then allows one to maintain

a distinction between the external response and the internal cognitive

structure.

One can use 'long division algorithm response (or pattern)'

to mean the observed pattern of behavior, and one can use 'long division

algorithm structure' to mean the internal cognitive structure in Barry
that organizes the response.
In Barry's case, when he uses the numbers 15 and I in a standard

arithmetic operation, he performs the operation smoothly and easily.
On the tape, it is obvious that he is confident and comfortable while

doing these calculations.

One has the sense that these calculations are

separate, self-contained periods of activity

-

that once they are begun,

he will tend to carry them through without interruption, devoting his

entire attention to them.

This may be related to the fact that Barry

displays no evidence of meaningful internal connection between the arithmetic algorithm structures he uses and his perception of the practical
situation.

The appearance of the algorithm responses as such separate

sections of activity on the tape is suggestive of the cognitiv e iso-
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—ation

of the algorithm structures from practical
concepts.

He indi-

cates that he does not have a good sense of the
domain of applicability

of each of the

3

inappropriate algorithm structures he uses, for if

that were the case they would have been rejected before he
calculated

solutions with them.
This, then, is the sense in which one can begin to interpret the

application gap in Barry’s performance.

He calculates, using a divi-

sion algorithm structure proficiently, and he gives some evidence of
a knowledge of the practical meaning of dividing the stones equally,

but somehow the connection between these two kinds of knowledge is

missing.

Summary

.

The following phenomena have been identified:

1.

Ignoring extra information.

2.

Spontaneous reference to a related problem.

3.

Shifts between comments about related problems and reference
to written symbol algorithms.

U.

Generation of solutions to arithmetic problems expressed in
standard written form and their solution via standard writtensymbol algorithms.

5.

Evaluation and rejection of answers without giving evidence
of further arithmetic calculations.

6.

Attempts to use several different standard algorithms for the
same problem.

7.

These attempts, each followed by an evaluation, form the pattern of a repeated cycle.

8.

cycle interThe references to related problems interrupt the

.
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mittently
9.

Proficient execution of division algorithms followed by re-

porting the remainder as the answer.
Several of these phenomena suggest that one can describe Barry's

algorithmic structures as cognitively isolated.

There is an apparent

lack of connection between a knowledge of the practical constraints
in the problem situation on the one hand and a proficient knowledge

of arithmetic algorithms on the other.
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(3) David - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol

An Acted-Out Solution

In solving story problems, students do not always formulate an

arithmetic problem to be solved.
In this protocol one finds an example of a student acting-out as-

pects of the sharing problem situation explicitly in order to arrive at
the solution.

David makes no mention of numerical arithmetic statements

in any standard form.

With considerable confidence, David solves the

"Sharing 15 Stones" problem using a 'skeleton' drawing with only the
essential aspects of the situation included to represent the distribu-

tion of the group of stones to the children.
The protocol is interesting because it reveals actions that can be

performed at an intuitive level without references to standard arithmetic calculations.

David's solution is precocious in the sense that

he solves a story problem ordinarily thought of as a division problem

even though he has not had multiplication or division in school.
can describe the knowledge structures

If one

being tapped in protocols like

this one one may be able to identify an intuitive foundation for multipli,

cation and division processes learned later in school.
David demonstrates a very limited but remarkably flexible knowledge of simple fractions in the context of dividing the remainder of
3

stones among

U

people.

Although the use of fractions

"lies

outside of

B and C of
the main focus of this study, David's approach in sections

ideas about fracthe protocol hints of an intriguing realm of children's

techniques.
tions waiting to be studied via clinical interview

.
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Description of the Protocol
The complete protocol is given beginning on the following
page.
In section A of the transcript David reads the problem and
immediately

draws a group of 15 circles.
tral group."

We will refer to this group as the 'cen-

He proceeds to draw

U

squares which he calls 'sacks' or

cans' to transfer (by drawing) 12 of the circles to the squares from

the central group.

He does this in lots of

each square and then crossing off
fore distributing the next

U

It

U

circles, drawing one in

circles in the central group be-

circles.

In section B David distributes the 3 circles that remain.

He

proceeds to "cut" 2 of the circles "in half" and distributes a "half
stone" to each square.

For the single remaining stone he says, "We'll

put little chunks of that one in each box."
In section C the interviewer probes for a more detailed descrip-

tion of the "little chunks" from the last stone.

David is uncertain

about their size but says they could be called a "half of a half of a

half of a stone."
Observations
tocol
Ob.

.

The following observations were made from the pro-

:

1

David acts out the problem situation relatively explicitly.
Had he made a more realistic drawing, or found some real
stones to use, we would say that he was even more explicit.

Conversely, if he had mentioned only numbers and number operthe
ations we would say that he was not explicitly acting out

situation

)

David's profile
Age:

8

Grade

:

)

:

years,

4

months

3

Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance with
Classmates: Well above average

Position in Curriculum:
or division

No training in multiplication

David - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol (11/26/73)
Section A

5

David: (Reads) "Jim and his
b friends found a green
paper bag about 2 feet
away from a rabbit hole.
Inside they found 15
green stones. They want
to share them equally.
How many green stones
should each one get?"
Oh no-

6

Tough?

2

—

3
b

7

D:

Uh huh.

8

I:

How can we start on it?

9

D

15 green stones- (draws
15 circles in rows of 3,
and a l6th, recounts them
and crosses out the l6th)

OK, now we wanna divide
it by 4.

10

11

I:

What does that mean?

12

D:

Here's one sack.. little
can (draws a square)
another, another,
another (draws 3 more
squares
OK, one for each- 1,2,3
b (draws small circle in
each square
are gone (crosses
OK,
off U circles in center

13

lb

)

)
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15

group) Now-we- divide U
more- 1, oops, 2, 3, U (draws
small circle in
each square )( crosses U
more off in center)
Now we divide this, by U
more (adds circle to
each square) Everybody's
got 3 (crosses off ^ in
center

16
17
18
19

Section B
20

D:

And there's 3 more!
(concerned tone)

21

I:

What's wrong?

22

D:

Cut one in half, put it
in here and here

(draws a circle in two
of the
squares)
1+

23

I:

And this is another
half?

2h

D:

Cut this in half, and,
here, and - here

(draws a circle in the
remaining two squares
25

I:

Now, what are these you
just put here, are these
whole stones?

26

D:

Half- half stones

27

I:

Let's blacken those in
so we know they're
Are there any
halves.
more?

D:

(Blackens half circles
^ squares;
lines
vertical
draws
the
2
of
3
through
circles remaining uncrossed in center)
There's just one more.
So we'll put little

28

29

in the

30

31
32

)

.
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chunks of that one in
each box.
(Puts a dot
in each square)

©0 0

0 o

3
.

-e

33

3 1*

I:

D:

How big are the
little chunks?

OK.

Little - like chunk,
chunk, chunk.

(J>

I:

Could you draw that
last stone down at the
bottom- make a biggreat big thing for the
last stone- show me how
you-

36

D:

1,- 2,3,- 1,2,3,chunks
divided (draws
a large circle, divides
it into 1* parts with
vertical lines, puts a
dot in each part

37

I:

What can we call those
chunks?

38

D:

I

39

I:

A half of a stone?

1*0

D:

Half of
Uh huh.
half of- half of a stone

Ul

I:

A half of a half of a
stone? What does that

1*

—

don’t know.

—

mean?
1*2

D:

Half of
I don't know.
a half of a half of a
stone

1*3

I:

Half of a half of a
half of a stone- is that
what they get?

1*1*

D:

I

1*5

I:

Is there any way to

don't know.

00
•

.

-GrO-

<b$-

-0-

—

r

•

35

0

e

? •—

Section C

<

o-o-

o.
00

0

•

0
•

0

,
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write what you did with
numbers?
46

D:

I

47

I

That was a rough one
huh?

48

D:

:

don't know.

Yeah, I think
bigger cans.

I

needed

7't

Fig. 1

David's Drawing
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Ob.

David constructs a drawing as part of his approach.

2

In this

case it is a ’skeleton’ drawing, with only selected aspects

of the story represented.
Ob.

David relates aspects of the story to different parts of his

3

drawing and to changes he makes in the drawing

He refers to

.

to the circles in the central group as stones (in line 9) and
to the

4

squares as "sacks" or "little" cans" (line 12).

He

relates each sack to a person having some stones in line 18

when he says: "Everybody’s got 3."

David refers orally to the

act of moving the stones as he crosses them out in the center

group and redraws the same number in the four squares (lines
22 and 24).

Cognitively we can interpret this behavior as indicating that David
associates manipulations of the drawing with actions relevant to the
story, such as giving a stone to one of the

4

friends.

The way in

which the drawing symbolizes the story for David in this way will be
discussed further in a later section.
Ob.

4

In section A David draws a circle in each of the

then crosses off

4

circles in the center group.

pattern is repeated
Ob.

5

When

3

3

4

boxes and

This behavior

times.

to
circles are left in the central group, David refers

cutting one in half

,

and puts a circle in two squares.

This

actions crosses
pattern is repeated once more and after both

off only 2 circles in the central group.
Ob.

6

puts a dot
With one circle remaining uncrossed, he

m

each

of that one in each
square, saying, "We’ll put little chunks
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box."

Then he crosses off the last circle.

David is uncer-

tain when asked the size of the chunks, but says they could be

called a "half of a half of a half of a stone."
Ob.

7

He does not refer to any arithmetic problem in standard oral
A possible exception appears in line 10 - "OK, now we

form.

wanna divide it by

!+."

Arguments will be given later to the

effect that the antecedent of "it" is not a number and that

therefore this is not an expression of an arithmetic problem
in standard oral form.
Ob.

8

In several places David describes actions he is about to per-

form before he manipulates (makes a change in) the drawing

.

These include, for example, line 13, "OK, one for each," (draws
small circle in each square), line 32, "So we'll put little

chunks of that one in each box."

(puts a dot in each square),

as well as lines 10, 15, 17, 22 and 2U.

Later we will inter-

pret this phenomenon as indicating the activity of cognitive

processes corresponding to internalized actions.
Ob.

9

We can characterize the protocol as a whole by saying that

David's approach to the problem has a piecewise adaptive charThe

acter.

then

3

U

squares are assigned one circle, then 2, then

1/2 and finally

3

1/2 and a "little chunk."

plifies the problem by solving it in pieces.

He sim-

Each act up to

stones to be
the last one leaves a new but smaller pile of

divided.

times

-

These actions form a pattern that is repeated
of the
each time David draws an object in each

5

h

the central group.
squares and then crosses off circles in

3,
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Polya (19^8) recommends the heuristic of breaking a problem
up into simpler pieces.

So one can say that David's spontan-

eous solution is compatible with this heuristic
is

'intuitively heuristic.'

-

his solution

We can refer to a piecewise adapt-

ation cycle with the following form:
(a)

New situation is viewed and a new 'helpful' (adaptive)
action emerges.

(b) The action is performed within the story situation con-

straints
(c) Steps

.

(a),

(b)

and (c) are repeated.

Of course, the actions appear to us to be helpful and to
be within the story problem constraints.

It remains to be

shown that they have this status for David in terms of his own

cognitive processes.

Cognitive Interpretations

:

Acting-out the problem situation with the drawing

:

During the

interview, David's attention is focused almost entirely on his drawing.

The drawing appears to help him in several ways.
a.

It serves as a tallying device

.

This means that he doesn’t have

group, and
to keep track of the number left in the central

how many
after distributing the stones, if he needs to know
in a single
each received, he only needs to count the stones

box to find the answer.

In this way he doesn't need to remem-

distribution sequence.
ber quantities 'in his head' during the
external memory aid
Thus the drawing can act as a physical,

.
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for quantities
b.

.

The picture may help David to keep in mind aspects of the qual-

itative

s

ituat ion — in this case the story is concerned with

transferring objects from a source group to some people.
c.

We can see how the potential of the picture to help a student

keep in mind aspects of the problem might contribute to the

conceptualization of a solution process if one takes the point
of view that the real problem in this case is not to find a
static answer in the form of a numeral but to find an appro-

priate sequence of effective actions

.

Presumably, the problem

solving process in this case would include trying out actions
and anticipating their effects.

From a Piagetian viewpoint,

when the actions are performed on concrete objects, the prob-

lem solving process should be easier than when one uses completely internalized actions to find a solution.

In the ab-

sence of real objects then, the drawing may provide a measure

of concreteness that is an aid to the conceptualization of

effective actions to solve the problem
d.

.

David’s drawing also shows one how he has isolated significant
aspects of the problem situation.

clude the 'rabbit hole.'

The drawing does not in-

The problem situation appears on

paper only as the transfer of circles from a large group to
k

small boxes.

Thus the drawing serves to make the situation

to make it
more concrete in a perceptual sense but also serves

inessential
more abstract in the sense of being stripped of

details
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e.

It is an interesting question as to whether David thinks more

in terms of giving stones to people or in terras of sliding

circles into boxes as he works with the drawing.

In other

words, once the drawing has been made, does David temporarily

forget about what it represents while he manipulates its ele-

ments, or does he always have in mind passing out stones to
four friends?

This is a question of degree that can probably

not be answered with a strict yes or no.

However, in the lat-

ter part of the protocol there are two indications that David

transfers at least some of his attention toward the literal

drawing and away from the original problem scene.

One appears

in line where he refers to putting chunks in a 'box' rather

than a can or sack.

The other appears when David refers to

'cutting one in half' - an operation which is easy to perform

with circles on paper, but difficult to perform with stones.
The above

5

characteristics are part of the sense in which the

drawing symbolizes the story situation for David.

Of course, it is not

like '$',
symbolic in the sense of being an arbitrarily chosen sign

which has a socially agreed upon meaning.

Rather, it is an invention

it bears a perceptual rethat is personal and also iconographic in that

semblance to the symbolized situation.

Somehow he trusts that the answer

for the 'real thing.
he obtains for the drawing would work

The inter

is that David has some
pretation given of the symbolic element here

doing 'sharing' and 'cutting
familiar action-oriented structures for
in half'

same structures can 'stretch'
in the real world, and that these

as they
parts of the rough drawing just
to create and assimilate the
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might assimilate real stones
Use of the word 'divide'

a.nd

.

real friends.

The phrase used by David in line 9,

"Now we wanna divide it by four" is interesting because it raises the

possibility that David may be aware of a standard arithmetical division
process that is relevant to the problem.

The phrase fits one of the

standard oral forms (standard school-oriented grammatical formats) for

expressing division problems.

But if he is aware of such a division

process it is clear that it is not the main one used in his solution,
since he proceeds to deal out "stones" in a very concrete manner without

reference to written arithmetic or oral counting procedures of any kind.
The word 'divide* is used twice again:

Line 13 - "Now we divide four more..."
Line lU - "Now, now we divide this by four more..."

Each time he is about to distribute

h

more "stones" to the four "people."
Also, David

These sentences do not fit the standard oral form so well.

other
has not shown any knowledge of arithmetical division operations in

problems where they could be used, and has had no training in multipli-

cation or division in school.

One possible explanation for the appear-

ance of the first phrase in line

9

assumes that David has been exposed

for expression divito older persons using the verbal canonical form

being exposed to exsion problems: "Divide a by b to get c," without
them.
planations of division procedures or how to use

Since the English

context, but also in
word 'divide' is not only used in an arithmetical

among
phrases like: "They will divide up the cake

h

people," one can

the stones among
imagine David thinking about dividing up

U

people and

by approximating canonical form.
trying to make it ’sound mathematical’
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In making this interpretation, then, we infer that he does
not go through

a mental process relating to dividing one number by another number.

Practical actions

.

If David does not use arithmetic ideas to

solve the problem, then how does he solve it?

It seems plausible that

a mental conception of the practical action of sharing a group of ob-

jects is involved in David's mental activity.

This would involve the

idea of passing out pieces to people from a central group and making
sure each person receives an equal amount.

This cognitive structure

can be viewed as being the internal process responsible for controlling

the observed act of transferring one stone to each person from the cen-

tral group in the drawing.
tion) are repeated

3

The internal process (and the external ac-

times in section A of the protocol.

The importance

of the sub-idea that each person receives an equal amount is reflected
in David's comment in line 19, "Everybody's got 3."

So from the way

that David acts-out the problem we hypothesize that a mental concep-

tion of a practical action is playing a primary role in the solution,
rather than an arithmetic process.

This practical action structure

will be modelled in more detail in Chapter

Dividing the remainder

.

V.

David seems very confident in his approach

until he expresses concern at the fact that only
after having dealt out 12.
up as well.

3

stones are left

But he proceeds to attempt to divide them

He continues in an "act out" mode, talking about

cutting

of that one in each
one in half" and saying, "We'll put little chunks

box."

when the 'dealThus he reacts in a strikingly flexible manner

ing one to each' process becomes in applicable.

How it occurs to David

question that will be discussed
to begin cutting the stones is a major

82

in Chapter 6,

Dividing the last stone seems to push David to the limit of his

understanding of how the repeated cutting of objects generates quantities of "chunks.

"

He seems to think that the proper chunks to be

given to each person would result from repeatedly

c utting

the object

in half - but is unsure of how many times this would need to be done.
It should be emphasized that nowhere does David refer to a fraction

as part of a calculation in standard oral form.

His use of the word

"half" appears to be closely tied to the action of "cutting in half."

Thus he appears to have a conception of "cutting in half" as a prac-

tical action, but there is no evidence that he conceives of 1/2 as a

number to be used in arithmetic calculations.

This leads one to be-

lieve that the conception of "cutting something in half" is an intuitive one for David, and one that could serve as a strong starting

point for his work in fractions in school.

Subproblems

.

Recall that the repeated pattern in David's actions

of adding circles to each square, crossing off circles in the center,

and viewing the result was described as a piecewise adaptation cycle.
One cognitive interpretation of this characteristic is to say that

David appears to focus on a string of subproblems
among

U

.

Dividing

h

stones

people is his first subproblem (and his second, and his third).

Then he divides

2

more stones.

one remaining stone among

h

His last subproblem is to divide the

people.

Presumably, David finds it easier

more directly.
to do this than to solve the original problem

subproblems.
easy for us as adults to point to well-defined

It is

But it re-

Chapter V as to whether
mains to be seen in the diagrammed analysis in
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one can point to specific cognitive processes in David that can be

interpreted as defining subproblems for him.
Summary

.

David's solution to the "Sharing 15 Stones" problem con-

trasts markedly with Anna's and Barry's.

Instead of using an arithmetic

algorithm he acts out the solution relatively explicitly by manipulating
the elements of a drawing.

In acting out the solution he performs a

number of practical actions such as sharing and cutting in half.

These

indicate that practical action structures are the main cognitive processes behind his solution.
We have raised a host of interesting questions with regard to this

protocol.

But in order to make further cognitive interpretations we

need better ways of representing cognitive structure interactions than
we have developed to this point.

We will attempt to model these inter-

actions for this protocol in Chapter

V.

8li

(4) Joey - "8 Cake Packages" Protocol

A Counting-Based Solution

In the protocol on the following page Joey successfully
solves a

story problem by means of a counting-based calculation.

problem would ordinarily be solved by multiplication.

This story

Joey has com-

pleted the introductory chapter on multiplication in his 3rd grade
text.

But, interestingly enough, he does not make a multiplication

calculation here.

He uses a more intuitive counting-based method.

The interviewer tries to make it as easy as possible for Joey to un-

derstand the initial problem situation.

He does this by introducing

the problem in a direct dialogue with the subject.

Observations

:

Lines 13 and lU indicate the form of Joey's suc-

cessful approach.

He counts by 2's while putting up fingers, stop-

ping on 16 as he puts up the eighth finger.

Apparently he intention-

ally stops counting by 2's when he has 8 fingers up.
The counting-based calculation Joey uses contrasts with a written

symbol calculation since no written numerals are used.

It also con-

trasts with explicitly acted-out solutions since no drawings or mani-

pulatives are used to mimic practical action sequences that will solve
the problem directly.
Ob.

1

Thus we have:

Joey performs a counting - based calculation to reach a solution.

fact
A major feature of this counting-based calculation is the

that it actually consists of two coordinated counting sequences.
out
counts by 2's up to l6, while at the same time counting

8

Joey

fingers.

—

) )
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Joey's profile
Age:

:

9 years, 2 months

Grade

3

:

Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance with
Classmates:
Below average

Position in Curriculum: Completed one chapter on multiplication, working in first part of chapter on division in 3rd grade text

Joey - "8 Cake Packages" Protocol (5/
1

Interviewer:

Got some cakes, OK?

Hostess cakes.

2 /75

(Draws)

Come 2 in a package, right?

(Nods)

Gonna have a party, OK?
(Nods)

You're going to buy 8 of these packages (writes
numeral 8 on paper).
6

J:

(Raises eyebrows, sits back in chair.)

7

I:

How many cakes are your going to have altogether when you get back?

8

J:

You mean you're going to buy
(Points to drawing)

9

I:

8 packages.

10

J:

OK, 2

h

-

8 of

these?

(raises hands near chest) 2 (extends left

thumb)
11

I:

Say it out loud.

12

J:

2,- (puts up 1 finger, then puts it down). 2,U,
(puts up 2 fingers, then puts them down).

13

fingers on l.hand, one
(Puts l.hand on table)
with each number spoken).
(Looks
12- lU-, 16 (puts up 3 fingers on r. hand).
at each finger as he puts it up.
You're gonna, a, have l6 cakes altogether.
2, U, 6, 8, 10 (puts up
,

lii

5

15

I:

Have 16 altogether.

16

J:

Uh huh.

IT

I:

Now how do you know l6, 'cause you go
get 16 - how do you -

18

J:

Count by 2's.

19

I:

Count by 2's.

OK.

-

how do you

,
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Thus he really performs 2 actions at the same time.
Ob.

2

Joey skips counts by

Ob.

3

Joey counts out

Ob.

b

Joey coordinates these two counting sequences simultaneously

8_

1

2 s

orally to 16.

fingers silently.

as he generates two parallel series.

Finally, Joey has some difficulty in 'starting up' this coordinated
sequence.

He makes several false starts before a successful try at do-

ing the counting sequences together.
Ob.

5

Joey makes several

Thus we have:

false starts

(saying only the first one

or two numbers before restarting) in coordinating the two

counting sequences.

Cognitive Interpretations
What kind of models of internal processes would be needed to ac-

count for this behavior?

One can start by positing the existence of

two internal cognitive structures, each of which is responsible for

one of the observed counting sequences.

In this case the two internal

counting structures controlling output act in parallel simultaneously
behavior.
staying 'in time' with each other to produce the coordinated
in coordinatThe false starts indicate the difficulty for the novice

ing two separate counting sequences.

They hint at the dynamic (time-

structures responsible for
varying) nature of the underlying cognitive

these actions.

the countAnd they indicate that the coordination of

that needs to be explained
ing sequences is a non-trivial achievement

by some cognitive mechanism.

to
To fill this need it seems necessary

not as static objects of knowledge
think of the two internal structures

—
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but as processes which run through a pattern of activity over a
period

of time

.

In this case the two structures run through their patterns

of activity in parallel, and this accounts for the fact that the ob-

served counting sequences appear together.
Two questions which we are not prepared to answer, but which at
least have been formulated, are the question of how the counting struc-

tures become involved in the first place, and the question of how to model
a detailed internal mechanism for the integration-in-time of two cogni-

tive structures.
We can sketch a model of cognitive processes to account for this

behavior as in Fig. 2, which shows the two cognitive structures, one
for which shows the two cognitive structures, one for each counting se-

quence, which must be synchronized in parallel.
One should not make the mistake of assuming that counting sequences

like these are necessarily associated with solving an arithmetic problem.
The fact that Joey does not refer to an arithmetic problem in standard

oral form opens up the possibility that the counting-based calculation
The observed

is not a method for solving a numerical arithmetic problem.

behavior may be Joey’s more direct symbolization of how he might solve
the real problem in a grocery story
cakes.

-

by counting out 8 packages of

on is seen to
In this interpretation, this counting-based-solut i

involvi ng
lie midway between an acted-out solution and a solution

_a_

with which the
written symbol algorithm in terms of the explicitness

situation is symbolized.
up
Collecting the 8 packages is symbolized by putting

8

fingers.

symbolized by counting
Seeing and counting up the number of cakes is
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2's orally.

The acts of verbal counting and raising fingers are much

less explicit as symbols of practical actions than a detailed drawing
in an acted— out solution.

Yet they can still be directly associated

internally with the practical actions of taking packages off a shelf in
the store one at a time.

Thus we can still perceive the possibility of

a one-to-one correspondence in time between actions of counting and

the vicarious practical actions of getting out the cake packages, whereas this cannot be the case in the expression of, for example, a multi-

plication problem in standard oral form.
Summary
approach.

.

Joey solves a story problem using a counting-based

This involves the simultaneous coordination of two cognitive

structures operating in time.

The approach symbolizes the problem solu-

tion actions more explicitly than an arithmetic calculation expressed
in standard verbal form, but less explicitly than an acted-out solu-

tion.
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(5) Hoy - "Sharing Six Candies" Protocol

The Assimilation Concept

This protocol illustrates the way in which a child’s preconceived
ideas can influence his interpretation of a problem

- to

the point

where specific aspects of the problem are ignored or 'warped' to conform to his ideas.
The problem concerns a boy who is to share some candy with his
It asks for an opinion on whether the boy shares them

two sisters.
fairly.

Roy's profile

(ll/21/TM

:

8 years,

Age:

Grade

2 months

3

:

Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance with
Slightly below average
Classmates:

Position in Curriculum:
or division.

1

No training in multiplication

"Jim got 6 candies from
(Reads aloud from card)
his 2 sisters, Kim
with
share
to
his mother to
already had some
Marla
At - at school
and Marla.
she had
because
candies and Kim was very hungry
2 to
and
Kim
missed lunch. He gave 1 candy to
Do you think that was fair
Marla.

R:

l

2

R:

Yeah.

3

I:

You do?

U

R

;

2 to
Uh huh - it was 6 and he gave 2 to Kim and
they
and
2
is
6
away
take
k
Marla and then
each got 2.

loud, "... he gave one
Roy clearly reads from the problem out
a few seconds later and say.
candy to Kim...", only to turn around
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"...he gave 2 to Kim."

Because we hear him read the problem out loud,

we cannot dismiss this contradiction as an accidental reading error.

For some reason he actually seems to have ignored or modified the meaning of the phrase, "he gave

1

candy to Kim."

Notice also that he ex-

presses a subtraction problem orally with the numbers appearing in a

non-standard order, "4 take away 6."

The reason for this is unclear,

but we assume that his thinking here is closer to an idea we would express as "6 take away

Ij."

The interviewer, surprised by Roy's behavior, probes for a reexplanation:
5

I:

OK - What happened? Jim had - tell me again why
you think it's fair - I didn't get all your reasons.

6

R:

Like here's Kim and here is - how do you spell
Marla?
(looks back at text for spelling) Marla, and here is Jim (writes the 3 names in
a row on paper), and urn -

T

Jim had U (writes "U" under "Jim") and he gave
2 to Marla (writes "2" under "Marla") and 2 to
Kim (writes "2" under "Kim") and then U take
away - no - he had 6

8

and he gave 2 to Marla and he had U and he gave
"2" under
2 to Kim and he'd have 2 back (writes
"Jim") and
"1" under "Jim")
then take away (crosses out
2.*
got
and then they each

9

l6

I:

And what makes it fair?

IT

R:

I

18

I:

Because they each got

19

R:

Uh huh.

Kim

Marla

2

2

just told you right here.

J im

OJ

2.

Appendix II.)
(A full transcript is given in

After straightening

number Jim starts with, Roy gives
out some initial uncertainty about the
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us further evidence of the number of candies given
to Kim.

The inter-

viewer then asks Roy if he would like to check his answer.
20

I:

Want to check it?

21

R:

I

22

Or are you sure?

wanna check it.

(Reads problem again silently, then begins to
"
read aloud.
1 to Kim and 2 to Marla—"
No way
(raises voice) He gave 1 to Kim and
2 to Marla.*

—

)

!

Roy is quite surprised by what he reads

,

and we suspect the reason

is that he expected the text to say that Kim had gotten 2.

So we see

the interesting phenomenon of a reaction of surprise to a text he has

already read.
Roy now generates quantitative details for this new situation:
29

I:

What d he do?

30

R:

He gave 1_ to Kim and he gave two to Marla and
Marla got 2 more - than kirn, and, oh - how
much did Jim have left (moves lips, whispers
He took away "take away" )

'

.

31

He had
he took away 3 so he had 6.
Marla had 2 and Kim had 1, and
plus 1 is 6.*

3-3

3

left.
plus 2

Notice Roy’s spontaneous expression of the same situation in
terms of both subtraction and addition-type formats.
In sorting out these new relationships Roy seems to still be ig-

noring certain facts at hand

— he dos not

mention the fact that

was hungry" and that "Marla already had some candy."

Kim

It is as if his

his
overriding concern is to straighten out the discrepancy between

and what he
first conception of the number of candies Jim gave out

understands from the second reading of the problem.

.

9b

(This completes the protocol excerpts containing the
phenomena to be

analyzed here.

In the complete transcript included in appendix II Roy

reads the problem a third time and is surprised to discover that
"Marla

already

had.

some candies."

He eventually concludes that "you'd never

make it fair.")
Observations summary

.

Several phenomena have been identified in

this protocol excerpt:
Ob.

1

The most striking phenomenon is the way in which the subject

apparently modifies or "warps" a feature of the problem and
ignores others.
Ob.

2

The subject shows a reaction of surprise when he rereads the
problem.

Ob.

3

(line 22)

The subject spontaneously uses both a subtraction and an addi-

tion-type format to describe & single situation
Ob.

U

.

(line 31)

Other issues that will not be analyzed further here are:
a.

reversals like "k take away 6";

b.

the subject's temporary reference (line 7) to

Jim starting with

U

candies rather than 6 (which

he corrects )

Cognitive Interpretations
In this section we will suggest a theoretical explanation for the

'warping' phenomenon in this protocol.

The 'warping' can be explained

Witz
using Piaget’s concept of assimilation (Piaget, 1952) and

concept of an active mental structure (Witz

&

&

Easley's

Easley, to appear), and

of one of the more in
in fact this protocol provides a classic example
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teresting phenomena associated with effects
of assimilation.
The major idea to be introduced here is
that Roy is not just 'rec eiving

and storing information

1

as he reads the problem, but that he

is using mental structures of his own to
interpret, organize, and

assign meaning to the sentences he is reading.

meaning of the term assimilation

- that

This is the most general

aspects of the environment are

always actively interpreted in terms of one's previous knowledge

-

in

terms of the existing mental structures in the organism.
In this protocol it is apparent that Roy has some previous know-

ledge about what it means to share some objects.

He also shows that

he comprehends the idea of separating 6 objects into

with 2 objects in each group.

3

equal groups

It seems plausible that this knowledge

could have been involved in interpreting the first sentence of the problem

—

even before he read the remaining three sentences.

In that case

he would have 'jumped to the conclusion' that each of the three persons will get 2 candies before he finished reading the problem.

If

this interpretation is correct, then the fact that he ignored the in-

formation in the rest of the problem text indicates the overriding

strength of his initial idea about what should happen when people are

sharing some objects.

One then speaks of Roy's ideas (about sharing

and elementary arithmetic) assimilating the fact that there are 6 candies and

3

people, and anticipating that each person will have two.

In this case these ideas do not assimilate the other facts given in

the problem - such as the fact that "he gave

1

candy to Kim" - even

though they are read out loud.
Thus, when certain mental structures or ideas become active we
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refer to the process by which they come to interpret
or respond to
certain aspects of the environment as assimilation.

The way in which

Roy ’jumps to a conclusion' here illustrates the
active nature of the

assimilation process, as if the internal structures were
actively seek-

ing or ’grabbing onto' certain expected features in the problem
description just as much as aspects of the problem description are determining

which structures become active.

There is also a generative aspect of

this process whereby details are 'filled in' to fit the context of the

active structures - thus the detail of the specific number of candies
each person receives is set at 2 in order to fit the 'sharing equally'
context.

The way in which Roy ignores information in the problem il-

lustrates the selective nature of this process whereby the current ac-

tivity of certain ideas can cause a person to focus only on certain

limited aspects of a situation.

This can lead to cases where one 'sees

what one expects to see' to a great extent.

We therefore have a two-

way interaction between subject and environment

-

not only aspects in

the environment affecting the set of ideas that become active, but the
set of currently active ideas affecting the aspects which are focussed

on in the environment.
We can also use Piaget's concept of disequilibrium to model the

mental process behind the fact that Roy exhibits a surprised reaction
when he rereads the problem and says, "No wa^!
1 to Kim and 2 to Marla."

(raises voice)

He gave

The reaction of surprise indicates that more

information.
is going on internally than the simple inputting of new
or disequilWe account for the reaction by the presence of a conflict

about the piobibrium condition between the ideas Roy has established
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lem situation and the ideas he constructs while rereading
the problem
carefully.

The idea that Jim gave only

with his whole view of the situation
corrected.

1

- it

candy to Kim is incompatible
is not just a detail to be

The reaction of surprise here is taken to be an indicator

of the disequilibrium condition thus set up.

The condition is assumed

to set up tensions in Roy which encourage him to modify his ideas until

they are mutually compatible.

And indeed, one immediately sees Roy

struggle spontaneously (lines 30

+ 31

)

to reconstruct the situation.

In this view the answer to the question:

ignore the information in the last

—

is answered in the following way

3

"Why does Roy apparently

sentences of the problem text?",
the information is ignored because

it doesn't fit with (is not assimilated by) the ideas that become ac-

tive in Roy to interpret the first sentence.

The additional informa-

tion is incompatible with Roy's strong idea of equal shares and the way
in which 6 objects can be split evenly into 3 groups - it cannot be

interpreted in terms of these ideas and therefore it is not interpreted
at all - i.e.

,

the information is not assimilated by structures active

in Roy at the time he reads it.

Another concept that helps to account for Roy's behavior here is
the concept of a mental overload

.

This concept refers to the idea that

there is a limit to the rate at which certain cognitive processes can
proceed.

In this case Roy's reading speed may exceed this rate and

relationtherefore accentuate the difficulties Roy has in assimilating

mental structures.
ships described in the problem text to appropriate

Summary

.

identified:
In conclusion, three new phenomena have been
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1.

Warping and ignoring of a situation aspect.

2.

Reaction of surprise.

3.

Use of contiguous subtraction and addition format.

In addition, we have introduced three theoretical
concepts:
!•

Assimilation

—

5

aspects:

interpretation, active seeking,

selective attention, generation of detail, and two-way interaction.
2*

Disequilibrium

3.

Overload - beyond a maximum rate at which cognitive processes
can proceed.

- as

conflict between cognitive structures.
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(6) Roy - "Uo Tangerines" Protocol

Autonomy of Cognitive Structure Activity
This protocol provides an example of a case where
the subject
does not seem to apply a single method of solution
directly to the problem.

Instead, the problem text seems to set off several competing
men-

tal processes within the subject.

Some of these processes act in a

creative manner to generate related problems with different numbers.

Although he is5 able to solve these problems, he never does solve the
original problem.

But the comments he generates in the course of his

attempts provide evidence for several significant kinds of cognitive
structure interactions.

Transcript and observations

.

In the protocol, Roy works on a

problem which includes several items of irrelevant information.

Roy

readily ignores the extra information, and in fact, he anticipates the
question that is asked.
1

I:

Let’s try this one.

2

R:

(Reads) "A truck driver loads Uo tangerines in
boxes.
Each box holds an equal number of tangerines."
(Says this softly to himself)
Oh, I bet I know
"
"Each tangerine (Continues reading)

3
U

—

5

6

I:

What?

7

R:

bet I know what I’m gonna do, I'm gonna see
how - how much there is in each box.

8

I:

Oh, OK.

9

R:

I

(Reads) "Each box holds an equal number of tangerines
Each tangerine weighs - 3 ounces
and each box - box measures 6" x 5" by 8".
How many tangerines are in each box?"
.

10
11
12

)
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13

I

knew.

Ik

I:

You did know, right.

15
16

R:

Uh huh.
So 5. boxes, ^0 tangerines - oh boy.
It couldn t be (shakes head) equal — pqnni l
numbers because - if it was
^ boxes it'd be 10
in each
and 5 boxes it'd be
it'd have to be, it'd have to be 50.
It couldn't
(interrupts)

—

IT
18
19

—

—

20

I:

There d have to be 50 tangerines?

21

R:

It's thirty-fi
(points to "Uo" on page)
thirty
no thirty
wait (interrupts)
how many are in each box
continues to look at text).

22

'

—

—

—

—

23

I:

What are you looking at now?

2b

R:

On this (points to first 2 sentences of written
problem)
Uo tangerines in 5 boxes (stretches).
^0 - take away 35 in each box

28

I:

35?

29

R:

No (shakes head) it couldn't be 35-

30

I:

Why couldn't it be?

31

R:

(Asks) 15 in each box?

32

I:

How'd you get 15?

33

R:

Because uh,

3b

I:

It's OK to guess,
lem for 3rd grade.
how you guess.

35

R:

I

36

I:

So 15 is a guess?

37

R:

Uh huh.
15 is a guess.

25
26
27

I

don't know,

(Looks at

I

.

don't know.

I

I

mean, this is a hard probBut I'd be interested in

just Or do you have some way of

—

read and
This is the most difficult protocol presented so far to

s

101

to analyze - partly because Roy's comments apparently
only hint at the

complex mental activities he is going through, and partly
because Roy's

approach to the problem is not the straightforward, logical
approach
one would look for from an adult.

One needs to attempt to analyze pro-

tocols of this kind, however, if one is to take seriously the goal
of

characterizing children

ideas rather than measuring their conformity

'

to accepted adult ideas.
In lines 15 to 35

,

instead of displaying a single direct approach,

Roy seems to shift between several different approaches to the problem.
In one approach he talks about how 40 and 50 Tangerines can be split

into 4 and

5

boxes, respectively.

In another he appears to subtract

from hO to yield 35, but he retracts this figure as the answer.

third approach he arrives at 15 as the answer (how
clear).

Vie

5

In a

does this is not

He reports this answer to the interviewer as a question -

searching the interviewer's face for a reaction.

(This is the only

instance in the protocol where Roy appears to be "fishing" for a reaction from the interviewer.

At other times he seems to work quite inde-

pendently and to be absorbed in the problem.)
Ob.

1

So one has:

Roy shifts between several approaches in the course of his

solution attempt.
Ob.

2

Roy retracts a proposed solution, saying, "...it couldn't be
35.”

is
So far, Roy has not given a solution to the problem that he

satisfied with but has succeeded in solving two related problems in-

volving 40 tangerines in

4

boxes and 50 in

5

boxes.

This indicates that

situation and that he has
in some sense he understands the basic problem

:

.
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some kind of understanding of multiplicative
relationships, at least
for certain sets of numbers.

Instead of limiting himself to inferences

about the problem given, he actually generates new
situations that he
seems to know more about.

However, the transcript carries a sense of

this generation of related problems being more of a
spontaneous reaction

reflecting ’what the problem makes him think of' rather than
an intentional strategy on his part.

An important question for later reference

"Where do the related problems come from?

is:

What kind of internal

mental process is called into play in the context of solving a problem

which also leads to the generation of new cases?"
Ob.

3

Thus one has:

Roy immediately generates two related problems

.

Continuing:
38

I:

Could you check it?

39
40

R:

OK.

hi

See if it's right?

—

40 tanger
(begins to draw)I'm gonna go - there's a - (whispers) box
(draws 5 large boxes).
(Drawing boxes One, two.
)

42

I:

What's that?

b3

R

Those are the boxes - three, four, five.
OK. - and there's 40 tangerines one, two (puts 2 dots next to first box) oh, wait - (interrupts)
Let's see, if there's (Points to each box as if counting)
(Points again to first box and I think I hear
him whisper "50" )

bb
45
b6
bj
48
49

.

50

I:

Fifty what?

51

R:

15 (points to first box) 32 (points to second box) No, it's 30, 15 and 30 -

54

I:

15 and 15 are 30, yes.

55

R:

And forty-five (separate words)
3rd box)

52
53

-

(points to

.

.
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56

Nope, it's too over.

Here Roy demonstrates his ability to check his
proposed answer

against the constraints of the problem by using a drawing.

This pro-

vides us with more evidence that he understands the constraints
of the
problem.

Thus he also retracts 15 as a solution.

(Notice that he does

not act-out the situation in a completely verbatum manner with his drawHe doesn t start with 40 and put 15 of them at a time into boxes

ing.

[perhaps he begins to do this in lines Uh and

^ 5 ],

He performs the re-

verse process as he indicates putting 15 at a time into each box and
counts the number he has used, until the total exceeds

i+0.

]

The interviewer’s question about why 15 doesn't work leads to a

burst of activity.
57

I

58
59
60
61

R:

:

62

63
6U

65

What happened?
It's equals 35 plus 15 35 plus 5 is 40
and there 'd - there wouldn't be the equal amount
there'd be like 1, 2, 3, H, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10
(puts 10 dots in first box).
1, 2, 3,
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (puts 10 dots in
second box )
1, 2, 3, h, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (10 in third box).
Thirty (sweepts pen over 3 boxes).
1, 2, 3, k, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 (10 dots in fourth

-

box)
And then that wouldn't be there, (crosses out row
of 10 dots in fourth box) (puts 5 new dots
5
there'd only be 1, 2, 3
in fourth box)
and 5 tangerines, 1, 2, 3 ^ 5 (puts 5 dots in
fifth box) and 5 tangerines in that one that makes ^0 10, 20, 30, U0, 50 (points to each box).

66
67

,

,

68

,

69
70
71

72

I:

OK - Fifty?

73

R:

10 , 20

,

30 - 35

,

U0

,

(points to each box).

10k

Fig.

3

Roy's Drawing #1
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It'd be five - if that'd be It'd be right if it was 4 boxes but - not five.

74
75

76

I:

What would happen if there were 4?

77

R:

Then - if we took away that one (crosses out
fourth box) 10, 20, 20, k0_ (points to boxes 1, 2, 3, 5),
and we put 10 (puts 5 more dots in box 5, whispering "1, 2, 3, 4, 5-") - and we put 10 in
that one (points fourth box),
and 10, 20, 30, 40_ (points boxes),
and 40 in there, that means 4_ boxes.

78
79

80
81

Why Roy says "35 plus 15" in line 58 instead of 30 plus 15 is not
clear.

But he seems to have in mind adding groups of 15 together, one

for each box, and rejects 15 as the answer when the total goes over 40.
As opposed to his brief earlier comments in the protocol, Roy's

statements in lines 61-75 and 77-81 have more of the character of beThe state-

ing full-fledged explanations of one of his conceptions.

ments clearly relate back to his first approach involving 40 tangerines in

4

boxes and 50 in

5

boxes.

But here he goes further, showing

how the last group of 10 can be split into 2 groups of
boxes.

to use up

5

5

Thus, he generates another pseudo-solution, one that fails to

meet the criterion of having an equal number in each box.
He seems to have some kind of lapse as he finishes this argument
in line 71 by saying, "10, 20, 30, 40, 50," as he points to each box.

After the interviewer's query he corrects this in line 73 to
30 - 35, 40."

10, 20,

The pause in line 73 indicates the effort required on

his part to break up the rhythmic act of counting by 10'

s.

This sug-

counting, where
gests calling his error in line 71 a case of overshoot
a counting sequence is carried too far.
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Notice that his comments in line 6l-Tl are
spontaneous and not

solicited by the interviewer.

The fact that they are spontaneous is

important because this indicates that we are
hearing a more direct ex-

pression of his understanding of the situation as
opposed to an attempt
to respond to a question from the interviewer.

periods of expression

-

These are extended

the longest in the interview.

detailed picture of a rather complex idea.

They present a

Their length parallels a

more intuitive observation from viewing the tape that Roy pours a pro-

portionately large amount of energy into them.

There is also a co-

herence, speed, and confidence in his delivery in these sections that
give the explanation its 'drive'

-

that is, there is a feeling that Roy

is especially not prone to being interrupted here; there is something

he is going to say 'no matter what else happens.'

So from these intui-

tive observations and from the detail, length, and complexity of the
passages, we have:
Ob.

h

Roy gives a spontaneous, 'driven'

,

extended e xplanation of

one of his approaches.
Next, the interviewer asks Roy about the extra information in the

problem text and then gives him a simplified version of the problem

with smaller numbers.
82

I:

Does this help you down here? The other stuff?
"Each
(points to sentence in written problem:
tangering weighs 3 ounces and each box measures
6" by 5" by 8".")

83

R:

Uh uh.

8U

I:

Think that's extra: or

85

R:

(inaudible)

[No]

—
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86

I:

What if we had a - 15 tangerines instead of
Uo?

87

R:

- Uh - there 'd be 3 boxes and
5 in each.

88

I:

Would that work?

89

R:

Uh uh [no] - yeah [yes]

90

I:

But what if we really had 15 tangerines and
we had 5 boxes?

91

R:

Ya couldn't do that.

92

I:

Couldn't split 'em up?

93

R:

Ya couldn't split 'em up.

From this section one has:
Ob.

5

Roy states that 15 tangerines can be divided equally into
boxes (with

5

in each) but not into

5

3

boxes.

Thus Roy's statements here are incompatible with the commutative law of

multiplication.

This is a rather striking phenomenon.

Roy's statement in line 87, "... there 'd be

3

boxes in

5

in each,"

is given immediately without any visible calculation in response to the

question, "What if we had... 15 tangerines instead of Uo?"

solution will be referred to as an immediate solution.

This kind of

This is reminis-

cent of Roy's first response of the interview where he gives an immediate solution to a related problem rn line l6, "...if it was

it'd be

10^

in each,"

(for U0 tangerines).

this situation in lines 95 bo 8l, he draws

each and says, "...10, 20, 30, U0...".

boxes

Later, when Roy explains
U

squares with 10 dots in

But this explains the quanti-

tative situation by starting from the answer and therefore does not

directly indicate a method he used to derive the answer.
two instances of the following phenomenon:

So there are
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Ob. 6

Roy reaches an

i mmediate

solution to certain problems without

referring to any visible calculation method such
as acting
out, counting, or written symbol manipulation.

Thus there is a fourth category to complete the list
of basic

problem solving modes begun earlier.

The list now looks like:

(1) Formulates and solves an arithmetic problem in standard oral

form or standard written form.
(2) Displays a counting-based approach.

(3) Displays an explicitly acted-out approach.
(b) Reaches an immediate solution without visible calculation.

Another pattern in the protocol is:
Ob.

7

All of Roy's trial solutions are multiples of

5

.

In connection with this pattern it is interesting to diverge momentarily

to make an informal cognitive interpretation.

The immediate solutions

mentioned above occur in situations where Roy seems to think about
equal subsets containing

5

or 10 objects each.

His drawing of

U

en-

closed groups of 10 dots in line 75 to 8l support this interpretation.
If this interpretation is also correct for the case of "3 boxes and

5

in each" then it provides a partial explanation for the apparent fact

that Roy has difficulty thinking about "5 boxes and

3

in each" in the

same way, since in that case, the equal subsets are not multiples of
So it is possible that Roy is able to think in terms of groups of

5

5.

or

10 more readily than with groups of other sizes.

Another phenomenon is the following:
Ob.

8

Roy interrupts himself in several places.

respond with a shift in approach.

Two of these cor-

ds

:

)

109

Interruptions are observed when a) verbal or other
activity stops sud-

denly without an ordinary completion, b) this may be
accompanied by an

exclamation like "wait!" or "hold it!" or "no

c) and it may be accom-

panied by frowning or a simultaneous body shift.

Observed interruptions

are marked in lines 19, 22, and U6.

The interruptions in lines 19 and

22 coincide with a shift in approach.

Shifts and re-emergence

Recall that Roy seems to shift between

.

several approaches to the first problem.

We can keep track of these in

the following chart

Approach

Lines

A)

16-19)

B)

21)

"It's 35"

?)

22)

".

B)

26-28)
29)

1

"If.

.

"I4 O

.

.

U

boxes it

be 10 in each"

'

.wait"

take away

35 in each"

-

"No it couldn't be 35"

c)

31-37)

"15 in each box"

D)

38-60

(

A)

6l-8l)

"10, 20, 30, U0"

Checks 15 at

I

.
'

suggestion

.

This chart constitutes an informal classification of Roy's behavior.
It identifies sections

(labeled with the same letter) that are appar-

ently similar with respect to the content of Roy's statements and drawings.

For example, sections in lines 16-19 and 6l-8l share the central

characteristic that Roy draws or speaks of boxes with 10 in each box,
in contrast to other sections.

Question marks indicate sections where

allow
there is an apparent shift in approach but too little data to

classification of the approach.
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In the absence of more detailed statements
and actions on Roy's

part, this kind of classification is a speculative
procedure.

But it

is a procedure that gives one a behavior pattern
to work from, and

there is always the possibility that one may be able to improve
on the

analysis in view of subsequent data.
In conjunction with the phenomenon of shifts between approaches,
one

can speak of the re-emergence of an approach when it reappears in the sub-

ject's behavior after being absent for awhile.

The explanation in lines

6l to 8l is a particularly striking example of the re-emergence of an

approach because of the long intervening period between sections following the "A" approach, and because of its spontaneous character.

the length and complexity of the preceding section (lines 38 - 60
Roy is checking the answer via multiple addition.
ing why 15 won't work (lines 58 - 60

)

5

)

where

As he finishes explain-

he launches spontaneously into an

explanation where the earlier approach involving
boxes and 50 in

Notice

re-emerges and is extended.

*40

tangerines in

*4

He does this on his own,

without a question from the interviewer about his earlier ideas.

This

spontaneous explanation is rather long and complex, leading to the fol-

lowing phenomenon and the following question for future reference:
Ob.

9

There is a spontaneous re-emergence of an approach observed
at an earlier point in the protocol.

•^Alternatively, one might say that Roy's approach in lines 6l-8l should
be labeled (A+D) because it involves elements of his approach in (D)
namely the imagined action of counting and placing equal groups in drawn
boxes in order to evaluate a tentative numerical answer. This observaaspects
tion would have the advantage of recognizing the way in which
one would
case
that
In
of behavior can overlap in various combinations.
by
counting
talk about "aspect A" re-emerging. The case of overshoot
10' s in line 71 also supports the presence of aspect A.

Ill

In the absence of a question from the
interviewer, why does

this approach re-emerge?"

Cognitive Interpretations
S uccessive

:

Dominance and Competition

.

The analysis will now move

from a consideration of patterns observed in the protocol data

-

the

phenomena - to a discussion of internal processes that can account for
these phenomena.

One starts from the finding that Roy immediately dis-

plays several different approaches while working on the problem.

This

suggests that there is a different thought process going on in Roy asso-

ciated with each approach.

In addition, the fact that Roy shifts quickly

between these approaches, the presence of spontaneous interruptions at
some of the shift points, and the re-emergence of an approach suggests

that each of the thought processes behind the approaches 'decides on
its own' when to become involved in Roy's thinking.

That is, one can

imagine each process as an entity with a certain degree of autonomy

-

allowing it to compete with the other processes and even to interrupt
them.

To account for Roy's various approaches then, one posits the exis-

tence of several distinct, semi-autonomous, cognitive structures, each
of which 'take a turn' at dominating Roy's thinking.
the presence of several approaches.

This accounts for

This means that more than one cog-

nitive structure is capable of assimilating the same problem situation.
higher
A structure need not be called into play explicitly by some other

level structure.

It may

'respond on its own' to the current perceptual

theresituation and attempt to assimilate all aspects of the situation,
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by dominating the mainstream of cognitive
activity for a time.

1

*

This

opens up the possibility of producing sudden shifts
and interruptions,

because one is without the strict control of a higher-order
executive
structure to sequence the activity of various lower-order
structures.
Thus a kind of competition for dominance (control) takes place
between

structures, a new one 'taking over' when the currently dominant struc-

ture 'retreats' for some reason (such as a conflict with other constraints of the problem).
In other words, the observed periods of stable output within one

approach followed by a spontaneous shift to a new approach can be ex-

plained as the result of two opposing internal forces.

First, the cur-

rently dominant structure tends to try to interpret the entire problem

situation from one point of view.

Thus a structure can 'take over' for

awhile and support a period of stable behavior.
a divergent spreading of structure activity.

But second, there is

This can trigger the in-

volvement of new structures which may eventually 'take over'

.

So there

can be a stabilizing tendency and a divergent tendency in the cognitive

structure interactions going on at the same time.

Explaining the divergent generation of related cases

.

The theoret-

ical notion that cognitive structures act with a certain degree of

^In the absence of sufficient data to analyze each approach in detail
we cannot specify whether the cognitive process associated with each
of Roy's approaches should be thought of as a single structure or as
Here we simply use the word 'strucseveral cooperating structures.
In the case where one models
convenience.
ture" in the singular for
as consisting of several coopapproach
the cognitive process behind an
shifts by changes in the
observed
erating structures, one accounts for
open the possibility
leaving
profile of currently active structures,
others.
of observed approaches that share some characteristics but not
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autonomy can also play an important role in
explaining the phenomenon
of the divergent generation of related cases.

Recall that Roy gener-

ates related cases in referring to the following
sets of quantities:
a)

1+0

b)

5

c)

1+0

tangerines +

boxes, 10 in each

1+

boxes, 10 in each

tangerines,

with

5

50 tangerines

-»

5

boxes

3

boxes,

-+

3

boxes, with 10 in each, and 2 boxes,

in each

d) 15 tangerines

-*

5

in each

In each of these cases, Roy generates a new configuration of boxes

of tangerines.

In a) and d) he begins from a single quantity - the

total number of tangerines.

Thus in these 2 cases Roy does not appear

to converge on a determined answer in the way one does in carrying out
a standard arithmetic algorithm.

In that case, one starts with two num-

bers and determines a third, so one can make several points:
0b.

10

In cases a) and d) above Roy begins with a single number in

the context of a story and generates other quantities that

will fit some of the aspects of the situation;
Ob.

11

In none of these cases does Roy refer to an arithmetic oper-

ation in standard oral form.
Ob. 12

Furthermore, certain appropriate combinations are not generated, such as:
or f)

e)

15 tangerines

1+0

-*

tangerines,
5

boxes,

5

3 in

boxes 4 8 in each box

-

each box.

Any cognitive mechanisms one proposes to account for Roy's be-

havior should account for the above characteristics.
The generative aspect of Piaget's motion of assimilation is rele-

vant here.

Consider another generative phenomenon

-

that of symbolic

llU

£la£-

A

3

year-old playing with blocks may 'exercise' a cognitive

structure concerned with the idea of 'giving gifts' for
example, by

assimilating arbitrary objects to the structure.

Thus two large toy

blocks may serve to represent a brother and sister and a small block
may represent the gift given to the brother by the sister.

In this

case the child generates for himself the imaginary details of the gift-

giving situation such as the decoration of the gift and the comments
made by the imaginary brother and sister.

The details are generated

as the structure concerning gift-giving becomes active and assimilates

the bare blocks.

This structure will presumably involve substructures

that deal with the giver, the gift, the person given to, and perhaps

associated auxilliary behaviors (like saying "thank you").

Thus part

of the assimilation process in the case of symbolic play is the imag-

inary generation of appropriate context details via substructure activity.

A key feature of Piaget's concepts of assimilation and structure
is that they are used to explain both recognition performance behavior

and generative behavior.

Thus the same cognitive structure and the same

basic assimilation process could account for the subject's behavior in

recognizing a gift-giving situation, for participating in one, and generating an imaginary one.

In each case an act of assimilation is in-

volved on the part of the structure.

Even in recognition and perfor-

mance, a creative, generative, mental act is involved.

This point of

view might be summarized in general by the statement:

One understands

structures
(recognizes, performs in, imagines) a given situation via

appropriate
which generate actions (including perceptual orientations)
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to it.

This statement suggests that we take generation as
a central

property of cognitive structures, not as a separate process.
In situations where Roy generates a related case like:
UO tangerines

-*

h

boxes, 10 in each

we can say that the number Uo is assimilated to a structure that inter-

prets

1*0

tangerines as

U

groups of 10, thereby generating additional

detail and injecting it into the conceptualized situation.

Piaget's

fundamental concepts of assimilation and structure, then, provide us

with the possibility of accounting for generative phenomena such as
the generation of related cases.

Using the assimilation and structure concepts to explain the gen-

eration of related cases is reminiscent of the explanation of the 'warping'

phenomenon given in the previous protocol (Roy

-

"Sharing 6 Candies").

There we assumed that some structure was taking an active role in asserting an equal distribution of candy even though the problem text stated

otherwise.

In the present protocol we assume that a structure takes an

active role in generating the related case
10 in each.

- ^0

tangerines

-*

h

boxes,

This case is generated even though it does not fit all of

the constraints of the problem as stated in the problem text.

In both

cases the most outstanding feature is the fact that the problem text is

interpreted in an unorthodox manner to fit a stable cognitive process
already existing in the subject.

Accounting for Roy's extended explanation

.

The extended explana-

the nature
tion in lines 6l-8l brings up the difficult, deeper issue of
the facile way
of mathematical understanding because it suggests that

beyond a rote procedure
in which Roy can think about groups of 10 goes

:
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for solving problems of a certain type.

Without being so bold as to

attempt to define 'mathematical understanding',
one can make several

suggestive points.
One can summarize Roy's statements and actions in the
explanation
as follows

UO tangerines

•*

k

boxes, 10 in each

U0 tangerines

-*

3

boxes, with 10 in each and 2 boxes, with

5

in each

Now these relationsips are generated

,

not drawn from the problem text.

Thus one cannot think of the cognitive process behind Roy's explana-

tion as merely an algorithm for solving a specified kind of problem.
Furthermore, the explanation is distinguished by its spontaniety,
length, coherence, 'drive', and complexity.

These qualities suggest

that Roy is expressing something he 'understands' as he gives the ex-

planation.

They suggest an internal awareness of a system of relation-

ships relevant to certain ways of joining and separating the various

groups of objects.

The phrase, 'awareness of a system of relationships,'

describes a vague theoretical idea, but it is an idea that contrasts

sharply with the theoretical idea of an algorithm or sequence of mental steps which merely performs (solves a given problem) but cannot

support an explanation or generate novel behavior

.

A theory for an

internal mechanism which fits the phenomena better is the activity of
a cognitive structure, or group of structures, extended continuously

over the period of time during which the explanation is given.
A cognitive interpretation of the re-emergence phenomenon

.

In this

to 40
protocol the re-emergence of approach "A" (involving references
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as U groups of 10

vening activity.

was observed after a considerable period of
inter-

)

This was all the more surprising since the approach

had not led to a satisfactory solution for Roy during
its first appearance.

and

5

Roy says (line 16), "... if it was

boxes it’d... have to be 50."

U

boxes it’d be 10 in each

This is followed by a shift to ap-

proach B, presumably because Roy cannot reconcile ideas behind approach

A with the constraints imposed by the problem text
vided equally into

5

boxes).

(1*0

tangerines di-

How then does the approach re— emerge?

To account for this we think of a cognitive structure, S^, which
is the internal organization whose functioning produces the approach A

that we observe.

The structure is thought of as a dynamic internal

process which becomes active and continues for a period of time, providing a temporary orientation with which to interpret the problem situation.

The most distinctive behavior pattern produced by this structure

is the pattern of referring to units of groups of 10 objects.

We model

the re-emergence of the approach then by assuming that the structure

regains dominance as it reassimilates the problem situation.
The notion of a process for understanding the problem situation
in a certain way also ties in with the notion of aggressive assimilation

introduced in the previous protocol analysis.

It is difficult to ac-

count for the present dialog by modelling Roy's thinking as the delib-

erate selection of various methods based on the analysis of certain
features in the problem.

Because of the spontaneous way in which

approach "A" enters in lines

1(5

and

6l_,

it seems more valid to model

situation.
Roy's thinking as a process which "grabs onto" the problem

structure hecomThus at the beginning of the protocol we think of a
'Vu*.

VV
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ing involved which involves working with objects
in groups of 10, and

we think of this structure as proceeding autonomously
to interpret the

problem ’on its own terms.'

This is the sense in which we think of a

cognitive structure assimilating the problem situation aggressively,
the fact that Roy does not seem to be fully in control of
the emergence of approaches that he displays.

Then we can interpret the re-emergence of approach "A" in line 6l
in terms of structure

actively reassimilat ing the problem situation.

This can account for the spontaneous way in which Roy "slides into"
the beginning of the explanation in line 6l that constitutes the re-

emergence of approach "A".

A model of Roy’s thinking which postulated

a higher level decision making process that analyzed features of the

situation and made the decision to shift to another approach would
have a hard time accounting for the way in which the shift occurs.
Similarly, in a model in which methods of solution are chosen and tried
out one at a time, previously unsuccessful approaches like this one

would be marked as inapplicable and therefore not be retried.

On

the other hand by modelling cognitive processes as autonomous cogni-

tive structures which can aggressively assimilate a situation, we open
up the possibility of a ’strong’ structure reassimilating the situation, leading to an observed re-emergence of an approach.

Roy’s ex-

tended explanation provides evidence that this process is less of a
solution method than it is a means of understanding the situation.

It

not
represents a ’compelling point of view’ to Roy, and as such it is
so easy for him to simply mark it as inapplicable.

approach "A" re-emerging.

So one sees

Thus by modelling cognitive processes with

.
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autonomous properties like the ability to
assimilate aggressively,
one can explain observed phenomena like the
spontaneous re-emergence

of an approach.

Summary

.

In the analysis of this protocol several behavioral

phenomena have been identified which are shown in the following
diagram below the horizontal line.

We have also proposed several kinds of

cognitive processes to account for these phenomena, shown above the

horizontal line.

The downward pointing arrows indicate the processes

that help to explain such phenomena in Fig.

U
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Structure
Autonomy-

Proces

Characteristics

Cognitive

Phenomena

Extended
Explanation

Fig.

U

Re-emergence
of an Approach

Relations between Cognitive Processes Characteristics
and Observed Phenomena
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Chapter Summary

A wide variety of phenomena observed in the
protocols examined in
this chapter can now be listed along with protocol
numbers:
1*

Expression of an arithmetic problem in standard written
form or standard oral form; (l), (2), (6)

2.

Non-standard word order for division problem;

3.

Makes a standard written-symbol algorithm calculation; (l), (2)

U.

Tries alternative algorithms for a single problem; (2)

5.

Answer is evaluated and rejected; (2), (6)

6.

Generates related cases; (2), (6)

7.

Use of drawings; (3), (5), (6)

8.

Describes actions before drawing them;

9-

Piecewise adaptation cycle (solving a problem in pieces)
- an intuitive heuristic;

(l)

(3)

(3)

10.

Two parallel series generated by counting;

11.

False starts in counting; (4)

12.

Warping aspects of problem; (5)

13.

Ignoring aspects of problem; (5)

lU.

Reactions of surprise; (5)

15-

Expression of same situation in both addition and
subtraction formats; (5)

16.

Re-emergence of an approach; (6)

17.

Interruptions; (6)

18.

Extended explanation; (6)

19.

Favors multiples of

5

and 10

;

(6)

(M

)

.
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Disparity in solutions to two problems
related

20.

by commutativity; (6)
21.

Overshoot counting; (6)
In addition, four basic modes of solution
behavior were identified:
1.

Formulation of an arithmetic problem in standard oral
form or standard written form; (l), (2), (6)

2.

An Acted-out solution; (3)

3.

A

U.

An immediate solution;

Counting-based solution; (U)
( 1+

And three broader phenomena were identified:
1.

Misapplication of written arithmetic algorithms;

2.

Problem is

3.

Successive shifts of approach; (2), (6)

'misread'

(2)

to fit the subject's ideas; (5)

The theoretical concepts assembled in order to begin explaining

these phenomena have included the concepts of:

autonomous cognitive

structures remaining active in time, assimilation and disequilibrium,

written arithmetic algorithm structures, counting structures, practical action structures, isolation of algorithmic structures, parallel

structure activity, overload, and successive dominance.
In Chapter V the David-"Sharing 15 Stones" protocol will be anal-

yzed further and two new protocols will be analyzed in a more detailed
manner.

There diagrams will be used to develop models of cognitive struc-

ture interactions as they occur in time and to explicitly tie aspects
of the models to protocol observations.

Methodology for these more

detailed analyses will be developed in the next chapter
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CHAPTER

IV

METHODOLOGY II

Maps of Cognitive Structure Activity

In order to analyze protocols at a deeper and more
detailed level,

a diagramming technique will now be developed which displays the
rela-

tionships between the observed behavior of a student and a model of his
or her cognitive processes.

This is an extension of a diagramming tech-

nique called the "wavy line diagram" proposed by Witz (1973) and de-

scribed by Easley (197^)-

It is also related to methods of diagramming

used by Driver (1973), Tripplet (1973), and Knifong (1971
Example of a diagrammed protocol

.

).

The purpose of these diagram-

ming techniques is to aid in the construction of explanations of a subject’s behavior in terms of the activity of various cognitive structures.
In order to introduce these techniques in the context of a simple example,

the protocol of a younger child working on a simple arithmetic problem

will be used.

Consider the following transcript of an interview with

Kim (grade l.U), in which she demonstrates her ability to do a simple

subtraction problem on her fingers.
on several different occasions.

Kim demonstrates this ability

In this instance, the diagram portrays

the very simple theory that Kim has an established mental process that

governs this behavior

— and

that as a first approximation it can be

modeled as a single unit of mental organization
structure.

Line 1 and lines

U

—a

single cognitive

through 6 from the transcript on the

following page are diagrammed in Fig.

5*

7

.

)

1214

Kim ~

Subtraction Problem

...

1

I:

Try

2

K:

8 and then take away 7-

8 take away 7.

(This problem is addressed to Kim and another
girl,
Jill, working at the same table.
Kim makes some
motions with her fingers, says that she got 2 for
the answer, but seems uncertain.
I ask here to
try again to make sure, and she begins by saying
"8" as she holds up
I point this out,
7 fingers.
and she puts an eighth finger up.
h

K:

(Has 8 fingers up)

5

(Puts down 7 fingers, one at a time)
remains up)

6

I

(One finger

think it's one.

7

I:

OK, so you put 8 fingers up, then you put them
down, one at a time, huh?

8

K:

Yeah

9

I:

Can you count out can you count for me when you
do
put them down? You have 8?

—

.

10

K:

.

(Puts up 8 fingers)

—8

11

OK

and then take away

12

(Puts down 7 fingers in succession, begins counting
aloud with the 3rd finger down)

13

3, 1,5, 6,

lh

I:

And what happens?

15

K:

I

have

1

7-

left.

In the diagram in Fig.

5

time runs from left to right.

Below

wavy line one finds the investigator's observations of events during the
interview, as refined in several playbacks of the tape.

These include

statements of the interviewer and of the subject, actions performed
the
by the subject (written in parentheses), and current aspects of

)

,
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of

Model

Kim:

(Puts

(Puts
down 7
fingers
one at
a time)

K:

up 8
fingers

8

Fig.

5

Initial

fingers
up

Wavy Line Diagram for Kim

s one.

1

finger
up
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environment (shown enclosed in boxes).

Above the wavy line we find

the investigator's model of the subject's mental
activity.

The model

is trivial in this case so far, showing only
the activity of a single

structure.

Fingers

The investigator draws the region labeled "Take-Away
Using

to indicate that a cognitive structure (a stable unit
of men-

tal functioning) is active in Kim during this time.

This unit actively

coordinates her perceptions and actions while she is solving the probThe horizontal line extending to the right of the structure in-

lem.

dicates the length of time through which the structure stays active.
In this case the line indicates that the internal "Take-away using

fingers" structure 'stays on' for the entire protocol.
The left-most vertical arrow pointing upward shows that the struc-

ture assimilates the interviewer's question, "Try

8

take away 7".

In

this case the structure's activity is initiated as this assimilation
occurs.

The structure provides an interpretation of and a response to

the question.

The right-most upward-pointing arrow runs from a box

below the wavy line indicating that Kim is holding her hands in a
position with one finger raised, to the horizontal line indicating
that the "Take-away using fingers" structure is still in an active
state.

The position of Kim's fingers is here taken to be an aspect

of the world to which she is attending.

The upward pointing arrow in-

dicates that this aspect is assimilated by the structure.

Arrows point-

ing downward indicate those places where Kim's observable actions are

thought of as being initiated and controlled by the

Take-away using

fingers" structure.
Thus as statements and actions occur in time in the observable
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world (below the wave line), one thinks of an organized,
unobservable
mental process going on in time inside the individual.

In this first

first example the model of this process takes the simplest
possible

form- that of a single structure which is active for a period
of approx-

imately 30 seconds.
Lower level perceptual and motor output structures are assumed to
be operating as well but are not shown explicitly in the diagram.

the higher level 'mediating process' is represented.

Only

Kim's perception

of the phrase, "Let's try 8 take away 7", for example, certainly in-

volves the activity of aural and language comprehension structures.

In

the diagrams in this study the operation of these structures will not

be shown explicitly but will simply be assumed.

(See Fig. 6.)

Cognitive structure activity can be modeled at different levels
of detail, depending on the interests of the investigator and on the

level of detail in the data.
as in Fig.

7

,

The previous transcript can be diagrammed

with an exploded view of the "Take-away using fingers"

structure to provide a more detailed model of its internal form.
In this diagram Kim's three sequential actions are each associated

with the activity of particular substructures: "Put up fingers," "Put
down fingers," and "Counts remaining fingers."

The substructures

labeled "1st Number m" and "2nd Number n" indicate that the "Take-away
using fingers" structure assimilates two numbers.

They are labeled

not
with letters for the convenience of the analyst (the letters do

mathematical
carry the connotation of being variable concepts in the full

sense in the mind of the subject.)

Using this model, one would expect

question like.
Kim to be surprised and puzzled if she were asked a
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Fig. 6

Lower Level Structures
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Fig. 7

'Exploded View' of "Take Away Using
Fingers" Structure
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How much is 8 take away?" because the question
would probably activate
the "Take-away using fingers" structure in Kim, but
would not satisfy
the expectation of the structure to assimilate two numbers.

In other

words the question would create a disequilibrium situation,
because it

would activate this unit of functioning, but the unit would not be able
to embrace, or orient to, the question in a meaningful way.

Thus cer-

tain expectations are built right into the "Take-away using fingers"
structure.

The arrows labeled "followed by" indicate that these substruc-

tures are organized within the overall structure to follow each other
in their operation.

The structures

"8"

and "7" represent number structures

activated by the interviewer’s question.

There are many possible ideas

that could be activated in Kim by mentioning the word 'eight'.

These

would include structures for saying the word "eight," seeing or writing
the numeral, perceiving aspects of a collection of 8 objects, counting
to 8, etc.

Since we do not have enough data in this protocol to infer

the distribution of activation among these ideas in this case, we simply
label the structure "8" and think of it as the cluster of ideas acti-

vated by the word "eight" in this particular situation.

Note that this

labeled structure does not represent a static 'internal symbol'

that is

It represents an active perceptual or motor

'stored' or 'transferred.'

process that is active in Kim here for a while.

Observation and theory

.

It can be seen that this type of diagram-

and cogniming makes explicit the separation between observed phenomena
by repretive processes ahered to less formally in the previous chapter

appearing below the
senting phenomena (in this case the raw transcript)
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wavy lines and models of cognitive
processes appearing above it.

In

addition it shows the connections between
theory (above) and observations (below)

in the form of the vertical arrows
crossing the wavy line,

pointing upward from aspects of the environment
assimilated to structures and downward from structures to the observed
behavior they produce.

The diagramming also permits one to make more
detailed models

of cognitive processes to keep track of complex
relations between cog-

nitive structures above the wavy line.
The wavy line diagram can also help to clarify other methodological
issues concerning the analysis of cognitive structures.

Recall the

attempt in Chapter III to keep observations and theoretical interpre-

tations separate in the analysis.

In particular any statements that

would suggest that one could observe cognitive processes directly were
avoided.

What the subjects said and did was not viewed as equivalent

to what they thought

— it

was necessary to construct a theory of the

subject’s thought processes from his statements and actions.

Thus the

statements about cognitive processes in a subject did not follow logically from his behavior.

The fact that Roy assimilated what he read in

the "Sharing Six Candies" problem to an active structure concerned with

sharing equally did not follow logically from the data in the protocol.
The assimilation concept is an invention originating with Piaget.
this case it was used to account for Roy’s behavior on the tape.

In

What

the analyst does is to utilize and invent theoretical constructs that

give one explanatory power when facing the data on the tapes.

One is

not "proving" the existence of assimilation or other cognitive mechanisms

but one is saying that the child's behavior makes more sense to us when
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one thinks in terms of the child
possessing certain kinds of cognitive

structures that assimilate certain aspects
of the situation.

According

to some contemporary accounts of the
nature of science, such as Kuhn
(1962) and Bohm

in science.

(

1969 )

,

this is the case with all structural
concepts

Fundamental concepts like the atom, the photon,
and the cur-

vature of space around a star do not "follow"
automatically from physical observations.

They are structural concepts that have been
created

by scientists to help explain diverse phenomena.
the human mind that 'fit

1

They are creations of

a body of observations.

If the models of cognitive processes do not follow logically
from

observations, then what is their relationship to observation?

We need

to specify some other kind of relationship between observations and
theory.

These are the R1 and R2 relations specified by Witz (1973)

and represented by the arrows which cross the wavy line.

These serve

the purpose of tying theoretical models to observations, and show ex-

plicitly which aspects of the model account for which aspects of observed behavior.

This~m^thodology allows the investigator to approach

the analysis of interviews as a creative endeavor.

Models above the

wavy line are in a real sense invented by the investigator.

It is only

in this way that new insights can be gained and it is only in this way

that novel approaches used by children that surprise us can be explained.
But they are created as the investigator is immersed in his observations

of the tape.

A strong constraint is kept on the creative process of

theory building by maintaining rigorous ties to data.

In this way one

avoids having one's theory 'take off on its own' and become too far

removed from the reality of the real behavior of children.

The con-

133

straints on theory in this case are rooted in the
practice of starting
from the tape and from a detailed protocol and from
including the protocol in the report.

The R1 and R2 relations then tie the constructed

theory to the data and serve the purpose of forcing the analyst
to
keep revising his models of cognitive processes until they can account
for as many detailed observations as possible.

In summary, the method-

ology employed involves creative theory construction constrained rigorously by the requirement to peg theoretical models to the data explicitly. 1

Progressive refinement

.

One particularly important feature of

this type of analysis that is difficult to reflect in a final report
is the fact that the analysis process is one of progressive refinement.

The processes of telescoping or presenting an exploded view of a cogni-

tive structure (used in the second diagram of Kim's interview) is one

example of progressive refinement.

In that case we started with a very

simple model to account for the observed data and proceeded to expand
the detail of the modelT^by breaking down a cognitive structure into its

component parts.

revisions

— not

But models above the wavy line also suffer drastic

just expansions

— during

the analysis of each interview.

This process of proposing a certain configuration of cognitive struc-

tures to account for an interview passage, rereading the protocol to

determine whether the configuration is compatible with other passages
conin the interview, then returning above the wavy line to modify the

figuration is repeated many times.
hypotheses are
This process, in which large numbers of preliminary

1

discussion of
See the notes at the end of appendix 1 for a related
problems.
arithmetic
simple
to
solutions
methodology in the analysis of

13*4

rejected

in the early versions of the models,
is not reflected in the

diagrams printed in the final analysis.

But in reality the analysis

process is a bootstrap procedure of just
this kind.

Phenomena observed

in the protocol lead to new insights
for a cognitive explanation, for a

model of cognitive activity.

These models in turn aid him to see

similar phenomena elsewhere in the protocol ones he did not see at
first glance.

Thus the attention of the analyst oscillates back
and

forth across the wavy line as he works.

The process is one of analysis

by synthesis, because the analyst must synthesize a model of
cognitive
activity above the wavy line.

But the model is constantly being checked

for correspondence with the data, and this involves many revisions
in the model and scores of replays of sections of the tape.

An example

of this revision process will be given in the Joey - "Sharing Fifteen

Stones

protocol in Chapter V

.

In that analysis an initial diagram

and a revised diagram will be presented as an illustration of the process of progressive refinement.

The Dynamic Cognitive Structures Model:

Concepts and Diagram Notation

This section defines basic concepts of a model of cognition based
on cognitive structure activity, and develops a notation for diagram-

ming cognitive structure interactions.
ized in the analyses in Chapter V.

2

These concepts will be util-

The reader may prefer to begin

^See Chapter I, pages 22 to 32, for references to studies by Witz, Easley
and others where the concepts of cognitive structure, substructure, sequential and parallel integration, activity elements (related to expectation), activation, the R1 relation (external assimilation), and R2
relation are introduced and discussed.
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reading Chapter V and refer back to concept definitions
and notation
given here as needed.
!•

Stable Dynamic Relations Between Structures
These relations describe the way structures are organized to become active in groups.

They are stable over per-

iods of weeks to years.
A.

Cognitive Structures (Fig. 8a)
Cognitive structures are the basic units
of mental functioning in the model.

They are

stable processes which, when activated, assimilate aspects of the environment and provide
an interpretation for or response to them.
B.

Substructures (Fig. 8b)
Structures S^ and S^ are shown as substructures of structure S^.

This means that

S^ and S^ will ordinarily be active whenever

S^ is active.

As S^ and S^ function, S^ can

integrate the functioning of S^ and S^, i.e.
S^ is a higher-order unit of functioning.
C.

Sequential and Parallel Integration (Fig. 8c)
The output of substructures may be se-

quenced in time, for example, to control the

habitual performance of two actions in a specified order (Case l).

They may also be inte-

grated in parallel, as when two actions are

performed in a simultaneous or overlapping

a.

Cognitive structures

c.(l)

Sequential
integration
of substructures

d.

Fig. 8

b.

Substructures

c. (2)

Parallel
integration
of substructures

Expectation intention

Stable Dynamic Relations Between Structures
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H
+

+

time

a.

>

Structure activity

Source
gone

Some
candies
V^left
c.

Internal assimilation

e.

Assimilation gap

Fig. 9

d.

Disequilibrium

Transitory Structure Dynamics
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manner (Case 2).
D.

Expectat ion- Intent ion (Fig. 8d)
This relation is used to model structure

activity where the subject is about to perform
an action and indicates that he or she expects
a certain effect to occur as a result.

When the

action-oriented structure A is active, a tension
condition is set up in the perceptually-oriented
structure P, which continues until the expected
effect is perceived and assimilated to
II

.

P.

Transistory Structure Dynamics
These properties and relations determine how structures
can excite, conflict with, and cooperate with each other.

They are stable over shorter periods of seconds to hours.
A.

Activity (Fig.

9a

)

Structure A becomes fully active at time t^,
remains active until t^, where its activity declines to a peripheral level, and 'shuts off'

becomes inactive

— at

t^.

—

The horizontal line

is called the structure's activity trace

.

In-

tuitively, when one says that someone is cur-

rently aware of an object or event one implies
that some internal structure associated with
that object or event is currently fully active.

Similarly if one says that someone is
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in a state of readiness to perform some
action

one implies that some internal structure
assoc-

iated with that action is currently fully active.

Example: David - "Sharing 15 Stones" Pro-

tocol (Lines 22-44).
3

stones each to

4

David has distributed

people and when

3

stones

are left over he proceeds to cut two of them
in half.

This is accounted for in the dia-

gram by a structure labeled "Cutting in half"

which is active through line 30 before dropping to a peripheral level of activity.

The

structure becomes fully active again over
line 39 where David has cut the last stone
into

4

"chunks" and the interviewer asks him

whether a chunk can be called a half of a
stone.
B.

(See diagram on p.156)

Activation (Fig. 9b)
A is already in an active state.

A's

activity excites B (through some path of
coupling) sufficiently so that B 'turns on'
and changes to an active state

.

B may ac-

tually receive excitation from several
sources

3

(A^

A

2

,

A^

)

which cause B to be-

The examples in this section refer to the three diagramed analyses
in Chapter V.

)

.

come active.

In this case we say that A con-

tributes to the activation of B.
Example:

Stones

(Fig.

9b)

Protocol (Line 8).

Joey - "Sharing 15
Joey immediately

says, "Fifteen take away

This is ac-

acounted for by a structure labeled "Take away."
The model shows the school ideology structure,
"Use an arithmetic problem in standard verbal

form," contributing to the activation of the

"Take away" structure.

Internal Assimilation (Fig.

9o

When structure S^ assimilates structure
the activity of structure S^ becomes inte-

grated temporarily over a period of time with
the activity of structure S^.

Intuitively one

embodying an idea that provides

thinks of

an interpretation or meaningful context for S 0

.

It can also be the case that the activity

of

or

is initiated by the assimilation.

In that case the appearance of the assimilation

relation in the diagram will correspond with
the beginning of that structure's activity

trace
Example:

Protocol.

David

-

"Sharing 15 Stones"

David has drawn

3

small circles

representing stones to be shared among

it

people

and begins to "cut one in half" (Line
22).

In

this case an action structure assimilates a
per-

ceptual structure as the object of the action.
D.

Disequilibrium (Fig. 9d)
This condition arises when a structure

attempts to assimilate a structure

and fails.

The condition is assumed to create tensions in
the system which encourage the processes of

activation, reassirailation

,

and suppression

until the disequilibrium condition is ended.
Example:

Kathy - "Sharing 15 Candies"

Protocol (Line 11

).

Kathy tries to divide

15 candies among 3 people by giving

3

to

each but discovers that some candies will
still be left.

This knowledge conflicts with

the expectation that the candy source should
be used up.
E.

Assimilation G aps (Fig. 9e)
This is a condition which sets up tensions similar to those caused by a disequil-

ibrium condition

—

further cognitive activity

is encouraged until the condition ends.

condition occurs when a structure
to assimilate another structure

This

attempts
in order to

operate, but no appropriate structure S 2 is

Ih2

currently active.

Example:

It is diagrammed as an oscil-

Joey - "Sharing 15 Stones" Pro-

tocol (Line 65 ).

After an unsuccessful arith-

metical approach, Joey shifts over to dealing
out blocks into

4

groups to solve the problem.

Just before he begins dealing, Joey checks

the problem text to establish the number of

recipients.

To account for this the diagram

shows the occurrence of an assimilation gap
in the activity of a substructure of the

"Sharing" structure.

The condition is assumed

to activate other structures which lead Joey

to refer to the text.

This leads to the

assimilation of the needed structure relating to the number of people, "4 friends",

ending the assimilation gap condition.
III. Relations Between Cognitive Structures and Observations

of Behavior
A.

:

Relation (Fig. 10a)
The R^ relation between a structure S and
a set of aspects A

,

A

?

,

,

in the environment

indicates that S provides an interpretation of
or response to the aspects.
and A

ilate the aspects A
][

S is said to assim-

attended to in the
?

Fig. 10

Relations Between Cognitive Structures
and Observations of Behavior

U4
environment.

If the structure S becomes active

as this happens (Case l), one says that
S be-

comes active as it assimilates
S is

and

A,,.

If

alreaay active (Case 2) one simply says

that S assimilates A^ and A^.
One refers to these cases as external

assimilation vhen one wants to distinguish
them from an internal assimilation relation

between two structures.
Often, one thinks of an aspect A^ being

assimilated to a low-level perceptual structure P which is in turn assimilated internally to a higher-order structure S (Case 3).
However, explicit reference to lower order

structures will often be omitted in which
case the notation in 1 will be used instead
of that in

3.

It should be emphasized that structures

can assimilate several aspects of the environ-

ment at once (Case l).

Also, a single aspect

can be assimilated by more than one structure
(Case
B.

4 ).

Relation (Fig. 10b)
One's most direct sources of evidence for
the presence of an active structure in the

subject are observed patterns in the subject's
behavior.

Thus, one thinks of a structure

manifesting itself by controlling or influencing specific actions (including statements)

of the subject.

One can indicate the relation-

ship between the structure and the observed be-

haviors it accounts for by means of an R

p

rela-

tion between a structure appearing above the

wavy line and molar aspects of observed behavior (B^, B^,
(Case l).

)

below the wavy line

In some cases different structures

can be involved in the same molar aspect of

behavior (Case 2).

3

Easley and Witz (1975) define the R 2 relation as the entire set of
connections between observed aspects of the subject's responses and
R]. is dethe cognitive structures attributed to him for a protocol.
the environof
aspects
observed
between
fined as the set of connections
R]_ and R 2
The
them.
assimilate
ment and the cognitive structures that
in the
relations
many-many
relations are both characterized then as
mathematical sense.

.
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CHAPTER

V

DETAILED ANALYSES

Some techniques for constructing more detailed
models of cognitive processes were discussed in Chapter IV, and
three detailed analyses will now be presented.

These analyses will draw together many

of the individual theoretical concepts developed in Chapter
III, where
a survey was made of a wide range of story problem
solutions.

Two challenging goals of this chapter are the following:

The dia-

grammed models given will attempt to descri be interactions b etween cognitive structures in real time

.

Furthermore, ties between the models

and protocol observations will be ex h ibited explicitly

.

The solutions chosen for detailed analysis here are of a parti-

cular kind.

They are all solutions where the student explicitly acts

out the actions involved in the story of the problem by using drawings,

hand motions, or manipulative materials.

This means that the protocols

are particularly rich in observable behaviors and makes them good can-

didates for detailed modelling of the cognitive processes occurring.

They also offer a look at solutions that do not depend on written symbol algorithms, and therefore may lead to insights about more funda-

mental problem solving behaviors that are less formal than written
arithmetic
The first analysis in this chapter extends the discussion given in
chapter III of the David

-

"Sharing 15 Stones" protocol.

Two new pro-

tocols are then discussed in the second and third analyses.
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David

-

"Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol

Detailed Analysis

1

In this section the David "Sharing 15 Stones

sented in chapter 3 will be
analyzed more formally,

protocol preBefore proceed-

ing the reader may wish to review
the phenomena and cognitive
interpretations discussed there for the
protocol, and to reread the transcript on p. JO.
In this section a more detailed
set of observations will first

be made from the transcript, followed
by the construction of a cog-

nitive model using the diagramming techniques
developed in the previous
chapter.

Additional observations.

In Chapter 3 it was stated that David's

actions form a piecewise adaptation cycle in which
he repeatedly draws
an object in each of the

central group.

squares and then crosses off circles in the

U

This cycle can be shown more explicitly in the follow-

ing chart.

Code Letter for
Type of Behavior

Line

A

9

B

10

"Wanna divide it by 4."

C

12

Draws sacks

X

D

13

Draws a circle in each square.

Y

E

1

Crosses off

B

15

"Now we divide

D

1

Draws circle in each square.

X

—

Draws 15 stones in center

h

circles in center
b

more."
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Code Letter for
Type of Behavior
Y

Line

E

16

Crosses off

B

IT

"Now we divide this by

D

IT

Draws circle in each square.

F

IT

"Everybody’s got

E

19

Crosses off

G

22

"Cut one in half."

H

22

Draws circle in 2 of the squares.

G

2h

"Cut this in half."

H

2k

Draws circle in two remaining squares.

I

30

Draws vertical lines through 2 circles in center.

J

32

"We'll put little chunks of that one
in each box."

X

K

32

Puts a dot in each square.

Y

L

32

Crosses off last circle in center.

X

Y

X

Y

U

U

circles in center.
k

more."

3 ."

circles in center.

Sections are labeled with the same letter where they are observed
to be the same type of behavior.
at two levels.

Behavior patterns are identified here

Letters in the left column denote more general behavior

categories than letters on the right.

Letters used to classify more

than one episode of behavior carry the following interpretations:
B - Refers to dividing

U

D - Draws a circle in each square
E - Crosses off four circles in center
G - Refers to cutting in half
H - Draws circle in 2 squares

,

11*9

General categories are:
Y — Puts an identical object in each square

Y - Crosses off objects in center group
It should be noted that these behavior categories
are not defined

before the interview.

They are formulated from the child's behavior

by the analyst as he views the tape.

The analyst is constantly on the

look-out for new behavior patterns that he has not seen before.

It is

only in this way that he can be sensitive to the child's organization

of his behavior, including novel and creative behavior.
The chart shows the behavior pattern X-Y repeated

5

times in the

left-hand column, where X stands for putting an identical object in
each square and Y stands for crossing off some objects in the center
Thus we have a repeated pattern of behavior on David's part.

group.

At the same time, there are variations in his behavior in the X and Y

For example, in line lU David crosses off

passages.

U

circles in the
Later these

center group, and in line 30 he crosses off 2 circles.

variations will be interpreted as David's adaptations to the new situations that develop as he solves the problem in a piecewise manner.

Several sections of transcript can be identified which show that

David orients himself perceptually to several distinct groups of objects in his drawing.

David repeatedly refers to or acts separately on

several distinct groups of objects
2

t

3

,

4,

5

vant here.

and 6 shown in Fig. 11*

Groups 1, 2,

ially contiguous.

3,

b,

and

These include at least groups

.

1

Several kinds of observations are rele5

are drawn with their members spat-

Group l's members are drawn sequentially and so are

Group 6’s (the people's "cans").

Groups 2, 3, b, and

5

are referred

150

o
o
•

Fig. 11

Groups David Refers To

151

to when David says, "Everybody’s
got 3."

to verbally.

1

and 6 are also referred

David r efers to the squares differently
at different

times during the interview, calling them
sacks, cans, boxes, and

apparently associating them with people in the
statement, "Everybody's
got

3.

This indicates that the abstract figures in
his drawing are

flexible to a certain extent as symbols for various
aspects of the
story.

The transcript itself, the phenomena from chapter III

,

the draw-

ings of distinct groups, and the behavior pattern chart
constitute the

observations made from the protocol.
Cognitive processes model

.

One can attempt to connect these ob-

servations explicitly along with those in chapter III, to a model of
David's cognitive processes during the interview.
this protocol will center on the diagram in Fig. 13

The analysis of
.

A simplified ver-

sion of this diagram appears in Fig. 12.
In chapter III it was proposed that a major element of David's men-

tal activity is based on a practical action idea of sharing.

Starting

from the major X-Y behavior pattern just identified in the protocol, a

practical action structure appears in the diagrammed model in Fig. 12
to account for David's repeated actions of putting an object in each

of the four squares.
in the diagrams.

This cognitive structure is labeled "Sharing"

The horizontal trace line extending to the right

from this structure indicates its extended, continuous activity, stretch
ing almost to the end of the protocol.

Vertical lines connect the struc

ture to each observed behavior that it accounts for below the wavy line.
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Fig. 12a

Initial Diagram - David's Solution Process

)
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Fig. 12 b

(Sharing)

(

3 circles
left in

central
group

Draws
circle

(

Draws
circle

in 2

in 2

squares)

remaining
squares
circle
left in
central
group
1

David's notion of sharing relates to several
groups - a group of
people, a source group or source quantity of material
to be shared,
and the groups of material that each person receives.

groups represented in David's drawing.

These are the

The basic action represented

in the drawing is that of transferring stones from the central
group

to the people.

The unit of mental functioning controlling this action,

labeled "Give n shares to n people," constitutes the main substructure
of the "Sharing" structure and all of the other elements in the struc-

ture are organized around it.
structure.

Thus the structure is an action-oriented

As a unit of knowledge, one thinks of the sharing structure

as a stable, internal process that can become activated in David to

control, comprehend, or imagine an external act of sharing.

This in-

ternal process must integrate and make sense of several aspects of
the situation.

More specifically, there must be a perceptual orienta-

tion to an initial situation with a quantity of material to be shared
and a group of people, ordinarily with the overtone that the people de-

There is a kinesthetic sense of the motion of

sire the material.

transferring pieces of material to each member, and there is the notion, dependent on the concept of 1-1 correspondence, that every person

must get a share.

There are also perceptual expectations about what

should happen as the result of the sharing act

-

that each person will

have an equal amount and that the source material will be gone (or almost gone).
The structure is modeled in the diagram in Fig. 12 as having

major substructures.

2

The substructure controlling the perceptual-motor

by two perceptual
act of giving n shares to n people is accompanied
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Fig. 13a

Sharing

Detailed Diagram: David’s Solution Process

156

Fig.

13 b

)
157

people

158

substructures which create the expectation of two results:

that each

person will have an equal amount, and that the source group
will be
used up.

That these results are expected by David after a successful

act of distribution is indicated in the diagram by the notation a

—Ql

read "Do or have a, then expect situation B").
Here by expectations one means that certain perceptual substruc-

tures are activated ('warmed up')
event.

— ready

to assimilate an external

Thus there is a kind of tension condition set up within the

child when he or she is ready to act, and the tension condition is relaxed when the expected event is assimilated to the waiting perceptual
substructures.

One makes a special effort to avoid thinking of the

sharing structure or any other structure as a piece of static informa-

tion or as some kind of verbal statement.

Instead one thinks of it

as a stable, action-oriented unit of functioning in David.

As a unit

of knowledge, it is closer to what one would call "knowing a skill" or

"knowing how to share" than to "knowing some information" or "knowing
some facts about sharing."

Diagrammed analysis overview

The model above the wavy line in

.

Fig. 12 will now be presented in an overview fashion first and then ex-

amined in detail in terms of Fig. 13.

One can account for the repeated

actions of 'passing out’ stones with the activity of the "Sharing"
structure.

This structure accounts for David's behavior in section

A where he passes out
a time.

3

circles to each box on paper, one circle at

The structure operates

each time.

3

times, distributing

U

circle-stones

assimilates
It has an action-oriented substructure that
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a source that can be divided into n equal
shares and distributes them

to n people.

This leads to two expectations:

that each person will

have an equal share, and the source will be used
up.

When this structure cannot assimilate the

3

stones remaining in

the same manner, the structure labeled "Cutting in
half" becomes ac-

tive in parallel with the "Sharing" structure as two of
the circles
are cut in half and

U

half circles are passed out (section B).

How

the "Cutting in half" structure is activated will be the focus of
a

later discussion.

Another structure labeled "Dividing by cutting"

accounts for the way David handles the last remaining stone as he says,
"So we'll put little chunks of that one in each box."

This is a re-

lated but more general and less differentiated structure than the
Cutting in half" structure, and the size of each of the resulting
chunks is anticipated with less precision.

When the experimenter

asks about the size of the "chunks" (section C) David's "Cutting in

half" structure is presumed to operate recursively as he describes

the chunks as a "half of a half of a half of a stone."

The detailed

diagram in Fig. 13 first shows the "15 stones" structure being assimilated to the "Divide source into equal pieces" substructure.

But

there is no evidence of any action being taken on this group as a
whole.

Instead, the diagram shows the "Give n shares to n people"
stones structure "in

substructure activating and assimilating the

place of" the 15 stones, signifying that David stops attending to the
15 stones and focuses on only the first
a size he feels comfortable with.

U

stones as a source group of

This is shown as a termination of

the horizontal line for the activity of the

'15

stones

structure

l6o

and the activation of the "k stones" structure.

repeatedly assimilates new groups of

U

stones as the source, never

assimilating 8 or 12 stones to give 2 or
"Cutting in half".
ilates new groups of
left.

^4

The structure then

3

to each person.

The "Give n shares..." substructure reassimstones and distributes them until only

The perception of these

3

are

stones is not directly assimilatable

along with the "U friends" structure to the "Give
substructure.

3

n shares to n people"

This is presumed to create a kind of ’free for all’ sit-

uation where other

(

subliminally active) structures are able to com-

pete for control of David's thinking, and a structure labeled "Cutting
in half" emerges.

This structure is shown assimilating perceptions of

individual 'stones’ (circles) and going through the internalized action
of cutting them in half, leading to the expected result of having

2

smaller, equal pieces.

Internalized action

.

Going through the internalized action of

"cutting in half," is only the way we explain the fact that David
can actually represent in the drawing what happens when an object is
cut in half.

He does this without actually cutting a real object in

half, so we model his cognitive process as an internalized action.

The diagramming technique developed so far is powerful enough to show
some aspects of this internalized action in detail.

In dealing with

small numbers of objects (l to U) we assume that the subject is cap-

able of holding active a separate perceptual structure for each object or group of objects that he works with.
as

o

o

The structures drawn

are responsible for perceptual expectations of having two

half.
smaller pieces as a result of cutting one circle or stone in

l6l

We can think of a perceptual structure say, for
perceiving a small
stone, that would be active if David were actually seeing
a small
stone.

We assume that the same structure has become active
here, even

though there are no real stones present.

In this case we can speak in-

formally of David imagining the presence of a stone.

Similarly, he

imagines cutting the stone in half, when the "Cutting in half" struc-

ture is active without actually cutting anything in output mode.

The internalized action process is presumed to involve the activation of perceptual and motor structures at some intermediate level be-

tween the lowest structures of sensation and action and the higher conceptual expectations for cutting an object in half can be active internally in the absence of real external objects and cutting movements.
Can David imagine manipulating quantities of objects?

His activity

here is certainly consistent with the idea that he can imagine mani-

pulating at least 2 objects.

He says (line 22), "Cut one in half, put

it in here and here," and draws a circle of 2 of the

knows that "cutting in half" is going to produce

2

1+

squares.

He

objects, and this

knowledge is integrated smoothly into the context of sharing.

The

interpretation represented in the diagram is that this knowledge is

basically a perceptual-motor anticipation.

He knows how to cut some-

thing in half, and when he gets ready to cut something in half, his
perceptual structures are ’fired up’ to assimilate
equal size.

2

This view contrasts with the idea that David is using a

'memorized fact’ in a verbal form where he knows that
is 2."

new objects of

'1

divided by 1/2

case is
We are assuming that David's mental activity in this
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very similar to what it would be were he
actually sharing and cutting
real objects.

Subproblems and re-assimilation

.

Recall the earlier observation

that the way in which the action of sharing is repeated
with adaptive

variations suggests a "piecewise adaptation cycle" of the
following
form:
(1)

(

2

)

(3)

Perform

helpful

action within situation constraints.

New situation is viewed and new "helpful" act emerges.
Steps (l), (2), and

(

3

)

are repeated.

An equivalent way to describe the form of David's solution behavior
is to say that he solves the problem in pieces in a step by step manner.

Furthermore, each new step takes the results of the previous step as
its point of departure, and this allows David to adapt to results in

the partial solutions as he goes along.

What kind of internal process can account for such a cycle?

One

way to think about the model here is to say that David keeps solving subproblems that get him a little closer to a final solution.

The "Sharing"

structure is shown assimilating situations as small as sharing

stone

1

In the diagram this means that the structure reassim-

between 2 people.

"2 friends" instead of

ilates (re-focusses

on)

stones instead of

stones" in a flexible manner.

">4

each subproblem can be identified by:

(l)

friends" and

2

half-

For the observer

Bursts of organized activity

which indicate that a particular set of structures is operating;

(2)

The fact that these bursts of activity related to a limited subset of
the objects represented.
Does this behavior imply the activity of a separate 'executive
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structure in David which analyzes and breaks
down the problem so that

useful subproblems can be defined for solution?

The diagram shows that

we can model his cognitive processes in this case
without such an exe-

cutive structure.

The diagram does not show subproblems being defined

and then solved, it shows subproblems emerging

as_

they are solved.

In

other words, an action structure like "Cut in half" is not
'called
up' by another structure in order to complete a certain task
with spec-

ified features.

Rather, it assimilates a piece of the situation on its

own that it can do something with (in this case 1 stone).

If it is

anticipated that the action of the structure will contribute to the
overall solution, it goes ahead and outputs behavior.

But the subset

of objects in the problem situation that are focussed on in this be-

havior have already been determined by the subsolution
structure could do something with.

-

by what the

This determines the shape and size

of the observed subproblem.
Thus the cognitive model used to explain the presence of the piece-

adaptation cycles does not include a higher-level

wise

structure determining the form of the cycle.

'executive'

Rather, semi-autonomous

structures become active as they assimilate a piece of the problem
situation.
tion.'

This process will be called

'

piecewise-adaptive assimila-

The observed cycle is then seen to be a global effect produced

by localized structure activities and interactions.
The next sections describe further details in the analysis of this

protocol.

However, the reader interested in seeing more protocols can

skip at this point to the summary given for this protocol on

p.

170.
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Chaining

The diagram in Fig. 13 shows the integrated
activity of

.

perceptual-motor knowledge structures.
one

stone

The expected result of cutting

in half (two equal pieces) is assimilated by
the "Sharing"

structure which can 'imagine' distributing the pieces fairly
to 2 people.
Thus two structures are temporarily chained together with
the expected

perceptual result of the operation of one structure becoming the perceptual situation assimilated by the next.

Recursion

.

As described earlier, the last single "stone" remain-

ing is assumed to be initially assimilated by a general "Cutting in

chunks" structure to yield the "little chunks" output in line 32.

The

phrase "half of a half of a half of a stone," used by David in response
to a question about the size of the chunks, has several possible inter-

pretations.

It appears that David is applying the "Cutting in half"

structure recursively.

Roughly, this means that the structure is

applied to its own output.

More precisely, 'applies recursively' re-

fers here to an activity-oriented structure S which assimilates a

perceptual situation
ceptual situation

and includes the expectation of another per(see Fig. 1^).

When this structure is reapplied

by assimilating the new perceptual situation (P 0

)

to its action com-

ponent (a) we say that the structure is applied recursively.

Here the

first expected effect from cutting in half the single "stone

is to

have two equal smaller pieces.

Each of these could then be assimilated

by the same "cut in half" structure to yield

smaller size.

1*

equal pieces of an even

However, it is not clear that David is able to imagine

doing this here with precision.

He indicates his uncertainty in line

half of a half
h2 by saying, "I don't know," before saying "half of a
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Fig. lU

Recursion

:

.
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of a half of a stone."

On the other hand, there is a certain
definite-

ness to this remark, since it counters the
interviewer's probe (line
a half of a half of a stone?

only two

David

'

s

halvings."

1*0),

What does that mean?" which indicates

Two possible interpretations are advanced for

statement
He has an appreciation for the possibility of generating

(1)

U

equal pieces from one stone via the "Cutting in half"

structure.

But the exact sequence and number of halvings

required is unclear to him.
He comprehends the sequence of actions required, but de-

(2)

scribes them linguistically in a non-standard format.

There are

3

acts of halving required to generate the

k

pieces

possibly this is reflected in the way he says "half of" three
times (one to represent each act of cutting).

interpretation represented in the diagram.

This is the

It is consis-

tent with a tendency to focus on the act of cutting a

piece in half as opposed to focussing on the resulting

half-pieces
Initial activation of structures

.

There is a remaining question

of how the "Cutting in half" and "Cutting in chunks" structures are
activated.

Many children (such as Joey, whose solution to the same

problem is analyzed at the end of this chapter) would be content to
objects as an unused portion or let one person go short by

leave

3

one.

Not so with David.

He seeks a more nearly perfect solution.

An event related to this question emerges in a later portion of

the interview not shown in the transcript.

David mentions that he re-

-
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cently worked on the problem of dividing a popsicle
stick into two
equal pieces.

The stick was

^

each half would be 2 1/U" long.

1/2" long and David had determined that

Thus he had had a recent experience

with cutting something in half, in fact, with cutting a half in
half,
and this may have contributed to the ease with which the structures

were activated in the present case.
But this does not really answer the question fully, and one wishes

that one could point to specific characteristics of the situation which

triggered the activity of these structures.

As it stands, the model

cannot fully account for this aspect of the protocol.
One modelling possibility would be to include the idea that the

"Sharing," "Cutting in half" and "Cutting in chunks" structures are

connected to each other conceptually.

Possibly, an idea of dividing

in the sense of splitting is active in all three cases.

This then could

be a link that contributes to activating both the "Cutting in half"

and "Cutting in chunks" structures.

Witz (1973) and Tripplet (1973)

have discussed structures called frameworks which consist of such

collections of schemes that become active together.

Their work may

provide an important clue to a fruitful direction for future modelling in cases like the present one.
It can be assumed that all that is actually required is that some

minimal level of activation be provided, for example, to the "Cut in
half" structure.

It can be assumed that its activity will be self-

to
multiplying once this structure is active at a low level and begins

assimilate aspects of the situation.

Once the structure assimilates

to anticipate the rea single stone to the idea of cutting and begins
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suit of 2 equal pieces, then the "Sharing"
structure can reinforce the

activity of

Cutting in half" by assimilating its anticipated
effect.

So what one has here is a kind of ecological situation
where a small

initial

activating "Cutting in half" can in this favorable con-

'nudge'

text trigger ensuing interactions which eventually bring the
structure

up to a high activity level.

Look-ahead

.

One needs to qualify the statement that David is

thinking via internalized actions here, because his drawing acts as a
semi-concrete aid through which some of his ideas can be symbolized ex-

ternally and acted-out.

The drawing both provides a way to keep track

of the results of previous actions and provides a medium in which struc-

tures can act concretely (can operate in output mode).
But to the extent David 'thinks through' what he's going to do be-

fore he draws it, one can infer that he is engaging in internalized actions.

An intriguing question to ask for each point of the protocol is:

"How much does he think through ahead of time
ahead' at each point?"

-

how far can he 'look

At one extreme it is clear that David doesn't

anticipate the final result of the chain of all his actions right at
the beginning of the interview.

At the other extreme, one is confident

that short actions like "Cut one in half, put it here and here,"
(draws circles in 2 of the

U

squares) are thought through ahead of time,

because this is what enables him to add to the drawing in a piece by
piece fashion.

Between these extremes, how much does David 'look ahead'?

absence
It is not possible to say much about this question in the

of announced predictions or plans on the part of the subject.

The an-

"most results
swer represented in the diagram for this protocol is,
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of action chains are not anticipated ahead
of time beyond the current

drawing cycle."

By ’drawing cycle*

here we refer to the relatively well-

defined bursts of drawing activity in the protocol,
separated by pauses
and spontaneous verbalization on the part of the subject.
One possible exception to this limitation is the sequence
where

David cuts 2 circles in half to distribute them to

k

people.

We have

already inferred that he anticipates that cutting one in half will
provide equal pieces for 2 people.

How much more does he anticipate here?

That cutting 2 in half will give just enough for the

diagram does not reflect this anticipation.

1+

poeple?

The

But it could be changed

easily if evidence were found for the anticipation.

This would involve

compressing and shifting the cognitive activity above lines 22 and 2b
to the left - effectively showing more internalized action taking place

before David does any drawing.

Such a situation is shown above the

wavy line over protocol line 39 before David makes his comment about
"Half of a half of a half of a stone."

In that case his statement pro-

vides some evidence for a look-ahead chain of several internalized actions.

One can call the act of modifying the diagram so that cognitive

activity is shifted to the left 'red-shifting'

This informal metaphor

recalls the way the spectral patterns from stars that are moving away
from the earth are shifted as a whole toward the red end of the spec-

trum while the form of the pattern remains unchanged.

There is a na-

tural tendency (at least in this analyst) in doing structural analysis
simof this kind to show cognitive structure activity going on in time

ultaneously with (directly) above) or just prior to the observed actions
of the subject that reflect it.

One can then redshift sections above

:
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the wavy line (move them to the left) where the
subject shows evidence

of look-ahead via internalized actions.

Summary

.

David's use of a drawing in this interview provides
one

with an unusually good basis from which to conceptualize the
play-out
of internalized actions going on in David.

On the one hand, doing the

drawing makes David's actions more explicit and less internalized than

they might be if he had no drawing materials or manipulative materials.
But in that case, then we would lose the large contribution that the

drawing (and David's comments about it) make to our attempts to fol-

low David's cognitive processes.

And clearly the way that David uses

the drawing does not indicate that his thinking is limited to the points

where we see explicitly symbolized actions being put down in the drawing.

On the contrary, the drawing serves mostly to record the results

of mental actions, not the acts themselves, and his comments preceding
the acts of drawing indicate the extent to which he can think about
and anticipate actions and their effects internally.

Thus interviews

that encourage drawing behavior appear to be a promising technique for

future work on reasoning processes.

Behavior was accounted for via three practical action structures
"Sharing,” "Cutting by dividing," and "Cutting in chunks."

Each of

these have basically the same form, consisting of an action substruc-

ture connected dynamically to a perceptual structure comprising an

expected effect.

Internalized actions were conceptualized as involving

the activity of these structures in the absence of external output.

Several other new concepts have been introduced to give one in-

creased explanatory power in the area of problem solving.

David

s
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solution was seen to be built-up in a piecewise
manner in contrast to

Kathy's select-and-evaluate cycle approach in
the next section.

David

appears to solve a string of subproblems but these
evolve only as David

becomes aware of subsolutions.

The subproblems appear to form from the

actions that solve them, not from some higher order definition
process.

David's overall approach can be described in terms of a piecewise
adapta-

—^ on
-

c y cle

that emerges as a global effect of local structure activities.

Internalized actions can be chained

,

to provide longer range an-

ticipations, and the amount of look-ahead refers to the extent to which
this occurs.

Structures can function recursively by forming a real or

internalized action chain where a single structure reassimilates its
own anticipated effects.
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Kathy - "Sharing 15 Candies" Protocol

Detailed Analysis 2

Another example of an acted-out solution is the following
session
with Kathy, a third grader.

Kathy has not been introduced to multipli-

cation or division in school, and yet she succeeds in solving a
problem
that would ordinarily be solved by division.

Using what could be

termed an intelligent trial and error approach, she seems to estimate
and check possible solutions to the problem repeatedly until arriving
at the solution.

A shortened version of the protocol is given below.

(An asterisk indicates where a transcript section has been deleted.)

A complete transcript is given in appendix II.
Kathy's profile

8 years,

Age:

Grade

:

:

months

3

Teacher's Comparison of Mathematical Performance with
Classmates: Well above average

Position in Curriculum:
Transcript

No training in multiplication

:

Section A
(Kathy and the interviewer discuss
a situation where 3 girls want to share

some candy.

Each girl is 8 years old

and weighs 55 lbs., they decide.

Three

circles are drawn on paper by the inter-

viewer to represent the girls.)

Kathy

:

*

?

.

—

,

)

then asks
22

K:

How many pieces of candy are there?

23

I:

There' re 15

Section B
K:

Mmmm, this is gonna be hard.
(Draws 15 vertical lines on paper) 1 ,2 3 ,*+ ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,10
,9
11, 12, 13, lU, 15
and you put 3, no that wouldn't
work, (taps finger quickly in air over "A" 3
times and pauses; repeats over "B" and "C",
counting aloud as she reaches group "C") 1,2,3
That wouldn't work.*
,

—

29

I:

30

K:

31

I:

32

K:

How do you know?
'

Cause

I

tried it.

Oh, you marked off

(Puts 3 check marks over first
lines and over 2 more groups of
3 lines)
1,2,3; 1,2,3; 1,2,3.
3

33

I:

What were those little things on top?

3*4

K:

Candies*

II

Section C
(Draws a new row of 15 lines) So, 1,2,3,*+, 5,
(I. counts them as
6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,1*4,15
well) An now we'll try 5, we're gonna skip

Uo

*4

hi

I:

What makes you think

h2

K:

Nothing-

b3

I:

Well why skip

hh

K:

Because

—

*4,

5

boy, you sure are mean to

well maybe

—

I

*4.

don't know.

Section E
52

since you convinced me.
Well, I'll try
(Draws a new group of 15 lines)
checks over new line of 15(Puts 3 groups of
(Moving lips)
*4

*4

Fig. 15

Kathy's Drawing

*

)
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53

I:

Say it out loud.

5U

K:

—

3,U ; 1 , 2 , 3 ,
see, I should have skipped and made
14 .

5

JjJ

1 J

Section F

y

j /

55

I:

How many are - why 5?

56

K:

Maybe it would have been fi- four and a half.
(Laughs

57

I:

Can you tell ahead of time whether

58

K

Yes- no it won't
yes it will - 'cause there's
3 more candies, so it will work.

59

I

Left over at the end?

60

K

Yeah

61

I

Why should

62

K

'Cause there's 3 people and 3 more candies,
and so that if you did 5 there 'd be 1 more
candy for each person and 5 would work.

5

/

J

W

will work?

—

5

work just because of that?

Section G
So, (counts to 15 while drawing new set of 15
(Writes 3 groups of 5 check marks
marks)
over the 15 lines) 1,2,3, ^,5; 1,2,3,14,5;
it worked!
1 ,2,3
, 5
J J J J

63

u

14

,

6U

I

:

Far out

,

J J

U JJ Jj

.

Protocol summary

.

The protocol will be referred to by sections,

indicated by letters in the margins.

In section A the problem is in-

troduced via informal discussion (as opposed to being read from a pre-

pared card).
nores.

Some irrelevant information is included, which Kathy ig-

how
The interviewer delays imparting the information about

many pieces of candy there are to be shared.

The fact that Kathy asks

spontaneously seeking
for this information is an example of a subject
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necessary information to solve a problem.
In section B Kathy draws a series of lines
on paper to represent

the candies to be shared.

Apparently she taps her finger over these

lines to indicate passing out groups of candies to
each of the three
girls.

Apparently she guesses that each girl should get

3

candies and

rejects this figure when she sees that there will be some left
undistributed.

When asked about how she knows it won't work, she says,

"I tried it," and draws check marks over 3 groups of lines, leaving 6

lines unchecked.
In section C Kathy estimates that the answer might be

5

but seems

to indicate that it could be 4 as well, when asked about that possibility.

In section E, Kathy evaluates 4 as a solution and rejects it.

returns to
4 1/2

5

She

(her original 2nd estimate) but comments that it might be

.

In F she is asked to predict whether

marks on paper to try it out).
people and

3

5

will work (without using

She says it will, "because there's

more candies and so that if you did

candy for each person [left over from giving

4

5

there

'd

to each]."

statements here are compatible with the distributive law.

3

be one more

Kathy's
(Compare

her statement in the situation above to [4x3] + [1x3] = 5x3).
In G Kathy evaluates

distribution into

3

5

as the solution by again acting out the

groups.

Characteristics of Kathy's approach

.

It is instructive to con-

trast Kathy's approach with a more traditional approach to the problem

involving the idea of dividing

3

into 15 to get

5

candies for each

'
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happening here.

First, although Kathy's first estimate (3 candies
to

each girl) may be a guess, it is a reasonable guess.

Some mental pro-

cess has guided the selection of this initial number to lie within
cer-

tain bounds-to be 'in the ball park.'

Second, Kathy's choice of sub-

sequent guesses is intelligent as well- they 'move in the right direction' based on her experience in evaluating the previous guess.

Thus

when giving three candies to each girl results in some being left over,
something in Kathy's conception of the problem tells her to pick a
higher, not a lower number for her next guess.

Perhaps 'select and

evaluate cycle' is a better name for her behavior here than 'trial
and error.
In summary, several distinctive aspects of Kelly's approach to

this problem are:
Ob.

1

She does not refer to a multiplication or division problem
in the standard verbal form) yet she solves the problem.

Ob.

2

She repeatedly cycles through a pattern of proposing possible

solutions and evaluating them.
Ob.

3

Her proposed solutions are a tentative, not a determined result (with the exception of the provoked prediction that

5

will work at the end of the protocol).
Ob.

H

Her initial solution is 'in the ball park'.

Ob.

5

After she states that a solution won't work, her next proposed
solution is modified in the right direction.

Ob.

6

in
She 'acts out' the story of the problem using a drawing

evaluating her tentative solutions.
We are then left with the following problems:
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(Pi)

Can we actually model the mental process
behind the select and

evaluate pattern?
(P2)

-

can we provide an explanation for the cycles?

Can we say something about how she is able to solve
the problem

without using standard arithmetic operations?
(P3)

What mental process can account for the reasonable initial
guess?

(PU)

What mental process can account for reasonable second guesses

based on experience with earlier guesses?
Cognitive interpretations

.

These questions will be addressed by

using a model of interactions between cognitive structures shown in
the diagram below.

As a beginning, only parts A ,B , and C of the tran-

script will be analyzed.

Parts E and F will be analyzed at the end of

this section.
One can account for Kathy's behavior by positing the existence of

several cognitive structures, shown in Fig. l6

Kathy in this protocol segment.

,

that become active in

One assumes that the initial discus-

sion of the problem activates a structure in Kathy embodying the idea

of 'sharing some things'.

When this structure is active, Kathy is able

to think about, and imagine kinesthetically or visually, basic aspects

of the act of sharing a group of objects.
is active,

Once the sharing structure

it will be described as being "in output mode" when it ac-

tually controls motor output in an act of sharing.

At other times it

may still be active when it is not controlling an actual movement.

It

verbal activity
is not assumed that any kind of external or internal
to be active or
is necessary on Kathy's part in order for the structure
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lfll

in order for Kathy to share objects or think about sharing them.

One can now give a brief description of the diagrammed model to

account for the first select-and-evaluate cycle in the protocol.

The

"Sharing a discrete quantity” structure coordinates with another structure dealing with relative sizes of numbers to produce the inital response of proposing a solution of

3

candies for each girl.

The sharing

structure then operates in output mode on the 15 marks Kathy has drawn
on the paper, treating them as if they were candies, and

assigned to each of the

3

3

marks are

girls by putting checks over them.

The point of view taken here is that one actually sees the real-

time operation in output mode of the "Give n to each from s" substructure when Kathy looks at the row of 15 marks and taps off groups of
for each girl.
over.

3

She sees that some marks will be unassigned and left

Kathy’s perception of this result conflicts with an expectation

built into the sharing structure that all the candies will be distributed
and sets up a state of disequilibrium.
as a Jagged line

This disequilibrium (as shown

in the diagram) between two structures leads to

a rejection of 3 candies as the tentative solution and to the initia-

tion of a new select/evaluate cycle.
responThus the diagrammed model tends to rest a large amount of

sibility for Kathy's actions with the concrete, situation-specific,
a more
"Sharing" structure rather than with some structure for

stract number operation.

ab-

The internal makeup of the sharing structure

is modeled as involving several substructures.

An act of distribution

from a source is folwhereby several persons are each given n objects

that each person will have
lowed by the expectation of two results-
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n objects and that the source will be used
up.

That these results are

expected by Kathy after a successful act of

distribution is indicated in the diagram by
a

the notation at the right:

£

B

(read "Do a;

then expect situation B.")
The complexity and sophistication of Kathy's "Sharing a
discrete

quantity" structure is an important factor that determines the level
of

detail and precision with which she can think about the problem.

For

example, the structure might assimilate the number of objects to be

shared (the number of objects in the source group) as an important aspect of the situation.

Or it might exist as a less differentiated idea

which deals with collections of objects in the same way as continuous
quantities (like a pitcher of juice or a single candy bar).

One would

expect the former type of structure to coordinate more easily with

arithmetic structures.
From the data in this protocol one has difficulty saying much
about the question of how Kathy forms her initial proposed solution.

For the first proposal to be 'in the ball park' one feels that some
sense of relative number sizes must be coordinated with the sharing

structure, but here the analysis is unable to say anything in detail
about what might comprise a "Sense of relative number sizes" for Kathy.
It is also possible that 3 may only be her first verbalized solution

proposal and that other selection/evaluation cycles rejecting other
solutions have taken place in the seconds preceding this proposal.
One can never hope to identify all of a subject's thought processes;

however, it often happens that data from a later protocol will shed
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light on an issue in the present one.
s ivs

Thus one can aim for the progres -

refinement of our models as a long-range goal.

Accounting for the select evaluate cycle

An explanation of the

.

select /evaluate cycling takes the following form:

the sharing struc-

ture, once it has become engaged in the situation, "wants" to succeed
in terms of fulfilling its own expectations.

It "keeps trying," in this

case by actively reassimilating different values for the number of candies to give to each girl.

Thus one assigns a kind of mastery motive

to each structure, consonant with Piaget's notion of active assimila-

tion by a scheme in order to achieve equilibrium.
ture acts out its role using the initial guess of

The sharing struc3

candies, control-

ling hand motions over the 15 marks on paper to symbolize handing out

the candies.

This leads to a perceptual situation which does not satis-

fy the expectation of candies being "used up".

The resulting disequil-

ibrium situation inhibits the activity of the proposed solution structure ("3 to each"), and the sharing structure is then free to try to

assimilate a new structure for the quantity of candies to be given each
girl.

Thus we posit no 'executive procedure' for controlling the cycles

they are a global effect of local structure interactions.
This completes the primary analysis of this protocol.
nical points of analysis are given below.

More tech-

(The reader interested in

progressing to the next protocol can skip to the section summary.)
Technical analysis: improving the estimate
lem PU is still unsolved

— how

.

At this point prob-

does Kathy know that she should increase

rather than decrease the number of her estimate?

In Kathy's case the

leading to this
point of view taken here is that the mental structuring

1814

effect lies primarily within the "Sharing a discrete
quantity" structure itself, not in some more general rule-type
structure.

Something

like the kind of knowledge in question would be
reflected verbally in

the statement, SI:

"The more each person is given, the fewer the num-

ber of objects left in the source pile afterwards."

Following Driver

(1973), one can call this a semi-quantitative expectation, since it

deals with associating a change in one quantity with a change in another, and yet is not a numerical relationship.

The model takes the point of view that some form of this expecta-

tion is built into the simple sharing structure.

The fact that Kathy

knows which way to change her estimate is an effect that derives from
this expectation and from the anticipatory and repetitive character

of the sharing structure.

Giving objects to a group member is an

act that is repeated during sharing until each member has been dealt to.

One assumes that Kathy is able to think of the act of giving one member

of the group an increased amount of candy as an act which simultaneously

reduces the quantity left afterwards in the source group.

This is a

simpler semquantitat ive expectation than that reflected in

Sl_

above.

Can she then see that modifying several of these single acts in succession must also reduce the final quantity of the source group?

The fact

that she can reflects an extremely basic and important characteristic

of this kind of iterative knowledge structure

— the

characteristic that

effects expected from (associated with) modifying a single action are
also expected from modifying the repeated action.

This provides an

explanation for how Kathy is able to modify her proposed answers in
the right direction.

s

.

.
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K athy's "distributive" explanation

insight at the end of the protocol.

Kathy seems to have a new

.

When she finds that giving

h

to

each person will not work she says:
5^

K:

See,

55

I:

How many are

56

K:

Maybe

57

I:

Can you tell ahead of time whether

ir\

I

should have skipped and made

— why

5

5?

it would have been fi- four and a half.
5

(laughs)

will work?

—

—

Yes- no it won't
yes it will
'cause
there's 3 more candies, so it will work.

CO

59

I:

Left over at the end?

60

K:

Yeah

6l

I:

Why should

62

K:

Because there's 3 people and 3 more candies, and
so if you did 5 there 'd be 1 more candy for
each person and 5 would work.
So, (counts to 15
while drawing new set of 15 marks)
(Writes 3
groups of 5 check marks over the 15 lines) 1,2,3
i+,5; 1,2, 3,
U,5; 1,2, 3, ^,5; it worked!

6U

I:

Far out

Kathy

'

5

work just because of that?

statements are compatible with an adult interpretation of

this situation using the distributive law (compare her statements to

the equation

3x(U)+3x(l)=3x(5))

Is Kathy then using the dis-

tributive law to help her solve the problem?

How can one characterize

the thought processes behind her statements?

Of course Kathy's 3rd grade class has not studied the distributive
law in the algebraic form

(c

xa)

+

(c

xb) =c

x

(a+b)

and it is

certainly unlikely at her age she is thinking about an algebraic exPerhaps she is thinking about the written numerical

pression here.
equation

3 x

(

h

)

+ 3 x

(

1

)

= 3 x

she
(5) but this is also unlikely since
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has never studied multiplication.

Figure

b

shows an alternative model of Kathy’s thought
processes

in this segment that involves her practical action
structure of sharing

and an elementary arithmetic structure for enumerating
combined groups

of objects via 'counting on'.

This model fits what Kathy says and does

and yet does not involve sophisticated rules concerning numbers and
the order in which they can be added or multiplied.

Instead it is

much more directly concerned with the poeple and objects in the situation and the various concrete acts of redistribution that can occur.
An informal description of this model of Kathy's thinking runs
as follows:

it is assumed that Kathy begins in line 35 with the pre-

vious results in mind of having

3

She notices that there are

each.

candies left over from giving
3

more candies and

3

f

4

to

people and

imagines distributing one more candy to each person as an act that
will be fair and that will use up the source of candy.

Then she must

also realize that distributing one more to each person when each al-

ready has

b

is equivalent to having distributed

5

to each initially.

These events are reflected in the various assimilatory events shown
in the diagram in Fig.

IT-

Essentially, the diagram shows the same basic "Sharing" structure

shifting from the problem of sharing 15 stones to apply itself to the

problem of sharing

3

stones.

A new structure,

"Combine by counting on",

becomes active in order to anticipate the result of giving
son and then giving 1 to the person.

izes that the person will have

yond

U.

5

h

to a per-

It is assumed that Kathy real-

because she can count on

1

more be-

(Perhaps she anticipates this in a somewhat different way.

187

Fig. 17

Process for Kathy's 'Distributive' Explanation
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there is not really enough data in the transcript to model
the details
of this addition mechanism.)

Thus to model Kathy's insight whereby she suddenly sees that she
can distribute the remaining

3

candies to solve the problem, we show a

reassimilation on the part of the "Sharing" structure.

This mental act

is associated with a shift away from the select and evaluate pattern

into an approach whereby she solves the problem in 2 steps in a piece-

wise manner.

She realizes that instead of trying to "hit the money"

with single guesses for the exact number to be given to each, that
after she distributes a certain number to each she can work to distri-

bute the remainder left over.

This is the same piecewise adaptive

approach David used in the "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol.
A second component of her insight here is her comprehension of

the fact that distributing
alent to distributing

5

4

to each followed by

to each.

to each is equiv-

1

This is a good example of the role

of equivalent action sequences in mathematical thought.

Notice that

we do not represent Kathy's comprehension of this equivalence by some
kind of internal symbolic equation

— rather

the interpretation given is

in terms of the assimilation relationships that are present between

action-oriented structures at the moment of insight.
In Fig. IT the comprehension of equivalence corresponds on the

one hand to the parallel maintenance of activity in:

(l)

structures

will have
that cooperate in 2 steps to anticipate that each person
5

candies after receiving

h

and then 1 (from points (A) to (C) in the

diagram); and (2) a structure which can distribute

person directly from (B) to (C) in the diagram.

5

candies to each

Both complexes of
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structure activity are connected to the structure "Each
has 5."
Thus Kathy's thought process here is characterized not as
'an

application of the distributive law' but as a spontaneous reasoning
process.

It is in fact unlikely that she could make the same explana-

tion for a similar situation with larger numbers

— it

seems probable

that her approach here depends on being able to see that the

candies will distribute evenly to

3

3

extra

people and she might not be cap-

able of doing it with a larger number left over.

So it seems wrong-

headed to say that she is using a general principle.

And yet her

reasoning at this very simple and concrete level seems like the ideal
kind of starting point for building a more general structure.

Her

reasoning here appears intuitively well-grounded, sure, and stable.
The sense in which her approach can be described as intuitive will
be discussed further in Chapter VI.

Summary

.

To explain Kathy's capability of adjusting her proposed

solution, one can refer to the iterative and anticipatory nature of an

action-oriented "Sharing" structure in Kathy, and to the semi-quantitative expectation (built into this structure) that taking a greater quan-

tity from the source pile produces a greater reduction in the source
pile.

The select/evaluate cycles observed in Kathy's solution are ex-

plained in the model by showing the "Sharing

structure repeatedly

it
assimilating values for the number of candies given to each, as

attempts to avoid a disequilibrium condition.

Kathy's "distributive

the drawing to a
insight is modelled as a reassimilation of objects in

practical action structure.

)
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Joey - "Sharing 15 Stones" Protocol

Detailed Analysis

3

The following protocol is particularly interesting
because half

way through it the subject shifts his approach rather
radically.

It

provides an example of a student using his own capacity for self-

correction and being able to 'make a comeback' after starting on a problem in a wrong direction.

Here one has an example of a second type

of self-corrective behavior that contrasts with the select and evaluate cycle seen in the Kathy - "Sharing 15 Candies" protocol.

In that

protocol, Kathy proposed a numerical answer, and when it didn't work,
she was able to modify the answer successfully to reach a successful

solution.

In this protocol, on the other hand, Joey formulates a

subtraction problem which he hopes will generate the solution.

When

the solution conflicts with his perception of the constraints of the

problem, he shifts to an entirely different solution-generating process.

The major theoretical challenge of the analysis then, is to

account for this shift in approach.

Protocol summary

.

The complete transcript of the protocol begins

on the following page.

It illustrates a format for transcribing at a

finer level of detail.

Time runs vertically down the page with state-

ments and action that occur simultaneously appearing on the same line.
In section A Joey reads the problem from a prepared card.

initial comments can be summarized in three phrases:
"15 - ...
Urn

(pause

- 15 take away

(pause)

His
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15 take away

6.

Here he very quickly refers to a subtraction problem
in standard
oral form and then seems to be concerned with determining
an appropriate

subtrahend.

He formulates the arithmetic problem, "15 take away 6,"

saying that the 6 came from adding the numbers

U

and

2

in the text.

Thus in his solution he uses what was intended to be irrelevant information.
In section B after a long pause the interviewer suspects that

Joey is having trouble with the arithmetic problem 15 take away
suggests that he might use paper or blocks as an aid.

6 and

In lines 19— U

Joey counts out 15 blocks from a box and the interviewer questions him
about his counting method.

Joey then repeats the phrase "15 take away

6" and moves 6 blocks away from the central group of 15-

both should get

-

He says, "They

they each should get" and begins to count the remain-

ing blocks in the central group.

Then he frowns and when asked what will

happen says, "One's gonna get more," in a concerned tone, while

looking at the two groups of blocks. He then says, "How many?" and
The interviewer asks, "How

reads the words "U friends" from the text.
can you tell one's gonna get more?"

"Because if

I

splew

-.

They each

In section C, line 60, Joey answers,

- one

gets two, one - the other gets

groups of 2 blocks from

2..." and simultaneously begins to remove

k

the central group and place them nearby.

He proceeds to deal out all

the remaining blocks to the
4

4

groups, one at a time.

He looks at the

new groups and says, "It's not enough for all of 'em...

fies the short-changed group.

and identi-

When asked in line 6^ whether that group
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might be "Jim," Joey appears to
be embarrassed and asks
whether one has
to be for Jim.
The interviewer says no, and
Joey then identifies the
h

Sr ° UPS ° f bl ° CkS

“

beins Jim

'

s

11

fiends.

When asked about how many

more stones they would have to
find, Joey says, "One."
Initial qu estions raised by the
protocol

with the other 3rd and

(1) As

Itth

.

grade students who did this prob-

lem, Joey thinks of the problem as
involving

than

1+

people rather

We can proceed directly to analyze
the protocol in terms

5.

of the problem Joey concerns himself with involving

The reason why he uses

k

instead of

5

k

people.

is not clear.

(2) Why does Joey initially formulate the subproblem "15
take away 6 "?

One is tempted to dismiss this behavior by saying,
"He's guessi-

n g by randomly plugging numbers into an arithmetic
operation,"

He

or.

s

juggling the numbers just to use all of them and arrive

at an answer."

Is there any less capricious, plausible explana-

tion for his behavior?
(3) Joey makes a rather valiant comeback after having started off in

a wrong direction.

What chain of mental events causes Joey to

change his approach near line 65 ?
(4) Given the fact that Joey knows how to solve the

(U

person) prob-

lem by "dealing out" blocks, why is it that he didn't use this

method initially?
Characteristics of Joey's approach
Ob.

1

.

The statement in line 11, "15 take away 6 ," followed in line
l6

by the word "equals -" is an example of expressing an arith-

metic problem in standard oral form.

.
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Ob.

2

On the other hand, part C of the
protocol (beginning with

line t8) contains no statements in
canonical form.

Joey

—

ts ~° ut the P ro blem explicitly using
different areas of

the table to represent the source pile
of stones and the

four sharers
Ob.

3

So there is a shift from using the blocks
to work a numerical problem expressed in standard oral form
towards refer-

ring to the blocks as things to be shared and
referring to

groups of blocks on the table as "persons."

Actually, the

first indication that the blocks are taking on any signifi-

cance other than being objects to count with occurs in line
62 where Joey says, "One's gonna get more," in a concerned

tone.

This indicates that the two unequal groups of blocks

may represent the groups of objects that two sharers would
get.

And by line 79 Joey is referring explicitly to groups,

"...for one person, the other person, the next person and

then so on."

Initial analysis

.

The initial diagram in Fig.l8 shows basic as-

pects of Joey's thought processes modelled directly from the protocol.
A structure labeled "Take away" is assumed to be responsible for the

statement in canonical form, "15 take away

6 -,"

chooses to subtract, and why he adds the

and the 2 to obtain 6 as

the subtrahend is not clear.

h

in line 11.

Why Joey

The uncertainty about the source of ac-

tivation of the "Take away" and "Add" structures is indicated with
question marks in the diagram.

)

Fig. 18a

Initial Diagram: Joey’s Solution Process

v
11

)J:

15

take away
6
I :Where'd
you get 6?
J I added
these 2 up
I
The ^
and the 2?
J Yup

^

:

:

:

(IT

second
pause
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Fig. 18 b

Sharing

)
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Fig. 18 c
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The "Take away" structure assimilates
two number structures, a large

number and a smaller number.

The readiness of the structure to
operate

with these number ideas is shown by two
substructures labeled "l" and
"s".

A third substructure labeled "a" anticipates
the activation of

another number structure smaller than the larger
number which will be

treated as a result.

Different children will use different structures

in different circumstances to produce a solution
to this subtraction

problem in standard verbal form.

But there is no way to infer more de-

tails of the structure Joey uses from the data in this case, so
it is

labeled "Take away."

The same approach is used for "Add" structure.

The oscillating activity trace line for "s" indicates its "need"
or propensity to assimilate a second number for the subtraction process
to proceed.

In this case Joey seems committed to the "Take away" struc-

ture’s operation, but this is delayed until an assimilation of the most

appropriate number to ’take away'

has occurred.

Here, the active as-

pect of the assimilation process is particularly clear:

the substruc-

ture initiates a kind of internal and external search for another appro-

priate structure to assimilate.

Thus, the oscillating line represents

a kind of disequilibrium state within the structure.

In this case the

structure lacks an appropriate context for its operation

- the

recogni-

tion of an appropriate number structure for assimilation by "s".

When Joey has difficulty doing this calculation in his head, the

interviewer suggests using paper or blocks, and it is inferred that a
related but different "Take away objects" structure is activated and
assimilates the blocks.

As he proceeds to subtract 6 from 15 using

the blocks, the crucial point in the protocol where Joey frowns, says,
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"One's gonna get more," and then
changes his approach to the problem,

provides a real modelling challenge.

Joey is clearly perturbed when

he makes the comment, "One's gonna
get more (concerned tone)," in

line 62.

This indicates that he sees that the
two groups labeled A

and B in the drawing do not have the same
number of blocks.

That this

perception is the immediate source of disequilibrium
is supported by
his earlier statement in line 5^, "They both
should get, they each

should get

,

(after which Joey begins counting blocks in group R).

They both should get," indicates an expectation on
Joey's

part that

he should end up with a situation where 2 people have equal
quantities.

When this does not happen, we see him frown and hear him speak with
a

concerned tone in his voice, and we model this by showing a disequili-

brium relationship between the perception and expectation structures.
But the question remains as to the source of the expectation, shown as
a question mark in the diagram.

This question will be addressed in

the revised analysis to be presented later.

Joey then asks the question, "How many?" as he looks at the problem text and reads, "1 friends." Apparently, he deliberately seeks more
information here from the text.

It is not clear why this happens at

this point.
In line 68, Joey either ignores or does not understand the intent

of the interviewer's question, "How can you tell one's gonna get more?"
and says, "Because if

I

splew - they each

deal out the 15 blocks into

h

groups.

-

one gets 2 -" and begins to

The cognitive process here is

represented by treating the dealing behavior as stemming from the activity of a "Sharing" structure in output mode.

It seems likely that
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Joey uses "splev" as the past
tense of "split" In this
context.
The
model of the "Sharing" structure
involves substructures for
splitting
up the group of objects by
distrubing one or two objects
at a time
to each person and for the exDectatirm +>,0+ « u
expectation that each one should
end up

with the same number.
A reasonable way to proceed here
would be to show the "Sharing"

structure

s

activity initiating as the dealing
begins, but in Fig. 18

the structure is actually shown
becoming active at an earlier point

m

the protocol.

By shifting activation to an earlier
point, sliding

the structure to the left on the diagram,
one can account for Joey's

previous act of seeking information on the
number of "friends" from
the problem text.

of

U

friends to a structure for sharing during his
first reading of the

problem text.
the

This assumes that he did not assimilate the
idea

Sharing

As with the "Take away" structure earlier, one thinks
of

structure as now being in a position to act, but needing

to assimilate more detail in the environment before it can act.

One

thinks of the structure embodying the knowledge that some objects are

going to be given to a group of people, but in attempting to function
the structure finds that it cannot act without attending to a partic-

ular characteristic of the group of people

-

its number.

of situation will be called an assimilation gap

.

This type

This is much the same

as the situation where one sees a person walking toward him and suspects

that it might be one of several friends, and so tries to squint and

shade his eyes to get a more detailed look at the person's fact to de-

termine which friend it might be, in order to behave in an appropriate
manner.

Thus, one thinks about Joey's information-seeking behavior here

207

not as a search for an "item to be inputed"
but as the perceptual act
of focusing on a new aspect of the situation.

The fact that he learns

how many friends there are from the printed
text via lower level reading skill structures is incidental here.

One could use the same assim-

ilation model if Joey were, for example, doing something
with a real

group of children, suddenly needed to know the number of
children in
order to get enough supplies of some kind for them, and
proceeded to
count the number of children.

The "Each have the same amount" structure active in line 5U is

identical to the expected-effect substructure of the "Sharing" structure, so one treats these as identical in the diagram.

One can then

say that the "Sharing" structure is activated by a spread of activity

from one of its active parts.

Activity spreads from one structure to

the other because there is a permanent dynamical connection between

these structures in Joey.

When one shows a structure consisting of

several substructures, one is in effect saying that there are permanent

dynamical connections between the substructures and that all of them are

connected via the structure as a whole.

While substructures may act

in a particular sequence in output mode, one assumes that pre-output

activation can spread in any direction along connections between the
substructures.

Thus, in this case a structure concerned with an effect

activates a structure concerned with the cause of the effect.

After the blocks are dealt out, Joey recognizes that one person
will be short-changed, but doesn't show concern at this in contrast to
the way that he did earlier in line kk.

Instead he merely indicates

many
that "there's not enough for all of them," and when asked, "How
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more would they have to find?”, he says,
"one.”

This behavior is

modelled by the interactions shown between
the "people have same amount"
expectation in the "Sharing" structure, the
perceptual structure for
the

groups, and a "Small quantity manipulation"
structure which assim-

1*

ilates the groups of

h

and

3

ing a block to the group of

blocks, and anticipates the effect of add3.

In this last calculation it is assumed

that with numbers of this size there is no need for Joey
to do any standard arithmetic - he simply uses "low level" perceptual-motor
structures
to identify the action needed to make the perceived situation of

into one of

1

+

3

blocks

blocks."^

Revised Analysis

.

The preliminary analysis leaves us with some

unresolved difficulties in the form of
tivation is unexplained.

3

structures whose initial ac-

Two of these difficulties can be removed by

inferring that the "Sharing" structure becomes active even earlier-on
in the protocol (as shown in Fig. 19) than is represented in the diagram

in Fig. l 8

.

First, the "Sharing" structure can function as the missing

source of activation for the "Take away" structure.

We think infor-

mally of Joey sensing an analogy between this arithmetic process
and the act of taking the stones away from a central group to give
to the friends.

Formally, we show the "Sharing" structure contributing

to the initial activation of the "Take away" structure.

Second, the

early activity of the "Sharing" structure provides a source of activation for the "Each have the same amount" structure participating in lines
5

I

4

and 55, since this is in fact a substructure of the "Sharing" struc-

^Piaget's statement about "intuitive numbers" quoted on
here.

p. 6

is relevant
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)
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Fig. 19 c
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ture.
Sc hool ideology structures

So in Fig. 1 9 it is inferred that
the

.

"Sharing” structure is activated at
the very beginning of the protocol

when Joey reads the problem text about
sharing the stones equally.
then one must face a new question:

But

if the "Sharing” structure is active

from the beginning of the protocol, then why
doesn't this structure

operate to solve the problem immediately
later on beginning in line 70?

-

why does this only happen

This question and other aspects of

the first part of the protocol are explained when we
also infer the ac-

tivity of

s chool

ideology structures in Joey.

influence Joey here is the following habit

:

The factor assumed to

when confronted with a

story problem, one strives to construct a standard arithmetic problem
in standard verbal form that relates to the story problem and 'yields'

the answer.

Because Joey is influenced by this habit, his attention is

quickly dominated by the task of constructing and solving a standard
arithmetic problem.

If we assume that he expects to construct a prob-

lem in standard verbal form even before he reads the text, then the
"Sharing” structure initially serves only to tip the balance of activa-

tion in favor of one of the standard forms.

Joey's comprehension of

the problem situation from reading the text may be too weak initially
to enable the "Sharing" structure to dominate these standard arithmetic

structures.

Only later, after Joey begins using blocks, does the

"Sharing" structure dominate and enable Joey to solve the problem in
an "act-out" mode.

Thus, the diagram also shows a structure, "Solving

story problems," that is a general school ideology framework for

approaching story problems - causing Joey to be in a certain mental set
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or frame of mind when he is about
to do a story problem.

This frame

of mind is assumed to include the
expectation that the proper way to
do the story problem is to produce
an addition or subtraction calcula-

tion in standard form.
Joey's school ideology structures may also
influence his behavior
in adding U and 2 to provide 6 as the subtrahend
for the problem "15

take away

".

The habit of 'using all of the numbers' in a story

problem to calculate the answer may play a part in this
behavior.

This

kind of orientation toward 'using the numbers' also helps to
explain
the fact that Joey later solves the problem of sharing among

instead of

U

people

5*

The activity of the "Sharing," "Friends," and "Stones" structures
are shown as receding immediately to a low level as soon as the "Take

away" structure becomes dominant.

This aspect of the model is supported

by the fact that during the time that Joey is attempting to calculate
the answer to "15 take away 6" he refers to numbers alone without any

reference whatsoever to the enumerated objects (stones, people, etc.)
One can propose a possible explanation for this observation if one

assumes a limited capacity for structure activity at any given moment,

consistent with general empirical findings in short-term-memory research.
Since "15 take away 6" is a difficult problem for Joey, and presumably
involves him in a large amount of cognitive structure activity, there

may be 'no room left' for him to hold in mind or sustain the activity
of these qualitative aspects.
It is interesting to note the way in which his use of blocks as

an aid to calculation leads him to reintroduce these qualitative ideas

2ll

in a sharing context.

As Joey separates 6 blocks from a group
of 15 in

line 52, he seems to expect the two resulting
groups to have equal num-

bers of blocks with each group belonging to one
person.

Qualitative

language begins to re-enter Joey's statements here:
"They both should
get - they each should get -."

This situation is modeled by showing

the two groups of blocks on the table activating a structure
for "2

friends" and eventually reactivating the "Sharing" structure.

Thus, one

can make the interpretation that Joey begins to attach symbolic meaning
to the blocks — he begins to assimilate them to ideas about objects to

be shared by people - and as he does so he begins to be aware of the

discrepancy between what his constructed arithmetic calculation 'tells
him to do' with the blocks and what the story 'tells him to do' with
the blocks.

At this point the story ideas win out, the "Sharing" struc-

ture becomes dominant, the "Take away" structure is suppressed, and

Joey begins to act-out the problem explicitly by dealing out blocks
into groups.

The question of whether the interviewer plays a role in triggering

Joey's shift in approach should also be considered.

It is conceivable

that the interviewer's question in line 58: "They're going to share

them?" is a major factor contributing to Joey's shift from a numerical
to an acted-out approach.

This is not the interpretation given in the

diagram, however, because Joey's prior statement in line 5^

should get

— they

each should get

—

,"

>

They both

indicates that the practical

"Sharing" structure has already been reactivated before line 58.

Progressive refinement

.

Constructing the second diagram in otder

example of the
to solve problems recognized in the first diagram is an
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progressive refinement of a cognitive model.

Actually, the author went

through many cycles of refinement, modifying
diagrams and comparing them

with the tape, just to arrive at the initial
diagram shown in Fig. 18

.

Only the last cycle from Fig. 18 to Fig.
19 is shown here.

Disequilibrium cycles and successive dominance

.

The model of

Joey's cognitive structure interactions gives a fairly
specific answer
to the question of how Joey 'makes a comeback' and changes
his approach
in the middle of the interview.

The most important factor appears to

be the development of a conflict or disequilibrium situation which
allows
a new mental structure to 'take over' by line 69.

The whole process

can be called a disequilibration cycle with the following form:
1

.

A solution process is attempted while other structures re-

main active simultaneously,
2.

followed by a disequilibrium situation where two active structures conflict,

3

.

followed by competition between alternative ideas for dominance, with one eventually taking over.

1.

etc.

(Joey only makes one pass through such a cycle, but it is easy to imagine the possibility of several passes occurring in other situations.)

Recall that in the Kathy

-

"Sharing 15 Stones" protocol, Kathy also ex-

hibited behavior indicating an internal disequilibration cycle.

How-

ever, the current protocol indicates a somewhat different process than

Kathy's select-and-evaluate cycles.

Joey does not repeatedly select and

evaluate answers here; rather, he appears to try to determine a single

answer via a process.

And when his first process runs into trouble another
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one takes its place.

In Joey's case we see a complete
shift in approach

in the middle of the protocol.

This was accounted for by the successive

d ominance of two cognitive structures,
one following the other.

Sgpntaniety and t he sp read of activity

taneous or carefully planned?

.

Is Joey's behavior spon-

Can one say anything about spontaneity

using the model of cognitive structure activity?

One point where his

behavior is clearly spontaneous is in lines 57 and 62 where
Joey is
taken aback with the fact that removing six blocks from
15 does not
leave equal groups - that "one's gonna get more."

Spontaneous events

like this one are particularly interesting to the analyst because they
are clear indicators of a 'new development' in the mental activity of

the subject.

(For the moment we use the term 'spontaneous' to describe

both relatively unanticipated mental events and the resulting behavior.)
The model of cognitive structure activity shown in Fig. 19 provides a

first-order interpretation of the origins of Joey's spontaneous behavior.

One way in which it does this is by explicitly showing how devel-

opments in the environment can trigger new mental activity in the subject.

The spontaneous event just discussed is one example of this.

The

diagram in this case shows a configuration of blocks which triggers a

perception of more blocks in group "A" than group "B", which in turn
triggers a disequilibrium relationship with another structure.

Thus,

an outside event causes unexpected mental events to unfold spontaneously.
But this is not the only spontaneous interaction.

In the analysis

activation of structures takes place internally as well as externally.
The model portrays several of these mental events as spontaneous also.

One place where this kind of interaction is inferred is over line 8
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where the activity in the "Distribute
to people from source" structure
spreads to the Take away" structure.
Another internal activation is modelled
over line

51*

where the ac-

tivity of the "Each have same amount"
substructure spreads to the entire

Sharing" structure of which it is a part.

Now in both of these

cases the model is that of a spread of activity
from one structure to

another, and this spread is not under the control
of some higher order

"executive" structure in the subject.

Thus, the model is not consistent

with the idea that Joey makes a decision to activate these
structures
at these points in the interview - if by a decision we mean a
premedi-

tated choice of action based on some rational analysis of factors in
the situation.

Rather, the activity of the structures represent ideas

that occur to him in a spontaneous way, because they become activated

through connections with other currently active structures.
Summary

.

this analysis:

Several new theoretical concepts have been introduced in
School ideology structures were assumed to influence

Joey to orient to produce an arithmetic problem in standard oral form.
With Joey in this frame of mind it was assumed that the idea of removing
objects from a group to be distributed contributed to the activation of
a "Take away" arithmetic process.

This process then began to dominate

his thinking, suppressing ideas about qualitative aspects of the problem.

The suppression is partly the result of a limited capacity for

activity in the mind.

When he used blocks as a minipulative aid he be-

gan to assimilate them to the idea of sharing objects.

This lead even-

tually to a disequilibrium situation where the block configuration produced by the take away process could not be assimilated to the idea of
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people having equal shares.

In this situation the "Sharing"
structure

became dominant, completing one pass
on Joey's part through a disequilibrium circle. With the sharing structure
becoming reactivated, an assimilation

ga|>

occurred and Joey deliberately sought
clarification (on

the number of people) from the text.

Sharing

1

This cleared the way for the

structure to operate, and Joey reached a meaningful
conclusion

by dealing out the blocks concretely.
Several key events in Joey's solution were accounted for
by a
spontaneous spreading of activity between structures as opposed
to rational, premeditated decisions.
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Intuitive Processes

What does it mean when someone says, "I
can see that it's true in-

tuitively," in a mathematical context?

In this section the question

of whether the protocols that have been
presented can be used to illuminate the issue of what one means by intuitive
mathematical proccesses will be discussed.

As was mentioned in Chapter I, Erlwanger

(197*0 was able to show that many of the grade school
students he

studied were dependent on a system of rules for producing answers
to

written arithmetic problems

— and

that these rules had very little to

do with the students' intuitive mathematical ideas.

Erlwanger was

thus able to point to behaviors which he felt did not indicate the

presence of intuitive mathematical ideas, but the issue of what does
constitute an intuitive mathematical idea has remained in doubt.

Cer-

tainly in reading the three transcripts taken up in the detailed analyses of Chapter V one gets a very different overall impression than
one does watching students execute standard algorithms for solving

written arithmetic problems.

The task of this section will be to try

to characterize specific ways in which these three protocols can be

said to exhibit intuitive mathematical behaviors.

Recall Kathy's explanation in the "Sharing 15 Candies" problem:
work just because of that?

I:

Why should

K:

"Cause there's 3 people and 3 more candies [leftover from
giving U to each from a pile of 15 and so that if you did
work."
5 there 'd be 1 more candy for each person and 5 would

5

]

Can one tell in general whether a student is giving an intuitive ex-

planation that is understood in a 'solid' way rather than a superfi-

.
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cial explanation based on a memorized
rule or rote method?

Certainly

Kathy conveys the impression that her thinking
here is based on an intuitive understanding rather than a rote method.

What can one point

to in the transcript to support this impression?

Two different ways in which the protocol analyses
in question
can be said to indicate the presence of intuitive
processes (shown in
Fig.

20 ) are first, the way in which thinking on the part of the stu-

dents is grounded in actions, conceptions of actions on concrete
objects, and second, the way in which autonomous structures come into

Play spontaneously rather than being "called up" in a set order according to a fixed method.

Action-grounded knowledge

.

The first of these will be called

action-grounded knowledge, a type of intuitive knowledge, and the second will be called spontaneous reasoning, a type of intuitive reasoning.

The diagram in Fig. 20 shows these two types of intuitive internal

processes above the horizontal line and shows some types of behavioral
indicators associated with them below the line.

One can say that the

thinking behind Kathy's 'distributive' explanation above

is action-

grounded here in the sense that it is concerned with actions on concrete
objects
By saying that a student's thinking is grounded in action, it is

meant that the student uses thought structures which involve the real
or imagined movement of concrete objects, such as the simple act of

transferring a piece of food from one person to another.

The story

problems given here certainly involve simple movements of this kind.
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Fig.

20

Intuitive Processes

.
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and the models of students' thought
processes developed reflect the

way in which the students refer repeatedly
to concrete actions during
their solution attempts.

The thought processes shown were predominantly

not abstract arithmetic operations on symbols,
but were practical action

structures assimilating real or imagined concrete
objects.

For example,

in referring to sharing some objects, David says,
"Cut one in half,

put it in here and here'

(referring to an area in a drawing representing

a stone and two sharers).

He refers directly to actions on concrete

objects
There appear to be two main behavioral indicators that one can use
to tell when this type of thought is occurring— first

,

the presence of

verbal references to concrete actions or drawings of such actions or
the presence of such actions made externally; and second, the type of

language the student uses to describe why he is sure about his explanation.

References to actions on concrete objects (or the symbolization of
such actions using manipulative materials or drawings) were particularly
easy to identify in the acted-out solutions analyzed in this study, as
is shown by the examples just given with Kathy and David.

An interesting conjecture about the effects of action-grounded

knowledge is the following.

One can often detect a student's expres-

sion of necessity in a mathematical explanation in the form of statements that say "it has to work that way" as opposed to "you have to do it
that way to get it right."

The second format is often observed in the

case of children explaining standard arithmetic algorithms.

They say,

"You have to carry this one," or, in dividing 72 and 3^9, "You've got
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to have the smaller number outside
(the division bracket) or you won't
get it right."

These statements refer to conventions
that students

adhere to in order to execute arithmetic
algorithms in a proper manner.
On the other hand, statements like Kathy's:
"...if you did (give)

(candies to each person) there 'd be
5

1

5

more candy for each person and

would work." refer to something that "has to" be
true in the context

of the qualitative situation, not just in the context
of the "way it's

supposed to be done."

It is possible that action-grounded knowledge
is

responsible for these kinds of conviction.

It is possible that whenever

one probes a situation where a student in effect says: "It has to
work

that way," that one will find an action-grounded knowledge structure
at work.

This hypothesis is supported by the protocols analyzed in

the present study and should be studied further.

Spontaneous reasoning

.

In addition to action-grounded knowledge,

spontaneous reasoning refers to another type of thought process that
can be called intuitive.

The contrast to be emphasized here is one be-

tween solutions involving an established method familiar to the subject
vs.

action sequences that are constructed more or less 'on the spot' in

a flexible manner.

Again Kathy's 'distributive' explanation appears

to be a spontaneous construction, and not the application of a familiar

method, as does David's piecewise adaptive approach to the sharing 15
Stones problem.
Two indicators that a spontaneous process is taking place are:
1.

reference to a novel, non-standard solution approach, and

taneous interruptions,
tion attempt.

2.

spon-

'ahas', or reactions of surprise during the solu-

When a subject uses a novel approach it lends credence
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to the idea that the subject is
constructing it ’on the spot,’ but

of course this is not a conclusive
indicator.

(Spontaneous behavior

may at times mimic a standard method,
and a standard method that

is

learned or applied erroneously may produce
novel behavior.)
But in many cases it is obvious that a
subject is grappling in a

spontaneous manner with a problem rather than using
an established method of solution.
ing 15 Stones

Indicators of this kind are seen in the Joey "Shar-

protocol where Joey shifts his approach from solving a

subtraction problem in standard oral form to acting out the
situation
using counting blocks.

There is a spontaneous interruption when Joey

suddenly stops counting a group of blocks he is using to help with his
subtraction calculation.

His concerned tone of voice indicates the

surprise of a disequilibrium condition, and there is a shift to an

acted-out approach.
as a rational

The process behind these events was not modelled

'executive' procedure choosing a new approach.

The shift

was accounted for by the disequilibration and subsequent drop in ac-

tivity of a previously dominant structure, followed by a spontaneous

assimilation of the situation by an action-oriented "Sharing" structure which became dominant.

Spontaneous processes vs. procedures

.

In diagramming cognitive

processes should there be a visible difference in the diagrams for a
spontaneous vs. an established solution process?

One way in which such

a difference could be reflected can be illustrated by considering a

hypothetical alternative version for a portion of the diagram for
the David "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol.

The upper diagram in Fig. 21

shows the original spontaneous model for this section while the lower
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Fig. 21

Spontaneous Solution Process

Established Solution Process

Spontaneous vs. Established Solution Processes
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diagram shows an alternative model portraying
a solution via a standard

method known previously to the subject.

In the first diagram, the struc-

ture "Cutting in chunks" becomes active
spontaneously as it assimilates
the situation in which it can be helpful by creating
a new situation

where sharing can occur.

Below, the same "Cutting in chunks" structure

is part of a larger structure in the form of an established
procedure

which activates the two actions in sequence in a fixed way.

The spon-

taneous form of the process in the upper diagram characterizes most of
the models used to account for the observed behaviors in this study.
Do cycles in behavior imply cognitive processes in the form of

procedures ?

In the three detailed analyses of Chapter V several types

of behavior cycles were identified

— David’s

piecewise adaptive cycle

and Kathy's select and evaluate cycle are two of these.

Also, Joey's

shift in approach in response to a dilemma indicated the possibility
of approach disequilibrium cycles that could also apply to other pro-

tocols where more shifts in approach are observed like the Roy "Uo Tan-

gerines" protocol.

Now in order to explain the presence of these re-

peated cycles in behavior it is tempting to postulate the presence of
an internal cognitive process in the form of a fixed procedure that pro-

duces the behavior, since procedural terminology includes various means
for iteration, ("Do-loops

,"

GOTO statements, etc.) For example, Fig. 22

shows a very simple procedural model of the internal process behind

Kathy's select and evaluate approach.

This model was rejected in favor

of a less structured, less methodical process.

The word 'procedure' is used here to indicate a certain type of

cognitive structure with the following characteristics:

1.

the struc-

)

'

r

Fig. 22

Procedural Model of Kathy's Select
and Evaluate Process

Spontaneous
Structure
Interactions

Established
Procedures
or Methods

Cognitive
Processes
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( Repeated
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Patterns
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Solution
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Before
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Surprise,
"Aha's",
and
Inter up-

tions
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Fig. 23

Spontaneous Processes, Procedures
and Observable Behavior

Inflexibl
Order of
Actions
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ture controls separate actions (via
substructures) to be performed in
a well-defined sequence; 2. the
collection of substructures is activated
as an established

unit— once activated

it runs its course in a predeter-

mined manner unless there is some drastic
interruption.

As used here,

the concept is not equivalent to that
used in computer science— in the

cognitive structures model used in this study
there is no such thing
as internal static strings of symbols serving
in the role of inputs

and outputs for a procedure.

There are only other active structures

which can activate or be assimilated by the procedure.

But the concept

as used here does share the basic idea of an established
method consist-

ing of a sequence of steps.

One might want to use this concept as a

model to explain a child's methodical pattern of behavior in doing long

division problems, for example.
But in the case of the three cycles identified above, the analyses

have demonstrated that in each case cognitive processes can account
for the cycling that are not procedures.

Just as the autonomous be-

haviors of predator and prey can lead to cyclical population levels,
the autonomous activity of cognitive structures can lead to cyclical

behavior patterns.
How, in general, can one decide on the basis of a tape whether to

model a cognitive process as an established sequence of steps

procedure?

— as

a

The diagram in Fig. 23 shows some of the possible links be-

tween observable behaviors (below the horizontal line) and established

procedures on the one hand vs. spontaneous processes on the other
(above the horizontal line).

The point just made above is the fact

that, contrary to what one might think, repeated behavior patterns
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(cycles) are not necessarily indicative
of procedural processes but
can be accounted for by spontaneous
processes.

Thus cycles are shown

as potentially explainable by either
type of process.

Similarly, either

type of process can account for behavior
where the subject describes
part of his solution activity before he
performs it-in the spontaneous

case internalized action can take place and
anticipations can be verbalized.

However, inflexibility in the order of steps taken
under varying

conditions would indicate the presence of an established
internal procedure.

Whereas interruptions and surprise responses of the 'aha*

variety are spontaneous events that indicate spontaneous processes.
This last indicator— —spontaneous events

— has

been the primary one used

for Justifying the choice of spontaneous processes used in the cogni-

tive models in this chapter.
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CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Summary of Findings and Concepts
Developed
In this study exploratory clinical
interviews were conducted with

third and fourth grade students as they
attempted to solve simple quan-

titative story problems.
in the students'

A wide variety of phenomena were observed

solution attempts.

Although some of the students’

approaches seemed related to standard methods taught
in school, others
did not.

Models of the students' cognitive processes were developed
that
help account for the phenomena identified in the protocols.

Piagetian

(and neo-Piaget ian) concepts such as assimilation, disequilibrium,
cog-

nitive structure, and structure activity were utilized in these models
and were related to specific instances of observed behavior.

Although

the study draws on these theoretical concepts, it also has a strong em-

pirical emphasis.

Rather than starting from an established body of formal

mathematics and attempting to show what the children know in those terms,
the study started from the children's mathematical behavior and from a

general theory of cognitive functioning, and attempted to construct a

detailed model of the children's thought processes in specific protocols.
Findings from the analyses were given at several different levels:
(1)

Complete and unedited protocols were included so that the

reader could make his own analyses.
(2)

Observations of events and behavior patterns in the interview
were made from the tapes and identified in the analyses.

These

.

.
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led to the formation of certain
observational concepts, such
as.

generates a related problem, expresses
an arithmetic prob-

lem in standard oral form, exhibits
false starts in counting,
etc
(3)

Specific explanations of certain phenomena in
the protocols

were given in terms of descriptions of cognitive
processes
that account for them.

(M

Specific explanations of extended sections of protocol
were

given in the form of diagrammed sequences of cognitive structure interactions.
(5)

These specific explanations of phenomena in the protocols

utilize general theoretical concepts that may apply to other
students
An attempt was made in Chapter III to introduce the wide range of

solution behavior observed.

Cognitive concepts were also developed

there which can begin to explain these observations.

After developing

analysis methodology and diagramming techniques further in Chapter IV,

detailed analyses of three protocols were given in Chapter V where students acted out solutions explicitly using drawings or concrete aids.

These last analyses shed light on children’s mathematical processes
that are not dependent on rules for manipulating written symbols.

Observations
(1)

.

The analyses include the following observations:

Different students can attempt to solve the same story

problem in widely different ways.
(2)

Several kinds of successful solutions to story problems

232

ordinarily solved via division and
multiplication are re-

ported from students who have not yet studied
these operations in school.
(3)

Four basic modes of solution behavior were
observed:
a) Expression and solution of an arithmetic
problem in stan-

dard oral form or standard written form
b) Acted-out solution
c) Counting-based solution
d)
(U)

Immediate solution

Four spontaneous behavior patterns (often referred to as heuristics) were identified:
a) Select and evaluate pattern

(convergent trial and error)

b) Successive shifts in approach (using more than one approach

to attack a problem)
c) Piecewise adaptation pattern
d)

(solving a problem in pieces)

Generating and solving related problems

(5) Other phenomena observed include:

inappropriate use of al-

gorithms; use of drawings; spontaneous actions relating to
inverse, commutative, and distributive principles; and a

subject 'misreading* a problem to fit his own ideas.

Cognitive models

.

Some general features of the model of cognitive

processes proposed to account for these phenomena can be summarized as
follows.

A method of diagramming was used which allows one to repre-

sent cognitive structure interactions in a student as they occur in time.
cogniThis technique also allows one to explicitly tie aspects of the

tive model to detailed protocol observations.

Several types of cogni-
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tive structures were discussed,
including written-symbol algorithms,

counting-based structures, and practical
action structures.

Cognitive

structures were described as semi-autonomous,
activatable processes which

assimilate and respond to aspects of the
environment.

Other theoretical

concepts utilized include: structure activity
levels, parallel structure activity, competition for dominance, external
and internal assimilation, disequilibrium, internalized actions, chaining,
and recursion.

The theoretical concepts used in this study can be
organized in the
following way.
I

-

Major Theoretical Concepts Used in the Cognitive Structure Model
A.

Forms of Structure Organization

Cognitive structures

Substructures

Sequential and parallel integration
of substructures

Expectation structures
B.

Structure Interactions
Structure activity levels
Parallel activity
External assimilation
Internal assimilation

Disequilibrium
Assimilation gaps

11

‘

^

eClflc Theoretical Concepts
Used In E»p 1n n a tlons of
A
of Str ucture Organon™

t h„
.

p „„ t

-

Practical action structures

Counting structures

Written symbol algorithm
structures
Semi-quantitative expectations
School ideology structures

Structure isolation
B

‘

Struc ture Properties and Interactions

Competition for dominance

Piecewise-adaptive assimilation
Select and evaluate process

Limited capacity for parallel activity

Aggressive assimilation
Generative assimilation
Overload

Internalized action
Iteration

Chaining

Recursion
The analyses suggest that the children have knowledge structures

which are active and semi-a.utonomous in the sense that their structures

aggressively assimilate problem situations, generate related cases,
dominate other structures, drive explanations, and influence perceptions.

Many of the reasoning processes modelled took the form of structure in-
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teractions that are spontaneous
rather than being governed
by established,
hierarchical procedures. Structures
were shovn-conflicting with
each
other; cooperating with each
other; and interacting with
the environment-in a manner similar to the way
different species interact in an
ecosystem.

Discussion of Cognitive Interpretations
The three detailed analyses in
Chapter V claim to give a descrip-

tion of mental events that account
for problem solving behavior in ex-

tended sections of protocol.

One is able to claim some degree of rigor

because the correspondences between detailed
protocol data and cognitive
processes were exhibited explicitly in the diagram.
One can divide the theoretical interpretations
into two groups

—

(1) the forms of knowledge structures, and (2) the forms
of reasoning

processes (structure interactions)

— that

have been used to account

for observations of behavior.

Knowledge structures

-

practical action structures

.

The most im-

portant knowledge structures in the last three analyses were practical

action structures

.

The students were given story problems that would

ordinarily be classified as division problems, and they produced successful solutions

were observed.

— but

no standard division algorithm behavior patterns

How then were these problems solved?

They were solved

as the students acted out the problem situations using drawings or man-

ipulative materials.

The students’ concept of 'sharing' was modelled

as a process organizing an activity, not as a collection of static re-

lationships or of facts about sharing.

The emphasis on action-oriented
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structures was particularly
natural i„ this case since
the
solutions were acted out
fairly explicitly by the
students
The
center of the solution
process was the act of
sharing itself. And
this is an informal,
practical action; practical
in the sense that it
action the child can use to
solve a real problem (not
just a story
problem) and informal in the
sense that it is probably
learned by the
child in social contexts rather
than in the formal school
setting. Also,
.

although these actions may
involve counting single sets of
real or drawn
objects, they do not depend on a
knowledge of standard arithmetic
algorithms like column addition or
long division. Thus we have seen
several cases where students use
a practical action structure
to act

out the solution to a story problem
without using a standard

algorithm structure

.

Another question concerns the extent to which
these three solutions are ’special cases.'

Several protocols were chosen for analysis

because they contained more 'visible,'

(i.e., acted out) solutions.

Perhaps this is the only kind of solution where
action-oriented structures are involved.

Is there then any indication that one can use
ac-

tion-oriented structures to model knowledge underlying other kinds
of
solutions where counting procedures or written algorithms are used?
There is such an indication in the way that drawings are used in

conjunction with internalized actions in the acted-out. solutions.
call that these solutions are not acted out totally explicitly.

Re-

Blocks

or drawings are used to symbolize the results of imagined actions on

real objects.

Thus the activities are carried out on concrete objects

but are less explicit or 'true to life' than acting out a sharing situa-
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tion with real people.

And especially in the
cane of David and Kathy,

internalized actions sometin.es
took the place of overt
actions.

The
concept of internalized actions
was introduced to account
for sections
where students described actions
before they were represented
in the
drawing (sometimes they were
not represented at all).
Internalized actions then provide the possibility
of a link whereby practical
action
structures can be involved 'behind
the scenes') in solutions where
more
formal arithmetic appears.
In that case it would be
possible to think

of most solutions, even those like
Anna's where the only behavior one
observes externally is a written
calculation, as involving a vicarious,
internal acting out of the problem at
some level via a practical action
structure.

Thus, internalized actions, via the
activity of practical

action structures, constitute a primitive
process for solving problems
that may be shown in further studies to underlie
solutions involving

arithmetic calculations.

Reaso ning via structure interactions

.

The explanations of solution

behavior given for the eight protocols have included competitive
and
cooperative interactions between structures as well as interactions between internal structures and the external environment.

The power of

these non-logical but non-trivial interactions is impressive.
One can use the general term ’reasoning’ to describe these inter-

actions; but reasoning here refers to processes of cooperation and conflict between action-oriented structures, not to the logical manipula-

tion of static statements.

trasting meanings.

Fig. 2h shows a diagram of these two con-

In an action-oriented, cognitive structures model

reasoning is a spontaneous interaction between a collection of active.
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Cooperation Between Structures:
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Reasoning Process Models

.
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autonomous knowledge structures
whereas in a verbally-oriented,
logicbased model, reasoning is a planned,
well-defined process which transforms true statements— segments of
static knovledge-into other true
statements
Cooperation, external interactions and
conflict will now be dis-

cussed in turn.

Cooperation between structures

.

Three forms of cooperation have

been discussed— internal assimilation, parallel
operation and chaining.
As discussed
t_ion

m

David's "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol, internal
assimila-

provides a mechanism by which reasoning can take place
in the ab-

sence of external objects.

One structure can then provide an inter-

pretation and an appropriate context for the functioning of another
structure internally and this can be considered a form of cooperation.
The concept of chaining was introduced in the David— "Sharing 15 Stones"

analysis

.

The

Cut in half" structure is seen as operating so as to pro-

vide a better situation for the original "Sharing" structure to operate
in.

Thus two structures cooperate so as to provide a path to an improved

solution.

Parallel operation was discussed in the Joey "8 Cake Packages"

protocol, where two counting-based structures cooperated by operating
in a synchronous fashion to produce a solution.

Interactions between structures and the environment

.

Other types

of interactive cognitive processes that have been introduced are the
feedback interactions between structures and the environment.

The

general form of these interactions is shown in Fig. 25A select-and-evaluate pattern was identified in the Kathy "Sharing
15 Candies" protocol where Kathy estimated a solution, tested it using a
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Cognitive
reaction

Cognitive
reaction

Fig.
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Feedback Interaction

drawing and adjusted the solution.

This was modelled as a self
sustain-

ing Interaction between a
practical action-oriented "Sharing"
structure
and the marks on paper that
Kathy used to symbolize the
distribution
of groups of candies.
A gi ecewise ad aptation circle was
used to describe behavior in the

David "Sharing 15 Stones" protocol
where David 'built up' a solution
piece by piece, eventually distributing
the entire group of circles
he had drawn representing the stones.

This was modelled as an interac-

tion between a practical "Sharing"
structure and externally drawn marks,

where the "Sharing" structure reassimilated
successively smaller subgroups left to be distributed.
A marked shift in approach was identified in
the Joey "Sharing 15

Stones" protocol.

Joey shifted from using counting blocks as an aid

in doing a subtraction calculation to using the blocks
to represent

stones to be dealt out into

k

groups.

It was proposed that this shift

was triggered by a conflict between an internal structure (expecting

each person to receive the same amount) and the perception of an external configuration of the blocks (showing unequal groups).

It was also

proposed that the presence of a 'concrete effect' was playing a role in
this shift in approach, where the presence of the concrete materials

encouraged a 'takeover' by the practical "Sharing" structure.

This re-

presents another type of interaction between external events (in this
case the presence of the blocks) and the balance of activity in internal

cognitive structures.

Conflict between structures

.

Two of these examples of external

interactions are also examples of conflict between structures.

Kathy's
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select/evaluate approach is an
example where different numbers
are
tested by the student— and these
number ideas are rejected
whenever the
perceptual results of passing out
candies and the expectation that
none
will be left conflict.

Thus the number ideas compete
with each other

for consideration, and the
perception-expectation conflicts are what

keep the cycle going as the "Sharing"
structure attempts to reach an
equilibrium.
The concept of successive dominance
(or 'takeover') of one structure after another structure's activity is
suppressed is an example of

competition that was used to interpret the
Joey-"Sharing 15 Candies,"
Barry- Sharing 15 Stones" and Roy-"40 Tangerines"
protocols.

In each

of these protocols the subject was observed to take
several different

approaches to the same problem, and the successive approaches
were

accounted for by the presence of different structures competing
to
assimilate the situation.

Therefore there are two senses in which structures can come into
conflict — (l) in disequilibrium situations where one structure tries
and fails to assimilate another structure, and (2) in situations where
two or more structures compete for dominance.

The interactive character of the solutions

.

For the protocols

analyzed in Chapter V the student's possession of a practical knowledge
structure was not sufficient by itself to explain the student's behavior.

The protocols show fairly complex interchanges going on between

the subject and the environment.

The models of cognitive activity pro-

posed did not show any process as simple as that of a single knowledge
structure responding to a problem and outputting a solution.

(Nor do

they show a simple linear
sequence of mental actions
outputting a solution. )
They show a complex series
of interactions between
internal structures and external events,
and between the internal
structures
themselves

during the course of a solution.

They show structures
reassimilatin e

new situation aspects in the
course of a solution attempt,
structures
competing for dominance, and
structures cooperating to complete
a solution.

Ordinarily one uses the words
"reasoning" in the context of

problem solving to refer to cognitive
activity where a familiar series
of actions is not immediately
available to the subject as a solution.
It is the adaptive, competitive and
cooperative activity of structures

that has been used here to explain just
these cases where processes

go beyond a simple habitual response.

Thus, several cases were anal-

yzed where a familiar series of actions was not
available to the student
to provide a solution, and a new combination of
several actions was required.

So a description of a subject's mental structures
is not enough

to account for problem solving behavior

— one

must also describe the in-

teractions between structures and between structures and outside events
that lead to appropriate action sequences.
An ecological metaphor

.

But on the other hand the point of view

presented here does not treat reasoning processes as controlling the
structures in a rigid way.

Rather, reasoning processes are viewed as

spontaneous interactions between structures

— and

the structures them-

selves retain a large degree of autonomy and retain the ability to act

alone in certain situations.

Autonomous properties have been ascribed

to structures in the context of structures competing for dominance,

generating related cases, and aggressively assimilating situation as-
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pects

to account for phenomena like
counting overshoots, interruptions,

Shifts in approach, and the re-emergence
of an approach.

So reasoning

is not viewed as a set of rational
well-ordered processes which inte-

grate various passive knowledge structures
to engage a problem.

Rather,

knowledge structures actively engage (assimilate
aspects of) a problem
situation themselves and in doing so they interact
with each other in
certain ways by competing and cooperating as they
interact with the environment.

The play-out of these interactions may be termed
'reasoning.'

A metaphor apropos to this view would be an island ecology
involving
many resident species that have established niches and form a stable
ecosystem.

The adaptive species reactions that would be observed if one

were to introduce a new food source on the island—
by stocking a lake
for example

might also trigger a play-out of complex interactions like

competition, cooperation (symbiosis) and assimilation (of new food
sources or territory).

As in the proposed cognitive model, the island's

ecology is made up of semi -autonomous units (organisms) which act inde-

pendently but which also enter into several kinds of interactions with
each other.

Suggestions for Further Research

Arithmetic structures

.

Beyond the area of elementary reasoning

processes, the present study has only scratched the surface of the problem of identifying children's arithmetic structures.

Several directions

for studies are suggested:
1.

Appendix

I

contains a study of Joey's comments on simple

arithmetic problems that he solves "in his head.

More

studies of this kind would
illuminate the way arithmetic

structures work outside of a
practical context.
2.

Practical problem solving interviews
with 1st grade children may show how practical action
structures operate when

conservation of number is still not firmly
established.
They should also indicate the form of
arithmetic structures
in their early stages of development.
3.

Practical problem solving interviews with
older students
may indicate the nature of recurrent
difficulties with
concepts of fractions and proportions.

D rawings

.

Solutions centering on drawings appear to offer a
unique

opportunity for studying internalized actions.
•

Quantitative and non-quantitative problems where it

is necessary to use a sequence of several different kinds
of actions

may be useful in determining the extent of the overlap between the present Piaget ian— based model and the search model in information processing theories.

A central question to be dealt with here is the problem

of how the activity of an appropriate action structure is triggered in-

ternally.

How do relevant actions come to mind?

Structural learning

When there is a sufficient understanding of

.

typical arithmetic structures occurring in children, one should be
able to study structural changes over longer time periods by mapping a

particular set of cognitive structures in a child on two occasions.

Varying number ranges
the results of dividing

i*0

.

The fact that Roy is knowledgeable about

objects into

^

boxes and 15 objects into

3

,
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boxes but not with to Into

5

boxes or 15 Into

5

boxes suggests that

Roy’s knowledge or arithmetic
is not evenly distributed
over the number range 0 to 50. A conjecture
is made here that this
unevenness is
not just a reflection of which
arithmetic facts Roy has tried to memorise but that it signals the
presence of certain general cognitive
struc-

tures through which the child organizes
the way quantities combine.

Further research is needed to identify these
structures.

One interest-

ing research format involves using a story
problem more than once with
a student but with the numbers changed.

Dynamic properties

Examples of observed dynamics (interruptions,

.

overshoot counting, false starts in counting, word
emphasis patterns
in certain transcripts, rhythmic actions or speech,
reactions of sur-

prise, etc.) are used to a limited extent in this study.

Further studies

of these phenomena, seen as the effects of structures operating in real
time, should add support to the notion of internal structures as dynamic

processes as opposed to static representations.
Studies of single students

.

An attempt has been made in this

study to uncover a wide range of phenomena and to develop cognitive

mechanisms which begin to explain them.

In depth case studies of single

students working on many problems would serve to refine these cognitive

models and to make stronger claims for their validity.

An appreciation

of the usefulness of both general concepts and particular protocol

models will grow as they are refined enough to be able to account for
a whole series of protocols with an individual student in a consistent

manner
Internalized actions

.

Studies are needed to investigate the fol-

lowing hypothesis raised by
St,Ucty
* the studv-

qn
solutions
to quantitative story
i

problems are organized on the
basis of internalized actions
on objects
even in cases where one observes
immediate solutions, counting-based
solutions, or the formulation of
arithmetic problems in standard
form.
Educational Implication's
It is unfortunate that the
intuitive knowledge and reasoning pro-

cesses discussed in this study seem
to be utilized to such a limited

extent in school.

Despite repeated urges to "start from what
the student knows,"
it is still true that many educational
activities are designed around

a blank slate model of the learning process.

"Starting from what the

student knows" is too often translated to mean:

"Determine which of

the standard objectives in the curriculum has been mastered
by the

student."

Too little advantage is taken of knowledge and reasoning pro

cesses that originate with the student.
It is suggested here that reasoning processes and practical know-

ledge structures like those identified in this study can serve as

starting points for building mathematical ideas.

Certainly this study

gives only a partial list of such starting points, but the list should

become larger and clearer as more clinical research is carried out.
Problems in applying arithmetic

.

Barry's attempt to solve the

"Sharing 15 Candies" problem was interesting because he made a 'grand
tour' through four written arithmetic algorithms involving multiplica-

tion, division, subtraction, and addition.

Furthermore he was observed

to report numbers in the place of the remainder as the answer in written

division problem.

These observations are related
to Engager's (19TM
clinical study of 5 th and 6th
grade children. He found
the absence
of a relationship between
school mathematics and intuitive
ideas about
quantities
(in the students) and showed
how the students in his
study had instead constructed a
large number of rules centering
on the
manipulation of number symbols on
the printed page.
Now one could
probably very easily teach Barry
to report the number on top of
the

division bracket as the answer rather
than the number at the bottom
of the calculation.
there.

But the heart of the matter does
not of course lie

Barry's division algorithm structure
appears to be an isolated

structure that has difficulty in connecting
its activity to practical

action structures that interpret practical
problems.
In order to examine the problem of isolated
structures, the role

of story problems in the typical grade school class
will first be
discussed.

The standard approach to teaching arithmetic is to teach

written computation skills and then to give students story problems

which provide practice in applying those skills.

One first teaches a

section on a particular operation, say addition of 2 digit numbers with
regrouping, moving quickly from a conceptual introduction using concrete

objects (or, more frequently, illustrations) to ’serious business'

practice with written arithmetic problems.

Only after practice with the

written arithmetic are story problems introduced.
make a separation between a context of computation
and a context of applying arithmetic.

-

Thus schools typically

— of

do i ng aritlimetic

—

It is possible that this separa-

tion is a major factor leading to the cognitive isolation of algorithmic

structures in children.

The present study indicates
that the above sequence need
not always be followed.
In the protocols of David
and Kathy in Chapter V

one sees them solve the "Sharing
15 Stones" problem ordinarily
solved
via division by using different acted
out approaches. Neither David nor

Kathy have studied division in school.

And although Joey had already

had an introduction to division problems
in school, he too acted out
the solution to this problem.

Joey also used a counting-based approach

to the "8 Cake Packages" problem.

These protocols show that it was pos-

sible to engage these children in interesting forms
of problem solving

using problems that would ordinarily be reserved for
older children.

When they could not or did not use a written arithmetic
algorithm, they
used an act-out or counting-based approach.
lem to the structures they

They assimilated the prob-

had— to what they knew how

to do

.

One of

the interesting features of mathematics is that there are usually many

ways to get to the same place.

Too often schools seem to champion only

one way to getting to a particular place, such as using written-symbol

algorithms to calculate the answer to a story problem.

Starting from practical contexts

.

Can one use story problems to

introduce children to new arithmetic ideas?

Although the interviews

in this study were not designed to be instructional experiences, one

does see in the protocols interesting situations where learning may
occur.

Since David and Kathy are just about to reach their first chap-

ter on multiplication and division it would be interesting to try in-

troducing them to these topics by starting from practical contexts portrayed in story problems.

One could try to tap into the practical ac-

tion structures of the children as the intuitive foundation on which
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new counting-based structures and
algorithmic structures can be built.
In that case, instead of learning to
do arithmetic so that they can
later

it,

students would be learning to do arithmetic
in the con-

text of applying it.

For example, the time to introduce Joey
to the

notation for multiplication, such as

8 x 2 = 16

,

might be directly after

he solves a problem like the "8 Cake Packages"
problem where he uses
a counting-based approach.

If Joey can connect this notation to

several different practical problems before he is
required to memorize
all of the multiplication facts, then he may be on the way
to estab-

lishing a link for himself between the world of symbols on paper and
the world of practical actions.

Progressive levels of symbolization

.

The study proposed that in

several of the protocols the children solved story problems via intern-

alized actions without the use of formal arithmetic ideas.

This led to

the hypothesis that solutions to story problems are often organized men-

tally on the basis of internalized actions on objects even in cases
where one observes immediate solutions, counting-based solutions, or the

formulation of an arithmetic problem in standard form.

(See p. 237.)

This suggests that educators should pay increased attention to the devel-

opment of children’s ability to reason via internalized actions.

One

way to do this may be to encourage students to symbolize practical problem solutions at increasingly abstract levels

— in

acted out, drawn out,

counted out, and finally, written arithmetic formats.

It appears to

be crucial that students not view these formats as completely separate

spheres of activity.

They should be able to translate between them

and view them as different ways of representing the same problem.
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Tapping intuitive knowledge and reasoning
pro cesses.

Story prob-

lems may not be the best medium for
these approaches— other mediums

may work better, like problems growing
out of small-group projects
(see Lomon [1971] for a description of
a project approach) or the use

of mathematics to describe systems in the
study of science.

But in

any case there appears to be an opportunity and
a need for a creative
effort to develop instructional settings that meet two
general criteria.
First, algorithmic procedures and notation need to be connected
to

quantitative situations that are already intuitively meaningful to the
student in some way.

This may help to prevent the cognitive isolation

of algorithmic structures.

If a student can solve certain problem sit-

uations successfully through practical actions and counting, then these

may be good starting points.

Algorithmic methods, rather than be studied

as ends in themselves, should be learned as useful shortcuts to practical

approaches, like counting or acting out, that are more intuitive but that
are too time consuming.

Second, the protocols analyzed here were explained via the presence
of active knowledge structures which entered into spontaneous reasoning

interactions such as generative assimilation (leading to the generation
of related cases), chaining, recursion, the select and evaluate process

(leading to solving a problem via convergent trial and error) and piece-

wise assimilation (leading to solving a problem in pieces).

Settings

need to be found where creative reasoning interactions like these can
most easily come into play.

In this way perhaps students can develop

an appreciation for the fact that there are many ways to reach places.

and a sense of confidence in their ability to find them.
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appendix

I

PATTERNS IN JOEY'S COMMENTS
ON ARITHMETIC PROBLEMS
The exploratory clinical
interview approach used in the
main body
of the present study for the
analysis of story problem
solutions can
also he applied to the analysis
of solutions to simple arithmetic
problems.
This appendix illustrates this
application by interpreting patterns in Joey's comments on arithmetic
problems, showing how many separate instances of behavior can be
attributed to a few types of thought
.

processes.

Notes included in this appendix analyze
the same data more

rigorously, illustrating a second level of
analysis that is somewhat

more formal.
Introduction.

Elementary teachers today feel a good deal of pres-

sure to maintain a high rate of mathematics achievement
in their class-

rooms, both in terms of standardized test scores and in terms
of the

amount of curriculum material covered successfully.

This pressure often

tends to focus one on monitoring correct answer percentages so that suc-

cessful students can be reinforced and moved ahead if possible, while

students having trouble can be identified for more practice or for reviews of lesson material.

However, authors such as Davis (1972), Gins-

burg (1972), Erlwanger (1973), Lankford (197*0, Easley (1975), and
Easley and Zwoyer (1975), have indicated an alternative to an exclusive
focus on performance scores in the classroom.

They suggest paying atten-

tion not just to whether a student's answer to a problem is correct,

but also to the particular process the student goes through to obtain
the answer.

This approach can uncover some fascinating patterns in
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student's behaviors, and holds
promise for providing a basis
for more
effective instruction. This appendix
describes some patterns in a
third grader's explanations of how
he solves certain addition and
subtraction problems. Analysis of these
patterns suggests that at least
two of them are manifestations of
ideas he has constructed largely on
his own, independently of his training
in school.

In addition, the

flexible nature of these ideas contrasts with
a simplistic view of arithmetic knowledge

— the

view that a knowledge of arithmetic consists of
a

collection of facts and symbol manipulation algorithms.
A simplistic view o f arithmetic knowledge as facts
and algorithms

.

According to this view one first learns to say and write the
names of
the natural numbers in order.
facts up to 9+9=18.

Then one memorizes the simple addition

The same is done for subtraction facts.

Armed

with these facts one can learn various algorithms for solving more difficult problems with paper and pencil.

The addition

13

for example,

+ 25

38

is performed using the facts 3+5=8 and 1+2=3 with the appropriate habits

for arranging the numerals on the page so that the two individual re-

sults, 3 and 8, can be read as a single 2 digit answer.

Carrying, col-

umn subtraction, and borrowing algorithms complete the picture, allowing one to add or subtract any two natural numbers.

Multiplication and

division facts are learned in a similar way, as well as the accompanying
algorithms which extend the domain of application of these two operations
to any pair of natural numbers.
In this view then, the facts learned initially, like 2+3=5, are

seen purely as a set of
separately learned associations.

Given a pair
of numbers and an operation,
the student must associate
to this combination a third number designated
as the answer.
The algorithms which
use and extend these facts are
methods involving one or more
simple steps
to be performed or repeated in
a specified order.
Here we have in mind
the standard arithmetic algorithms
which are used in conjunction with

visual symbols written on paper.

Each step involves the use of an

arithmetic fact or a knowledge of where to
write a numeral on the page
in relation to other numerals.

We shall call this view of arithmetic

knowledge the facts and algorithms view

.

Clearly, this view of the nature of arithmetical
knowledge is a

limited one.

It consists of an intricate system for merely
starting

from some marks on paper and writing down some new marks.

In theory,

it could be learned as an isolated body of knowledge because
the sym-

bols with which it works need not have any meaningful interpretation

-

it could operate without any connection whatsoever to our everyday

knowledge of the world.

The expression '300 ^6', for example, could

simply be associated with a particular symbol manipulation algorithm
and the answer symbol it yields.

Another kind of knowledge not admitted

in this view is a knowledge of relationships like '(3+5) = (5+3)' or
'if 3+5=8 then 8-5=3'.

Nor is there a knowledge of the relationship

between 3+5=8 and counting operations with objects.
Almost all teachers and textbooks go beyond this view to some extent in the kinds of knowledge they try to develop in students.

Count-

ing groups of real objects, for example, is an activity which can form
a rudimentary connection between number names and real world situations.
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Thus numbers will begin to have
at least one interpretation
in the
child's world. Word problems are
assigned with the intention of forming deeper connections between
practical situations and arithmetic

knowledge, but many students seem
to have difficulty making these
connections.
Laws such as the commutative and
associative laws are intro-

duced in order to tie related operations
together, but when this is done
primarily via formal definitions, students
may still fail to use these
principles in practice.

So the extent to which students succeed
in de-

veloping a knowledge of arithmetic that goes
beyond the level of a collection of facts and algorithms is currently not known.

Part of the

problem is that although we feel that facts and algorithms
approach is
inadequate by itself, we have difficulty pinning down a very precise
answer to the question: "What kinds of knowledge go significantly be-

yond this approach?"

Patterns in Joey's comments

.

An alternative to answering this

question by drawing on ideas from established mathematical theory is to
look for intuitive mathematical ideas that occur naturally in children.

The examples in this appendix are drawn primarily from protocols in-

volving arithmetic problems.

In individual interviews a chiJd is asked

to do a problem 'in his head,' although he is always allowed to use

paper and pencil if needed.

The student is encouraged to comment on

his thinking during the course of solving the problem and after a solu-

tion has been found.

Analysis then proceeds on the assumption that

these comments are partial reflections of the cognitive processes used
to find the solution.
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The following passages are
excerpts from a series of taped
interviews with Joey, an eight year
old child in the third grade.
They have
been carefully transcribed and
appear here without deletions
or editing of any kind.
These excerpts were chosen as
interesting cases to

investigate the possibility that Joey's
arithmetic ideas go significantly beyond a facts and algorithms
knowledge structure. To the extent that this occurs, one can begin
to define other more intuitive

kinds of arithmetic knowlege that Joey
uses.
A1

Interviewer:
Joey:
I:

Joey:
I:

Joey:

How much is 8 plus 9?
IT

Well how'd you get that so fast?
-

Oh,

-

Is that just easy?

Yeah, because 9 plus ah - 9 plus 8 is 17
because 10 plus 8 is 18 - now 9 is one
less than 10 so it's se- seventeen.

Here Joey comments on his answer and gives us some clues about how he
thinks about addition with numbers in this range.

He makes similar

comments on two other problems:

I:

Joey:
I:

Joey:
I:

Joey:

How much is
7 plus 8?

Uh huh
-

7

-

plus 8?

You said 7 plus

8.

[yes]

15

Got that pretty fast too.
do that one?

How'd you

just went like this, it would be 10
plus 7 is 17 - o.k. - then 9 plus 7 is
16 and 9- oh and 8 plus 7 is 15I

,
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I:

Joey:
I:

Joey:

[how much is] 9 + 2?

9+2? - ll

And how do you get 11?
'Cause if there, 'cause if it was9 ah
10 plus 2 it would be 12, now- it's
9,
ah, then that should be 11.

—

There are several similarities in
these passages.

In each Joey

solves a related problem where he adds
one of the given numbers to 10.

Then he makes a series of inferences
about other sums.

The inferences

are made by repeatedly reducing the first
addend and the sum of the re-

lated problem by one until the original problem
is reached with its
solution.
easily.

Adding a number to 10 appears to be something he
can do
He seems to prefer thinking of 10 as the 'starting
point,’

and orients to the number in the problem closest to 10
as the first
addend.

This choice minimizes the number of steps then required to

solve the problem.

Notice also that in A1 and A2 Joey ends up with

the addends in reversed order

—

for example, when given the problem

8+9, Joey answers 17, then begins his comment by saying, "..ah, 9 plus
8 is 17

as 8+9*

because..,"

He treats 9+8 as a problem with the same answer

Thus he spontaneously uses thought processes which produce be-

havior consistent with the commutative principle of addition.
V

We will also want to consider the domain of situations in which
this behavior appears, but we have too little data here to define this

domain carefully.

For the moment we can estimate that this kind of be-

havior could occur at least in problems of the form A+B or B+A where
A=8 or 9 and

2<B<8.

Where needed, one can obtain a more precise pic-

]
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ture of this kind of domain by
selecting appropriate questions
in subsequent interviews
Prom these observations, then,
we think of Joey
being able to do sums of the form
10 + A quickly and easily, and
being
able to work backwards from them
to solve other problems indirectly.
.

We will call this pattern 'decrementing
from 10.'

(See Note

1

for a

more formal analysis of this pattern.)

^

ttern_s_i n_T oey's errors

interesting.

.

Joey's errors are often particularly

Consider the following passage:

—

8ow a bout 18 take away 7:
from card.

[Misreads problem

Jr

18 take away 7*

I:

Oh, I'm sorry,

J:

Huh?

I:

18 take away 17

J:

18 take away -- 11 [is the answer].

I:

How do you know?

J:

I just know.
'Cause if there would be 8
take away 7 it would be 1.

I:

So -

J:

So, if it was like that it would be 11.

.

Since the interviewer misreads the problem at first, we would ordinarily

assume that Joey gives the number 11 as an answer to the problem 18-7
and ignores the interviewer's emphasized correction for some reason.
But then he makes a similar error in another situation.

At one point

in the course of solving a word problem he decides to subtract l6 from

,

.
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17 and says the following:

J:

17 take away 16 is 11, right?

I:

Well, show me that on paper.

J:

Let

'

s

see

[writes]

17

-16
01

(writes the 1 first,
then the 0)

Uh oh I:

It's not 11?

J

Nope

:

.

It's one

This increase our suspicion that Joey has a
non-standard way of thinking about certain subtraction problems.

When Joey works on paper, it

appears that he deals with the problem differently than when
he does it
in his head.

But it’s hard to know whether his initial error in B 2

'

is a 'slip of the tongue', a 'borrowing error', a random mistake,
or

some other kind of error.
Some new clues show up later, however, when he is working on another

word problem.
of

b

to see how many groups of

placed

B3

He is using some counting blocks, putting them into groups

3

groups of

1

it will take to make 20 blocks.

b

He has

on the table when the following exhange occurs:

I:

How many [blocks] do we have?

J:

(Looks at one group)

I:

Where?

J:

(Looks at all

I:

So we need some more?

J:

Yeah, 18 more

3

-

Four.

groups)

l8 more

I

1

'd

mean 12

be 20.

—

.
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Here again we find a result that
is higher by 10 than it
should be.
This contrasts with the following
correct solution:

—

I:

OK.

J

16 plus

:

How about l6 plus 5?
5

—

21

I:

How'd you get 21 so fast?

J:

How did I get 21 so fast - I just did like
6 plus 5, 6 plus 5 is 11, so ah, l6 plus
5
probably is 21.

In cases B1 and BU we see Joey referring to a
related problem involving

the addition of two single digits.

The numbers correspond to the digits

in the one's place of the numberals in the original problem.

Joey seems

to infer that the answer to the original problem will be 10 higher
than

the answer to his related problem.

subtraction via digits.

'

We will call this approach 'addition-

The pattern suggests an explanation for his

errors in B2 and B3 as well.

In the case of 17-16,

for example, we sus-

pect that he thinks about 7-6, calculates 7-6=1, then converts the
an 11.

This works perfectly well in problems like 16+5 and 17-2.

1 to

Thus

it is a perfectly reasonable approach for a certain range of numbers.

But in subtraction problems involving 2 numbers between 10 and 20, after

he calculates the answer to the related problem involving digits, he

converts the answer unnecessarily into a number 10 higher.

Apparently

he gets into trouble because the domain of application of his method is

too broad.
So in addition to patterns in Joey's successful behavior one finds

patterns in the errors he makes as well.

They suggest that his calcu-

lation errors, 17-l6=U, 'with 12 blocks, to get 20 one needs l8 more,'

26l

20-12=18, and 18-17=11, are

not,

just accidents.

They are a consequence
of the quite consistent way in
which Joey thinks about addition
and subtraction problems with numbers in
2
this range.

Subt^tJon_^^tiM.

Another pattern can be defined from
the

following passages:

—

C2

I

:

How about 6 take away 3?

J:

3

I:

How do you know that?

J:

If it's - since 3 plus 3 is 6, well than
6 take away 3 is 3.

I:

OK.

J:

16 take away 6? - Hmm - l6 take away 6 aw - holy molyAw!
I should a been knowin' that, it's 10.

I:

How'd you get 10?

J:

Huh?

I:

Wha - you suddenly realized you could do it
why?

J

should a been knowing it - Because 10 plus
6, is l6 - So l6 take away 6, is 10 - I just
didn’t think of it.

:

How about l6 take away 6?

-

I

I:

Well what made you think of the 10?

J:

Huh?

I:

What made you think of the 10 all of a sudden?

J:

I

just thought of it.

Here Joey refers to the inverse operation of addition in commenting on
his answers to subtraction problems.

The additions are so closely tied
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to these subtract ions for
him that they can stand
alone as justifications of his answers
It is almost as if Joey
thinks about subtraction in terms of addition in
this range of numbers.
Notice that these
comments are spontaneous - they
are not responses to questions
about
.

relating addition and subtraction
problems.

Another slightly more

com-

plex example follows:

C3

I:

And what

J:

9 take away 3?

I:

How do you get 6?

J:

Huh?

I:

How do you get 6?

J:

Uh - because, a, 6 plus 2 is 8, add one
more, that's 9.

I:

You thought of all that?

J:

Uh huh.

I:

When you were doing it the first time?

J:

Uh huh.

'

s

9 take away 3?
- 6

Here again Joey refers to the inverse operation, but this time he does
so in two steps.

He refers to the additions 6+2=8 and 8+1=9, rather

than the expected 6+3=9.

If we infer from the pattern in Cl and C2 that

Joey is also thinking about something like 6+3=9, then in each of the
3

passages Joey is adding the subtrahend of the original problem to the

answer to obtain the minuend as a sum.
'subtraction via addition.'

This pattern will be called

Notice also that Joey's comments in

(13

are

consistent with the associative principle of addition if we paraphrase

:
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them as follows

6+2=8,
(a+b)

+1=9
+c=d

6+

=9

3

a + (b+c)

= d

Now Piaget (1969) uses the arithmetic
operations of addition and
its inverse, subtraction, as a prime
example of his concept of rever-

sibility in mental operations. The reversibility
idea implies a kind of
symmetry

m

two actions that have opposite effects

'undo' with equal facility.

-

one can 'do' and

However, the author has never seen children

spontaneously use a subtraction calculation to support an
addition calculation.

If we characterize pattern C as evidence for the
spontaneous

involvement of a reversible operation we should qualify this point
of

view by indicating that its application appears to be asymmetrical.
So far three patterns in Joey's comments on arithmetic problems

have been presented.

To account for these patterns we have proposed

the theory that they are three different thought processes involved,

and we have made a small start on the task of modelling the individual

characteristics of these thought processes.

We will move on now to

attempt to characterize some common characteristics shared by these processes.

But it should be noted that we could continue to analyze more

protocol data on Joey and continue to catalogue patterns in his responses.

(From pilot work it appears that one can easily find six or

more such patterns with a typical student and that patterns vary from
student to student.)

Thus an important direction for future research

would be to make a more complete catalogue of behavior patterns for a
student and to attempt to construct a complete cognitive map of the

student's system of arithmetic structures.
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Joey’s approach to arithmetic and
the

-

rr

--

Clearly we would be doing Joey an
injustice by referring to the arithmetic knowledge he demonstrates in these
passages as being based on a
facts and algorithms approach.

We can divide the previous problems
in-

to two groups according to how they would
be handled in a facts and al-

gorithms approach as follows:

Hyp othetically

Hypothetically
Solved via Paper-Pencil Algorithm

R emembered as a Fact

Al

8+9

Bl

18-17

A2

7+8

B2

17-16

A3

9+2

B3

20-12

Cl

6-3

BU

16+5

C3

9-3

C2

16-6

The problems on the left would be remembered as rote facts with no oper-

ations needed of any kind.

But in each of these cases we saw Joey

bringing in other numbers and operations.
to the original problem.

In each case he related these

Apparently he was not just remembering a fact.

The problems on the right would require a paper and pencil algorithm, but Joey solves these by other means without using paper.

It is

also unlikely that Joey solved these problems using paper and pencil-

based algorithms visualized 'in his head.'
and the fact that doing

B2^

His comments in

and C2

,

on paper led him to a different answer from

his first answer, all indicate that this was not the case.

Apparently

he was not using paper pencil algorithms.

Could Joey have learned the approaches he uses from segments of
his school's curriculum that go beyond the facts and algorithms q.pproach?
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In pattern C,

'subtraction via addition,- the
approach Joey uses is
compatible with activities in his
textbook that relate problems
like
8-3=5 and 5+3=8. Thus it is
conceivable that the idea behind
this pattern developed in response to
instruction given Jeoy in school.
But
in the case of pattern A,
the 'decrementing from 10

unlikely

—

as a method it is far too unorthodox.

'

pattern, this is

The curriculum which

Joey used in school presents a different
kind of method to students for
adding via ten.
It encourages students to break
a problem like 8 + 7 =?
into two sums:

8+2=10 and 10+5+15.

Joey, on the other hand, starts

with the sum 10+7+17 and then derives the
sums 9+7=16 and

8 + 7 + 15

So

.

Joey apparently did not learn the knowledge
he exhibits in pattern A
from the school curriculum.

Pattern B also appears to not be a result of school-fostered
knowledge.

When Joey makes statements like:

'17-16 is 11

,'

and,

'(when

you have 12) 18 more'd be 20,' in the B examples, several interpretations are possible.
mistakes.

We could assume that these are random, careless

But the consistent pattern we observe in the errors leads

us to believe that they are caused by a stable thought process in Joey.

We would assume that this process is derived from a method that was

taught to Joey, but that was distorted by him in some way.

But in Joey's

curriculum the only method that is taught for problems like those in
pattern B are standard paper and pencil algorithms.

Since it appears

that Joey did not use anything resembling these algorithms, we conclude
that the process Joey uses here is one

Characterizing Joey's knowledge

.

lie

invented primarily on his own.

If Joey's knowledge of arithmetic

is partially self-invented and goes beyond a collection of facts and

.
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algorithms, then how can „e
earacterUe it?

In reading through the
transcripts the most distinctive
aspect that emerges is the
striking
1111)1 11
in th ®
he thinks about these
problems. There are
three aspects of flexibility
visible in the protocol
segments.

~

^

The first aspect is
fieneruUd^.

By this we mean that
each of the

three ideas of Joey's analysed
here is a general scheme that
assimilates
a whole domain of situations.
For example, his 'decrementing
from 10'
scheme can assimilate the problems
9+9, 7+8, 9+2, and, we expect, many
others. When arithmetic facts like
7+6=13 are assumed to be the only

available kind of knowledge, each unit
applies to only one arithmetic
problem.

The behavior patterns discussed here,
however, suggest the

existence of units of knowledge in Joey
that can each handle many
problems
Now this characteristic of generality is
not unique to intuitive

arithmetic ideas like Joey's

— it

is also a characteristic of the stan-

dard symbol manipulation algorithms and structures
of intelligence in
general.

But a second aspect of flexibility in Joey's thinking that
is

not an intrinsic characteristic of symbol manipulation algorithms
is his

apparent aware ness of interrela ionships between number s and between
t

number operations
less than 10

,

.

In A1

(8+9=17) Joey says '10+8 is 18 - now 9 is one

so it's se-seventeen.

'

He refers explicitly to a 'one

less than' relationship between the numbers 9 and 10 and refers implicitly
to a corresponding relationship between the values of 9+8 and 10+8.

the connection he makes between the two summed pairs seems to involve
a relationship between two numbers contained in the pairs.

some of the relationships Joey seems to be at home with.

These are

Thus
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Joey expresses another
kind of reiatlonship
between particular
summed pairs in pattern B.
In B1 (18-17=11) h c „ ays:
'So if

It's like

that it would be 11,' and
In Bh (l6+5 -21)i

'I Just did like 6*5

He indicates that the
problem 18-17 is 'like' 8-7 and
that

l 6+5 is 'like'
6*5, but there is not enough
evidence in these examples to
nay whether
the relationship involves
adding or subtracting 10, or
the way 16 'sounds
like' or ’looks like'
6, or some other aspect.

In pattern C Joey again
relates different problems, but this
time

there are summed pairs and subtracted
pairs such as 16 - 6-10 and 10 + 6 =l 6
He says little about why these
are necessarily related for him,
but the

relationships appear to be very strong for
him, as if the reason were
so obvious that it needs no explanation.

So in each of the three patterns we see
an aspect of the flexibility of Joey’s arithmetic knowledge in his
ability to interrelate numbers

and number operations.

This leads us directly to a third aspect of his

flexibility— that of redundancy

.

In other interviews Joey has demon-

strated that he, like mo3t children his age, can also do
addition and

subtraction problems by counting, often using his fingers for tallying.
So he has at least two ways of doing each problem discussed so far.
in particular cases he may have other ways of operating as well

And

— such

as the paper and pencil algorithm he uses In passage B2, sums he has

done often enough to be remembered by association,

or'

any of several

other interesting forms of arithmetic knowledge that will

not,

be dis-

cussed in this paper.

Although we have no clear-cut evidence in Joey's case it also

is

quite conceivable that the thought processes underlying each behavior
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pattern can be 'stretched' to
apply to a problem ordinarily
thought about
in another way.
For example, for 11+6,
instead of relating the problem
to 6+1, Joey might relate it
to 10+6.
We should notice that such
domain
overlaps are not guaranteed to occur
in any single instance, however,
since Joey does say that 18-17 is
11, and apparently does not use the
thought process underlying the
'subtraction via addition’ pattern to
ask himself whether 17+11=18.
Had he done this, he might have
corrected
his answer.
to the

Or would he have?

Notice that if his thinking corresponded

addition-subtraction via digits’ pattern when he added
17+11,

he would have related this to 7+1=8 and
gotten 18 for the answer!

So

here we have the possibility that Joey’s structures
have been working

together redundantly, and reconfirming each other, even
though they
don't always agree with the standard arithemetic facts.

Impl ications and a question

.

Several interview passages have been

analyzed to show how Joey's arithmetic ideas go beyond a facts and algorithms approach and beyond what he has been taught in school.
ideas are characterized by three kinds of flexibility:

These

each idea is

general in that it handles a range of number situations; each reflects
an awareness of interrelationships between numbers and between number

operations; and together these ideas imply a redundancy in the means

Joey has for thinking about arithmetic problems.

However, since the

answers Joey obtains using his arithmetic ideas agree only part of the
time with the standard ones, his teacher may feel safer asking him to
forget his own approaches and to concentrate more on learning the num-

ber facts and standard algorithms.

But since Joey has apparently con-

.
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St™

many Of these ideas on his
own, it would seem tragic
to simply
dismiss them as undesirable.
In the long run, that would
in effect be
telling him that his own creative
efforts are undesirable.
Unfortunatel y , this may happen with many
students in an inadvertant way, because teachers ordinarily lack
training in ways of discovering the
selfconstructed ideas their students have.
Thus when they introduce or re-

view an arithmetic concept they may
be unknowingly competing with an
idea that the student has already
constructed.

At the moment we do not

have data on the extent to which this
occurs in schools, but it is in-

teresting to note in this regard that Joey is
not an exceptional student academically

— he

comes from a lower income family and earns below

average grades in schoo]
So it seems important that educators pursue the question
of how

the school can work with children like Joey to build on the
arithmetic
ideas they have already constructed so that their creative instincts

are not suppressed.

simple solution.

This problem is not likely to have any single

But part of the solution will involve an increased

sensitivity on the part of teachers to the self-constructed ideas of
students.

In this study an attempt has been made to expose some of

these self-constructed ideas as a first step toward the development

of this kind of sensitivity.

Note

1

:

We can make this informal analysis of these first "A" passages

more rigorous in the following way.

Consider these statements from

.
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analysis.

Joey... adds one of the given
numbers to 10 and then

makes a series of inferences
about other sums.

by reducing the first addend
and the sum..."

The Inferences are made
Here and throughout the

analysis there is no careful
distinction between Joey's snoken
on the one hand and the flow,
of his ideas on the other.

The word 'Infer-

ence' above, for example, slurs
these two categories together because
it can be taken to mean a verbal
statement In a certain form or to mean
3.

certain kind, of thought process
This problem stems in part from a natural
but misleading tendency

to identify human ideas with verbal
statements

- a

volves treating human thoughts as static objects.

tendency which inBut here we take the

point of view that verbal statements are expressions
derived from thought

processes of the speaker that flow in time.
cesses, not static objects.

These thoughts are pro-

And verbal statements must be interpreted

by the listener in terms of the listener's knowledge.

We therefore have

two potentially distorting transformations occurring along the path
from
the thoughts of the subject to the thoughts
in the listening observer.

-

the 'communicated meanings'

So it does not make sense to identify verbal

statements with thought patterns in the speaker, and we can claim no
direct access to another person's thoughts through language.
The best we can do in talking about someone else's cognitive pro-

cesses is to try to model those processes.

This involves making an

educated guess, but it is possible to become more and more 'educated'
as one becomes more familiar with the particular person's behavior.
In that case the model of the person's cognitive processes can be re-

fined to fit more and more observations.

In order to do this system-
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atically it is necessary to
make explicit the steps by
„hlch
the characteristics of another
person's thought from his verbal
and
non-verbal behavior.

^

We can take a more rigorous
approach by separating as clearly
as
possible our observations of external
behavior from our statements
about internal thought processes
that can account for the behavior.
To
do this we can list observed features
of A1

appear to be similar types of solutions.

£ attern for Joe y-

,

A2, and A3 that make them

We call this list a behavior

Here the word 'pattern' refers both to
observed

-

similarities in Joey’s actions at different times
and observed similarities in the situations in which these actions
occur.

An observed be-

havior pattern, once established, suggests the presence
of an internal
mental organization

- it

suggests that the subject is going through a

similar kind of cognitive process in each case.

For the passages

labeled A above these two entities will be referred to as the 'decre-

menting from 10 behavior pattern' and the 'decrementing from 10 thought
process,' respectively.
To begin analysis, we first attempt to define the behavior pattern

by singling out 'surface' similarities between the passages that are

relatively independent of our own interpretations of Joey's thought
processes as follows:

Behavior patterns

:

1.

In each comment Joey refers to adding one

of the original addends to 10 in the form '10
of the two addends appears at M.

3-

+

M is

N.

'

He verbally relates the summation

involving 10 to the original problem in a single sentence,
lates '10 + A =

B'

The smaller

2.

to '9 + A = (B-l)," then to '8 + A = (B-2

h

.

He re-

'

and

,
)

,
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continues in this fashion until
the original problem,
or the same problem with addends reversed,
is stated with its
solution.
Similarities between the situations
in which Joey behaves
this way
include:
5. the fact that he is
asked to comment on his answer
to an
addition problem done 'in his head'
(without paper or manipulatives)
6. he is responding to a
question like "how did you do that
(problem)?";
7.

the pairs to be added consist
of the digit 9 or 8 and another
digit.
As one defines this behavior pattern
one can begin to model the

vay Joey conceptualizes these

3

problems by characterizing thought pro-

cesses that can explain his behavior these will be called thought

process

characteristics

:

1.

the fact that he sometimes restates a prob-

lem with addends reversed indicates that he
does not distinguish between

problems of the form a+b=? and b+a=? as having
different answers;
2.

the fact that he brings in sums of the form 10+a
and the fact that

he treats them as givens (he does not feel a need to
justify the answer

to 10+a) indicates that a familiar sub-process is involved
in doing

summations of this form.
3*

His statement in A1

,

Now 9 is one less than 10 so it's se—

seventeen," along with the sequential order in which he states related
sums in A2

,

indicates the existence of another thought process which

relates the summation 10+A to the original problem via a sequence of

intermediate sums.
The behavior pattern and the thought process characteristics given
above constitute a more rigorous analysis of the behavior in question
by maintaining a distinction between observations and theory.

To be

sure, as in all scientific work, the observations reported depend on
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the particular aspects the
observer attends to.

And as in any science

there is no way to logically
deduce theoretical models (of
cognitive
processes in this, case) from
observations - the models are always
hypothetical models. But the separation
of observation and theory allows
US in principle to agree on
observed phenomena to be explained.
Alternate theoretical models can then
be evaluated on the basis of how
well
and how much of these phenomena are
accounted for.

In addition, the

separation of observations and theory has
heuristic value in that it
gives the analyst two levels at which to
work.

New findings at one

level can trigger a breakthough at the other
level, in either direction.

Note 2

:

A more rigorous analysis here would be:
1.

In each of the

^

passages Joey reports an answer 10 higher

than the sum or difference of the digits in the one's places of the
numbers in the original addition or subtraction problem.
comments in B1 and

both refer to a related problem

subtraction of single digits.

-

2.

Joey's

an addition or

These digits correspond to the digits in

the one's place of the numerals in the original problem (we do not
at this point infer that Joey is thinking about written numerals or

the one's place, but these concepts are used to give us a preliminary

way to describe the pattern in his behavior).

3-

The numbers in the

single digit problem are given in the same corresponding order as the

initial problem - as in BU:

"6+5 is 11 so l6+5 probably is 21."

Similarities in the situations in which Joey exhibits this behavior include:

U.

Joey is asked to comment on how he found the an-
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sver to a problem done 'in his
hea d.'

5

.

The pairs to be SUImned Qr
sub _

tracted include one number in the
teens and another number in the
teens
or a digit.

Th ought Process Characteristics

:

From the fact that Joey brings in

the summed digit problems in B1
and BU and the fact that they are
ex-

pressed as single phrases and related
to the original problem with the
'

causal

'

expressions 'because' and 'so', we suspect
that

1.

Joey thinks

about 6+5=11 and 8-7=1 as independent
calculations and that he has par-

ticular thought processes that deal with these
calculations relatively
easily.

2

.

Because the simpler related problems correspond
to digits

in the one's place of the original problems we
also suspect that Joey

has some process for relating the original problem (with
answer S) to

the simpler problem (with answer T) that causes him to report an
an-

swer S, where S— 10+T.

But in terms of the data we have here, it is un-

clear whether this process involves ideas of place value, or adding
and subtracting 10 , or the way l 6 'sounds like' or 'looks like' 6 for
example.

Note

3

:

Again we can proceed more rigorously as follows:

Behavior patterns

:

1.

In each case Joey is asked 'how he got' the

answer to a subtraction problem given orally.
ranged from
3.

3 to l 6

2.

The numbers involved

.

In Cl and C2 his comments refer to a related addition problem

275

where the subtrahend Is added to the
difference to equal the minuend.
This summation is treated as a 'given'
by him, that is, no Justifica-

tion is provided.

In C3, we also find a summation, but
in this case

it is a double summation (6+2=8, 8+1=9).

Thought process chara cteristics

notion of ’adding
that’s 9.*

2.

3 to 6’

:

1.

We infer that Joey has some

in mind when he says

'6+2 is 8, add one more,

Furthermore we infer that for Joey, thinking about these

subtraction problems somehow activates mental structures associated

with the inverse addition problem.

In his responses to questions about

how he gets an answer, these structures tend to dominate any other ways
he may have for thinking about subtraction such as ’counting down' or

repeatedly removing

1

from the minuend.
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appendix

II

COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS

Complete transcripts are included in this
appendix for those

pro.

tocols which appeared previously in shortened
form.

Barry

--

"Sharing 15 Stones"

5/9/75

Full Transcript
1

B:

(Roads from card) Jim and his 4 friends found a green
paper
hag about 2 feet away from a rabbit hole.
Inside they found
15 green stones.
They want to share them equally.
How many
green stones should each one get?"
I

Four
friend.

2

[says this to himself] they’d have to have another

3

I:

They would?

U

B:

Uh huh (i: Why?)

5

I:

Show me why there isn't, why you think it isn't.

6

B:

15 isn't a equal number.

7

I:

Isn't an equal number - what does that mean?
you mean.

8

B:

I

9

I:

Show me what you'd do on paper for that one. Were you ever in
that situation where you had to split up something with some
So you each got an equal amount?
friends?
(B: Uh huh.)

10

B:

Un uh.

11

I:

Do you understand what they have to do?
ing to do?

12

B:

They have to have another friend (smiles).

13

I:

ll4

B:

There - there isn't the equally stones.

I

don't know what

could multiply.

I

didn't have an equal amount.
Or what they're try-

OK now, show me - tell me why they have to have another friend
but
I don't know what you mean - I think I know what you mean
I'm not sure.
(19 s.) Mmm -

I

could multiply

-

times 15-

)

)
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15

I:

16

B:

You can?

You think that would solve
the problem for them?

15

times U equals
5 times ^ is 20 zero
carry the 2 ^ times 1 is 1 (writes
6)
un uh -

15
x U

60

17

I:

What’s wrong?

18

B:

Too high a number.

19

I:

Too high a number:

20

B:

60? (Looks at I. and smiles
I could divide maybe.

21

I:

Well, give that a try.

22

B:

15 - divided by k (writes "15 tU=")
U divided by 1 -

23

I:

What d you say -

2h

B:

Uh, it won't go into 1 so
4 divided by 15 -

25

I:

Yeah -

26

B:

3

27

I:

How'd you get 3?

28

B:

Cause -

29

I:

OK

30

B:

—

*

1

I

have to go by 15.

1.

by 15 (looks at worn t on paper ._
could do it like thi
(writes U 1 5
k - and divide by 15 But it doesn't go into
U divided by 15 equals
x 3 - minus - 12
equals - that'd be - 3
now get U
and that's the answer.
)

5

—

Which is?

i5-:-U=

i+?

doesn't go into

1)

I:

How do you know?

times (writes 3).

I

31

Why?

1
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32

B:

That (points to

33

I:

Where?

34

B:

Right here - points again to the

3

underneath the 12).

3

underneath the 12) the

35

I:

OK now, how do you know that's the
answer?

36

B:

I

37

I:

And what - do you think that's a good answer?
I mean
that solve their problem? What is their
problem?

38

B:

To get rid of one of their friends (laughs).

39

I:

They have a problem

4o

B:

Or gain a friend.

4l

I:

Or gain a friend? Why?
you think that will help.

42

B:

Mmm - 4, 5, 6 (staring at wall)
green stones.

43

I:

OK.

44

B:

They could leave one.

45

I:

They could leave one stone?

46

B:

Uh huh.

47

I:

Then what would happen?

48

B:

Then there 'd be equally stones.

49

I:

Oh, show me how that works.

50

B:

3.

always do that in math.

-

will

why do they have to get rid of a friend?

I

don't

-

-

I

want you to tell me why

there's (looks at text) 15

Is that what you mean?

Here's the stones - 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, l4, 15 - (draws 15 circles)

51

I:

OK - they're green, right.

52

B:

15 take away 4 - (writes)
15, l4, 13, 12, 11 (puts out
1. hand as he counts).

53

I:

15
4

fingers on

-

4

Is that what you were thinking of before or did you just think

of that?
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5b

B:

I

55

I:

That's what you were thinking
of before? 15 take away I thought you were doing
dividing before -

just -

I

was thinking it before.

56

B:

I

57

I:

Did you use that?

58

B:

I

59

I:

OK, show me what you were thinking.

6o

B:

One (writes 1
(Writes 1 to left of first one).

was, but

I

?

was thinking that (points to
subtraction work).

was thinking of that too.

^

)

.

_

Ahhh -

t

YT

6i

I:

What happened?

62

B:

I

63

I:

Yeah

6b

B:

Uh huh.

65

I:

Yeah - now

66

B:

Hmmm -

67

I:

We were thinking about, a, why
need to get an extra friend -

68

B:

Uh huh.

69

I:

Or get rid of one? Does this (written subtraction) have something to do with that or is this something else?

70

B:

Hmmm - (speaking to himself) What can

71

I:

Well, why don’t you read the problem again and just make sure
So far you answer is what?

72

B:

A,

goofed - that was 11.
is that what you thought it was going to -

-

what else?

-

you said they - they might

I

do now?

11.

(Rereads problem)
(clicks fingers) Got it.

(7 s.)

15

plus U
Just now 5 plus U is
U plus 1 is

15
+ 1

9-

—

5.

Un uh, un uh, un uh.

59
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I:

What

7U

B:

Too high.

75

I:

Too high? Now how do you know it's
too high
thing wrong?

76

B:

(

'

s

wrong?

is there some-

Corrects answer to read 19)

15
+

ii

19

77

I

Made a mistake?

78

B

Uh huh.

79

I

19? - Does that look right?

80

B

Un uh (shakes head).

8l

I

How come?

82

B

Cause 19

83

I

this is a problem. We can multiply, or divide, or
subtract, or add.
Or maybe something else, I don't know.
And
how do you decide which one to do?
How can you decide that,
Barry?

'

s

too high of a number.

i

—

Qh

B:

I

don't know.
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Roy - "Sharing, Six Candies" Protocol

11/21/7*4

Full Transcript
R:

(Reads from card) Jim got 6 candies from his
mother to - to share with his 2 sisters, Kim and
Marla.
At - at school Marla already had some candies
and Kim was very hungry because she has missed
lunch.
He gave 1 candy to Kim and 2 to Marla.
Do you think
that was fair?"

R:

Yeah.

I:

You do?

R:

Uh huh - it was 6 and he gave 2 to Kim and 2 to Marla
and then take away 6 is 2 and they each got 2.
*4

I:

OK — What happened? Jim had — tell me again why you
think it's fair - I didn't get all your reasons.

R:

Like here's Kim and here is - how do you spell Marla?
(looks back at text for spelling) - Marla, and here is
Jim (writes the 3 names in a row on paper), and urn -

Jim had
(writes "1" under "Jim") and he gave 2 to
Marla (writes "2" under "Marla") and 2 to Kim (writes
"2" under "Kim") and then 4 take away - no - he had 6
*4

8

and he gave 2 to Marla and he had
and he gave 2 to
Kim and he'd have 2 back (writes " 2" under "Jim") and

9

then take away (crosses out
they each got 2.

10

14

I:

How did they get 2?

11

R:

Because a -

12

I:

No,

13

R:

Urn

1*4

I:

Anyway it was fair?

15

R:

Uh huh

16

I:

And what makes it fair?

17

R:

I

"V

under "Jim ") and then

Kim

Marla

Jim

2

2

K

see what you're saying, but I don't
you to tell
I

2

urn.

—

just told you right here.

—

I

want

s

.

282
18

I:

Because they each got

19

R

Uh huh

20

I.

Want to check it?

21

R:

I

22

R.

(Reads problem again silently, then begins to
read aloud
1 to Kim and 2 to Marla
"
No
way!
(raises voice) He gave 1 to Kim and 2 to Marla.

:

2.

Or are you sure?

wanna check it.

—

—

23

I:

So you read it wrong?

24

R:

I

25

I:

So now you have a new problem.
about that now?

26

R:

(No response)

27

I:

You think he gave 2 to Kim?

28

R:

No -

29

I:

What'd he do?

30

R:

He gave 1^ to Kim and he gave two to Marla and Marla
got 2 more - than Kim, and, oh, how much did Jim have
left (move lips, whispers "take away").
He took away

read it wrong.

I

What do you think

thought he did but he didn't.

he took away 3 so he had 6.
He had 3 left.
2 and Kim had 1, and
plus 2 plus 1 is

31

3-3

32

I:

So does that tell you anything?

33

R

Uh huh

34

I:

What?

35

R

Huh - forgot

36

I:

37

R:

:

:

)

-

Marla had
6.

I mean - a - different
It's a hard problem isn't it?
people could have different opinions on this, I think.
There isn't always just one answer. Depends on what you
think.
So why don't you read it to me again and tell
It's an interesting problem.
me what you think is fair.

(Rereads silently) (Bangs pen down and smiles) I read
Marla already had some candies and that's that
it wrong again!
'

d
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38

I

Marla already had some candies?

39

R

Uh huh - so (writes new row of the

1*0

I

Did you know that before?

1*1

R

Uh uh.

b2

R

Mm, and how many candies did Marla have?
gave something to 2 - and

b3

I

Something to -

bb

R

He gave 2 to Marla, and then
See Marla had
is 5 (writes 5 under Marla's name).
Jim only had he had - he had - 3 left (writes 3 under "Jim”)

3

names)

[no]

And he

3+2

Kim only had one (writes 1 under "Marla") and that's
not fair - cause Marla got the most.

1*5

U6.

I

So you think it wasn't fair?

1*7

R

I

1+8

I

How come?

1*9

R

Because um, if - if Marla' d already brung some candy
to school he should 'a - Jim should 'a gave - should've
gave - gave a - _3 to Kim, but it's never be fair because

don't think it was fair.

50

I

That's what you think

51

R

It's never be fair because Jim had 6, Marla had 5
and Kim had - had only one.
And if Jim gave b to
she
have
and
he'd have - Jim'd only
Marla, then
5
have 2
and then you keep on going and you'd never
make it fair.

-

OK - Never be fair?

'

guess.

52

I

It'd be hard to be fair,

53

R

Uh huh.

5 1*

I

How did Marla get 5?

55

R

Cause her - she probably had bought some before
they got to school.

56

I

And Jim gave her
so she got 5*

57

R

Uh huh.

—

I

one candy - he gave 2 to Marla,

-

.

.

28U

Roy - "Up Tangerines" Protocol

11/21/7**

Full Transcript
1

I:

2

R:

3
k

Let’s try this one.
(Reads ) "A truck driver loads Uo
tangerines in
box holds an equal number of tangerines."
(Says softly to himself) Oh, I bet I
know
(Continues reading) "Each tangerine - "

l^ach

5

boxes,

—

5

6

I:

What?

7

R:

I

bet

m

is

I know what I'm gonna do, I'm gonna
see how
each box.

-

how much there

8

I:

Oh, OK.

9

R:

(Reads)
Each box holds an equal number of tangerines.
Each tangering weighs - 3 ounces
and each box - box measures 6" x 5" by 8"
How many tangerines are in each box?"

10
11
12
13

I

knew.

lU

1:

You did know, right.

15
16

R:

Uh huh.
So 5. boxes, !(} tangerines - oh boy.
It couldn t be (shakes head) equal - equal large numbers because
if it was
boxes it'd be 10_ in each
and 5. boxes it'd be
it'd have to be, it'd have to be 50.
It couldn't
(interrupts)
1

—

17
18
19

—

—

20

1:

There 'd have to be 50 tangerines?

21
22

R:

It's thirty-fi
(points to "10" on page) thirty
no thirty
wait (interrupts)
how many are in each box (continues to look
at text )

23

I:

What are you looking at now?

2k
25
26
27

R:

On this (points to first 2 sentences of written problem) hO tangerines in 5 boxes (stretches).
1|0 - take away 35 in each box.

28

I:

35?

29

R:

No (shakes head) it couldn't be 35-

—

—

—

—

-

.
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3o

I:

Why couldn't it be?

31

R:

(Asks) 15 in each box?

32

I:

Mow'd you get 15?

33

R:

Because uh,

3h

I:

It's OK to guess, T mean, this is a
hard problem for 3rd grade,
But I'd be interested in how you guess.

35

R:

I

36

I:

oo 15 is a guess?

37

R:

Uh huh.
15 is a guess.

38

I:

Could you check it?

39

R:

OK.

1*0

I

don't know,

(Looks at I.)

don't know.

I

just Or do you have some way of

See if it's right?

—

Uo tanger
(begins to draw)I'm gonna go - there's a - (whispers) box (draws
squares
(Drawing boxes) One, two.

5

large

)

1*1

1*2

I:

What's that?

1*3

R:

Those are the boxes - three, four, five.
OK. - and there's 1*0 tangerines one, two (puts 2 dots next to first box) oh, wait - (Interrupts)
Let's see, if there's (Points to each box as if counting)
(Points again to first box and I think T hear him whisper

UU
1*5

1*6
1*7

1*8
1*9

50

I:

Fifty wha/t?

51
52
53

R:

15 (points to first box) 32 (points to second box) No, it's 30, 15 and 30 -

5l*

I:

15 and 15 are 30, yes.

55
56

R:

And forty-five (separate wordsO
Nope, it's too over.

57

I:

What happened?

58
59

R:

It's equals 35 plus 15 35 plus 5 is 1*0

-

(points to 3rd box).

”50".)

)
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6o
6l

and there's - there wouldn't be
the equal amount there's be like 1 2 3 4
5 * 6,
f, 8, 9, 10 (puts 10 dots
in first box).
,

62
63

,

,

,

10 (puts 10 dots in s «°nd box).
10 (10 In third).
Thirty (sweeps pen over 3 boxes).
1> 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
10 (10 dots in 4th box).
,
11 1 "' 1
tHere ’ (Cr ° 5SeS ° Ut
10
’

1
l’
1,2,

61*

65
66

3,

>!’

U,

I'
5,

!’ o’
6, T, 8,

’

,

^

'

iffourth^x)''-'

67
68
69
70
71

9
9

there ’d only be 1 2 3, 4, 5 (puts
5 more dots in fourth box)
and 5 tangerines, 1, 2, 3, 4,
5 (puts 5 dots in fifth box) and 5 tangerines in that one that makes 40 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 (points to each box).
,

,

72

I:

OK - Fifty?

73
74
75

R.

10, 20,

76

I:

What would happen if there were 4?

77
78
79

R:

Then - if we took away that one (crosses out fourth box)
10 20 , 30, 40 (points to boxes 1 2 3 5 ).
and we put 10 (puts 5 more dots in box 5 whispering " 1
4, 5-") - and we put 10 in that one (points fourth box),
and 10 , 20 30, k0_ (points boxes),
and 40 in there, that means 4 boxes.

30 - 35
40 (points to each box).
It'd be five - if that'd be It d be right if it was 4_ boxes but — not five.
,

,

,

,

,

80
81

-

,

,

2

,

,

82

I:

Does this help you down here? The other stuff? (points to
sentence in written problem: "Each tangerine weighs 3 ounces
and each box measures 6" by 5" by 8"."

83

R

Uh uh.

84

I

Think that's extra: or

85

R

86

I

What if we had a - 15 tangerines instead of 40?

87

R

- Uh - there 'd be 3 boxes and 5 in each.

88

I

Would that work?

89

R

Uh uh (no) - yeah.

90

I

But what if we really had 15 tangerines and we had

91

R

Ya couldn't do that.

(

—

inaudible

5

boxes?

3

,

s

.
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92

I:

Couldn't split 'em up?

93

R:

Ya couldn't split 'em up.

94

I:

Yeah.
What if we put uh - 4 in each of these
boxes - how many would
we have (points to drawn boxes)? If I
pu t 1 here (points box l),
4 (points to box 2) -

96

R:

4 - 4,

8

97

I:

In all

5 -

98
99

R:

- 20 (points to each square) 8, 12, - 16
it's be 20 - in each box.

100

I:

20 in each -

101
102

R:

(Shakes head) Five in each box.
It'd it'd be 20 in all the boxes if there was one big box together.

103

I:

OK.

,

into
104

R:

105

(points to boxes 1, 2).

So if

I

boxes

5

had 15 and I wanna put 'em - I wanna divide 'em up
- is there any way to do that?

(Whispers "15 divided up into 5 boxes.") No.
It wouldn't be
equal
wait - (picks up pen) if they could go by two
(get new sheet
of paper to draw on).
(Stares at written problem.)
(Draws 4 squares [smaller])
2, 4, 6, 8 (puts 2 dots in each).
(Draws 5th square and 2 dots) 12, that'd (Draws 6th and 2 dots) l4, that'd never be right
(Draws 7th square and a dot) 15, one that'd be one to make 15-

—

'

106
107
108
109
110
111
112

I:

Kay.

113
114

R:

4,

So this would be 2 - (points 1st square)

—

(points squares),
6, 8, 10, 12
(Puts 2nd dot in 7th square), (draws 8th square and

1

dot in

it)
-

What if we put

115

I:

’Kay.

116
117

R:

Um - 5?

I:

What happened?

118
119

120

3

in each?

(Draws 5 squares)
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (puts 3 dots in 1st), 6 - a or 3, 6, 9, 12,
15 (putting 3 dots in each square)
that'd be right.
So there 'd be - there'd be 15
(Pause 1 sec.) (looks up) Oh boy.
in each box.

.

121

R:

There - (pause

122

I

What

123

R:

124

I:

:

I

'

4

sec.) oh (blank look).

wrong?

s

forget.

^

I

^

can't 15 tangerines in

5

boxes?

that?
125

We could - could we do

Uh buh.
Kay.
Let s see:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (Draws
Vruts 13 dots in first square, counting)
.

5

squares)

126

I.

(Interrupts) No, I said I - if we had 15 altogether
could we put
em into 5 boxes - could we split 'em up?

127
128

R:

(Pause 2 sec.) No.
Yes, By 3's.

129

I

By 3's?

130

R:

Yeah.

131

I:

Where?

132

R:

Like there's - is

133

I:

What'd you think

134

R:

I

135
136

I:

Or you just didn't think of it?
Why did you say "no" before?

137

R:

I

138

I:

You for-got, OK.

139

R:

There 'd. be 15 in each box.

l4o

I:

OK, we better go up to get lunch.

:

(Pause 2 sec.)

3,
I

6, 9,

12, 15

(pointing to squares

meant before when you said "no"?

donknow.

donknow

- I

was guessing.

OK.

)
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Fig. 27

Roy's Drawing #2
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Kathy - "Sharing 15 Candies "

11/7/75

Full Transcript

Section A
1

I*

Here's one about um, sharing.

2

K:

Hmm?

3

I:

Sharing.

h

K:

Sharing a cake?

I

What's her name (referring to drawing of a girl on a bike) the
girl on the bike — what shall we name her?
(pause)
What's her
name?

6

K:

Alicia.

7

I:

Alicia
Alicia has some candy.
here's Alicia- and here are her

—

In a box, ok?
3

—

friends (draws

3

She has circles)

8

K:

But that's only 2 friends.

9

I:

I

10

K:

How many pieces of candy are there in it?

11

I:

And they - and they each

12

K:

(Pause) About 55 pounds.

13

I:

OK.

lU

K:

What does that matter? How many pounds are they gonna weigh
(Laughs)
after they eat all that candy?

15

I:

No - the question is

16

K:

Right.

17

I:

They're all eight years old.

18

K:

That means they're exactly the same.
ing to each drawn circle).

19

I:

They want to split up the candy

20

K:

How many pieces of candy are there?

mean her 2 friends, ok, so they're
she wants to urn,

-

3

of them.

OK?—

and

how much do they weigh?

"55" next to each
55 pounds, ok? (Writes

They each weigh

—

oh, and how old are they?

Eight, right?

(Writes "8" next to each circle)

- to

Same, same, same.

make it fair.

(point-

/
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21

I:

How many should they each - how many
should they

22

K:

How many pieces of candy are there?

23

I:

There re 15.

get—

for each?

'

Section B
2b

K:

8

Mmmm, this is gonna be hard.
vertical lines on paper)

55

(Draws 15

1,2,3,!+, 5, 6,

7,8,9,10,11,12,13,1)4,15 and, you put 3, no that wouldn't work,
(taps finger quickly in air over "A"
3 times and pauses; repeats over "B"
and C , counting aloud as she reaches
group "C") 1,2,3- that wouldn't work.
25

I*

You're going to put 3?

26

K:

That wouldn't work.

27

I:

Why wouldn't it work?

28

K:

Cause you'd have- you're gonna- each one would get 3, and that
wouldn't work because there would be candy left over.

29

I

There would?

30

K:

'Cause

31

I:

Oh, you marked off 3?

32

K:

(puts 3 check marks over first 3 lines
and over 2 more groups of 3 lines)
1,2,3; 1,2,3; 1,2,3

:

I

What do you mean?

Tell me what you were going to try

How do you know?

tried it.

33

I:

What were those little things on top?

3*4

K:

Candies

35

I:

Oh, but you were drawing- these are checks?

36

K:

Yeah, checks so-

37

I:

Oh, ok, so you have some left over?

38

K:

Yeah

39

I:

So you can't give 3 to each.

,

v/

j

jJj J

/

)
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Section
Uo

K:

C

(Draws a new row of 15 lines)
1>2,3,^,5,6,7 ,8,9,10,11,12,13,114 ,15
(I. counts them as well)
Now we'll try 5, we're gonna skip 4
I

.

bi

I:

What makes you think 5?

h2

K:

Nothing- (laughs)

b3

I:

Well why skip 4, hoy, you sure are mean to

kb

K:

Because

—

well maybe

—

I

I4

.

don't know.

Section D
b5

I:

OK, see if you can figure it out in your head first and
then if you can't, we'll do it on paper.
Is there any
way-to figure it out in your head?

b6

K:

We have to fraction something, but
have to do some fraction.

bl

I:

What's that?

bQ

K:

When ya,- how much
fractioning is
of a pound
is some fraction.

b9

I:

You think we have to fraction here?

50

K:

What you have
No, but I don't know what you have to do.
do is make little marks on paper and figure it out.

51

I:

OK, go ahead; what were you going to try?

—

I

—

don't even know how-

— is

like

—

Section E
52

K:

Well, I'll try U since you convinced me.
(Draws a new group of 15 lines.)
(Puts 3 groups of U checks over new line of 15(Moving lips)

53

I:

Say it out loud.

5l+

K:

—

3,^; 1,2,3,U.
see, I should have skipped and made

Section F
55

I:

How many are - why 5?

5.

one third

)

29b
56

K:

Maybe it would have been fifour and a half.

57

I:

Can you tell ahead of time
whether

58

K:

5

laughs

will work?

Yes- no it won't— yes it will 'cause there
3 more candies, so it will
work.

59

I:

Left over at the end?

60

K:

Yeah.

6l

I:

Why should

62

K:

'Cause there's 3 people and 3 more candies,
and so that if you did 5 there 'd be 1
more
candy for each person and 5 would work.

5

(

s

work just because of that?

Section G
63

So
(counts to 15 while drawing new set of 15 marks)
,
(Writes 3 groups of 5 check marks over the 15 lines)
1*2, 3, ^,5; 1*2,3, ^,5; 1,2, 3, ^,5, it worked!
.

6b

I:

Far out.

65

K:

So each of them would get 5 (points to lines)
5,5,5
(writes "5" in each circle) And there's the answer
right there, 55 lbs. (points to " 55 " written next to
one circle)
(laughs)

66

I:

55- what's the real answer?

67

K:

5

68

I:

OK.
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